

**CHILDREN'S MORAL DEVELOPMENT**  
**EXAMINED THROUGH**  
**KOHLBERG'S HYPOTHETICAL DILEMMAS AND FABLES**

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## *To God*

*But who am I, that I should be able to give as generously as this?*

*Everything comes from you,*

*and I have given you only what comes from your hand*

*1 Chronicles 29:14*

*I love you, O Lord, my strength*

*The Lord is my rock, my fortress and my deliverer;*

*my God is my rock, in whom I take refuge*

*He is my shield and the horn of my salvation, my stronghold*

*Psalm 18: 1-2*

## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to investigate children's development of moral reasoning on the basis of Kohlberg's theory. The study consists of two main studies, using different methods. In the first study using Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas, Form A, a total of 128 Korean and British children aged 7 to 16 years participated in order to investigate the development of moral stages, use of moral orientations, differences in chosen issues, and unscorable responses with Kohlberg's criteria judgments. The second study has been conducted to supplement the findings of the first study through using fables as an alternative method. Unlike the first study, however, the second study focused on only Korean children's moral development so that 160 Koreans aged 7 to 16 years were examined in terms of the moral stages, use of moral orientations, and unscorable responses through analysing their spontaneous responses to fables. In addition, their ability to generate morals from fables was also explored in order to provide further information on children's moral development and ascertain the use of fables as an alternative method to assess moral development.

As a result, the children in both studies showed similar developmental trends in moral stages regardless of their gender and cultural background. Regarding moral orientations, the findings indicate that the children's use of moral orientations also developed with age and that academic achievement level could affect development. Besides, the children tended to use the orientations differently according to cultural background. Cultural differences were also found in the chosen issues. Some responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system imply that there are some concepts peculiar to Koreans and hence that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is applicable but insufficient for Korean children even at young ages. Thus, the present suggests that not only Kohlberg's theory but also other theories such as theories of domain specificity and cultural psychology should be considered in order to fully understand the moral development. Lastly, the lack of ability of the 7 year old children to generate morals from fables suggests that it might be better to use

modified fables rather than fables intact as an alternative method, especially with young children.



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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW**

Although morality has been defined in various ways, most people agree that it refers to an ability to distinguish between what is right and wrong and to act according to this distinction. Many psychologists have carried out research on moral development based on the assumption that an individual develops morality. They focus on different aspects of morality, such as moral affect, moral reasoning and moral behaviour, depending on their theories. Psychoanalytic theorists have tended to confine their research to emotional aspects of morality. Freud (1960) claimed that the superego, one of the basic components of personality, leads individuals to have negative feelings such as anxiety, guilt and shame when they are morally wrong and that individuals can develop morality through making an effort to avoid these negative feelings. Social learning theorists (e.g. Bandura, 1973; Hoffman, 1970; Sieber, 1980) concentrate on moral behaviours such as aggression, cheating, sharing, and helping. They assume that all these behaviours are acquired through the principles of stimulus and response as well as imitation. Cognitive theorists have emphasised how children judge acts as “right” or “wrong” and explain their judgments.

Rest (1983) proposes a four-step process in executing a moral action, which show how these different aspects of morality across the different approaches work together. According to him, when faced with a situation, individuals interpret the situation in

terms of how their actions would affect the welfare of others. Secondly, the individuals figure out what the ideal moral course of action would be. As the next step, the individuals decide what they actually intended to do and, finally, they execute and implement the moral plan of action. The present study mainly focuses on the development of moral judgment and moral reasoning, which are included in the first two steps of moral conduct in Rest's four-step process, and cast them in the light of cognitive developmental perspectives.

One of the most influential approaches to cognitive development is Piaget's. According to Piaget (1952, 1960), individuals construct their reality or intellectual "structures" through interaction with their physical and social environment. He proposed that children's thinking evolves through a set of qualitatively different stages. The current stage does not simply reflect knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it. Rather, it represents an underlying thought organization which appears across various tasks. Furthermore, because later stages presuppose the attainment of the earlier stages, it is assumed that individuals pass through each stage in order. Each stage of development represents a qualitative recognition of the individual's pattern of thought, and the patterns of thought at later stages are more complex, differentiated, and adaptive than those at prior stages. Accordingly, later stages displace or integrate the structures constructed at previous stages.

Piaget applied the above principles and process of cognitive growth to children's moral development (1932/1965) as well as to intellectual development. Piaget's analysis of morality centres on the concept of justice, which prescribes how reciprocity among individuals is to be balanced. Piaget hypothesized his theory of

moral development on the basis of Kant's work (1785/1948) on moral autonomy and his view on the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, and Baldwin's theory (1899/1973) that attainment of autonomy in moral judgment is a developmental achievement. In order to ascertain his hypothesis, he examined moral development by examining children's attitudes towards rules during marble games and their judgment of the seriousness of transgressions concerning moral dilemmas in the form of stories. Based on the findings obtained from these two experiments, he formulated a theory of moral development that includes a premoral period and two moral stages - heteronomous morality and autonomous morality - which are developmentally sequenced.

According to Piaget, children as young as 4 years old are at premoral period. In a game of marbles, Piaget observed that the children tended to use idiosyncratic or shifting rules or even did not use rules at all. Thus, this period is characterized by children's little concern for, or awareness of, rules.

At the ages 4 to 5, the beginning of heteronomous morality, children develop strong concern and respect for rules. However, they seem to regard rules as moral absolutes, that is, they understand rules to be immutable, rooted in external authority, such as parental authority. Children at this stage also believe in immanent justice, the belief that wrongdoing inevitably leads to punishment. For instance, if a child who had lied to his mother fell off his bike and skinned his knee later on, the child might conclude that this injury was punishment he deserved for his wrongdoing even though there was no connection between the two episodes. Children are also apt to assess behaviour in terms of objective responsibility rather than intentionality. That



is, if an actor is punished for his act, children tend to assume that the actor must be wrong regardless of the good or bad intentions of the actor. Piaget claims that children remain at the stage of heteronomous morality because of two cognitive deficits: egocentrism and realistic thinking. Egocentrism refers to an inability to perceive situations from the perspectives of others, while realistic thinking means the tendency to confuse external reality with one's own thought processes and subjective experiences.

By age 9 to 11 the morality of most children begins to shift to a higher stage, autonomous morality, in accordance with their cognitive maturation and the increase of social experiences. At this stage children understand social rules and show great concern for equality and reciprocity in human relationships, and regard these two characteristics as the basis of justice. In other words, children now recognize that social rules are arbitrary agreements which can be questioned and changed and that obedience to authority is neither necessary nor always desirable. Children also begin to believe that violations of rules are not inevitably punished as their belief in immanent justice fades. With regard to punishment for wrong behaviour, children take account of the intentions of the wrongdoer and the nature of transgression rather than the objective consequences. Thus they tend to think that the punishment should be given in the form of restitution that will make up for harm done or make the wrongdoer less likely to repeat it.

Although it is true that Piaget's theory of moral development continues to stimulate an enormous amount of research, there are some limitations (Siegel, 1982). One of the limitations is that he concentrated on moral development only up to the age of 11

and paid little attention to the development after that age. Piaget's theory of moral development was extended to adulthood as well as modified and refined by Kohlberg (1981, 1984). He was profoundly influenced by Piaget and has contributed many new insights to the theory of moral development. He developed his theory based not only on Piaget's theory of cognitive moral development (1932/1965) but also on those of a number of moral philosophers, Rawls (1971), whose theory states that justice is seen as the fundamental principle of moral development and can be best characterized in terms of fairness. Kohlberg followed these theories and proposed a theory comprising three levels – the preconventional level, the conventional level and the postconventional level – of the development of moral reasoning, each of which were in turn divided into two substages, consequently generating the theory of six-stage moral development. He also developed hypothetical dilemmas in order to investigate the development of moral reasoning. Having cognitive developmental theory as his background, Kohlberg hypothesized that moral development is related to the development of general skills of rational reasoning, including deductive logic and the ability to distance oneself from what is personal, ego-centred or consensus-based. Thus the development of moral stages could mean the development of the cognitive ability to construct, and to transcend to a detached, impartial vantage point from which right and wrong are evaluated objectively. Moreover, he claimed that the development of moral reasoning is universal and that their sequence is invariant. This means that the moral stages develop in the same fixed order without skipping any stage for everyone in all cultures and groups.

Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) theory of moral reasoning has been examined in various cultural settings by many researchers, including Kohlberg himself, in order to test his

claim that the development of moral reasoning is universal. According to these studies, the claim of universality of the sequence of moral stages was supported by findings of many cross-cultural and longitudinal studies. Nevertheless, the claim of universality of the sequence allowed the possibility of differences in the rate and endpoint of the development of moral reasoning across variant cultures (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel, Edwards & Kohlberg, 1978; White, 1975; White, Bushnell & Regnemer, 1978).

Beyond suggesting the cultural differences in the rate and endpoint of moral stages, some researchers question Kohlberg's basic assumption of moral stages. Turiel and his colleagues (e.g. Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983; Turiel & Smetana, 1984), the domain-specificity theorists, criticized Kohlberg's assumption that moral stages and the moral understandings that determine them emerge out of conventional understandings (This is why Kohlberg denominated moral levels proposed by him as preconventional, conventional and post conventional levels). They found that children can distinguish between morality and convention during early childhood. Thus they suggest that children's moral and conventional understanding are different domains and the development exists within each domain. Moreover, Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1990), based on their study in India and US, also criticized Kohlberg's disregard of the crucial role of culture in development since he claims that justice is a single moral code and hence that the development of moral stages from preconventional level to postconventional level is universal. Shweder et al. (1990) place great emphasis on culture as an integral part of moral development. They argue that morally relevant interpretations of events (i.e. whether the event is morally right or wrong) vary across cultures, an argument long made by anthropologists who

noted cultural variations in judgment (e.g. Murdock, 1980). Besides, Shweder et al. (1990) indicate that the interpretations of local guardians (e.g. parents) on the events are typically presented and conveyed to young children through routine family life and social practices so that the children internalize the interpretations and gradually develop and reconstruct their own moral code. Thus, in contrast to Kohlberg, they propose that there is more than one way to rationalize a moral code across cultures. For instance, Indian Brahmins thought that not only in their culture but also in any other culture for a widow to eat fish is morally wrong and a great sin, while respondents in US considered it just a matter of convention. This does not mean that the Brahmins was not able to distinguish between moral and convention while the Americans was and hence that the former was at a less mature level of morality than the latter. Rather, it implies that the Brahmin and the American have different moral codes in some ways and hence their end-points of development are different. Therefore Shweder et al. (1990) claim that there may be alternative rationally based moral codes that Kohlberg does not illuminate and they question the universality of Kohlberg's moral stages. Other studies (e.g. Gilligan, 1982; Ma, 1988b) support the findings of Shweder et al. (1990) by providing different perspectives on moral development, which Kohlberg probably overlooked or could not figure out.

Many findings on cultural variations serve as a motive to examine the use of moral orientations in the present study. When moral orientations are considered, only a few studies have been conducted, and these have pointed out the difference in moral reasoning according to ethnic cultural background. Further, they argued that there were certain concepts which Kohlberg was not able to treat because of cultural uniqueness (Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Snarey, Reimer

& Kohlberg, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker & Moran, 1991). With respect to age, differences in moral orientation were also observed in some empirical studies (e.g. Tappan, Kohlberg, Schrader, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987; Walker, 1989). Unlike Gilligan's claim (1982) that Kohlberg's theory of moral development has gender bias, Walker's review (1986b) states that gender differences were apparent neither in moral orientations nor in moral stages. (Here, it is preferable to use "gender differences" rather than "sex differences" because the differences seem to be due to social influence rather than biological aspects.)

In order to confirm the universality of moral reasoning in terms of moral stages, and especially, moral orientations, more comparative studies across various cultures - including Western and non-Western cultures - are needed. British society is representative of the Western culture that influenced Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. On the other hand, Korea is a non-Western society which is still guided by the traditional maxims, such as Confucian ethics and Buddhism, in spite of the modernization of almost the whole country. For instance, the emphases on loyalty to the governing class, respect for elders, obedience to one's parents, courtesy in human relationships, and duty to the community over individual rights are all regarded as characteristics of Korean society generated from Confucian ethics. Thus, Korean society preserves a more traditional, conforming, authoritarian and status-oriented culture compared with Western society (Park & Johnson, 1984). A cross-cultural study between Korean and American children (Song, Smetana & Kim, 1987) partly supports the hypotheses of a greater emphasis in Korean society on cultural traditions, social status, and appropriate role behaviour than in Western societies, which could lead to cultural differences between Korea and Western societies in terms of moral

and social conventional orientations. In the light of these distinctive features of each society, a comparison between Koreans and the British in terms of the moral reasoning could provide further information on the universality of moral reasoning in terms of not only moral stages but also moral orientations.

In Korea, some empirical studies have already been carried out with reference to Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, but not his theory of moral orientations (e.g. Kang, 1994; Lee, 1981; Lee, 1985). Most studies were aimed at investigating relationships between the moral stage model and individuals' backgrounds such as age, gender, and socio-economic status, and showed similar results to studies carried out in other cultures. A limitation of these studies is that they did not inquire into aspects peculiar to Korean culture which might influence the development of moral reasoning.

Based on empirical studies, the present study makes the following hypotheses: First, both Korean and British children will show age differences in not only moral stages but also the use of moral orientations. Secondly, although the sequence of moral stages might be similar, there might be cultural differences between Korean and British children in terms of moral orientations due to the cultural variance. Lastly, there could be some concepts peculiar to Koreans that affects their moral reasoning but which Kohlberg has not illuminated. In order to test these hypotheses, the moral reasoning of Korean and British children will be compared by means of Kohlberg's methodology and hypothetical dilemmas. Furthermore, a further study using an alternative method, fables, is also conducted in order to supplement the findings of the study using Kohlberg's dilemmas.

Traditional tales such as folktales, myths, legends and fables were developed from

ancient times in order to explain the origin of the universe and natural phenomena and to pass down the group's history to the next generation (Norton, 1987). Inculcating morality of the group could be one of the important purposes of diffusing the tales and, especially for this purpose, fables could be widely used because of their characteristics. That is, fables are differentiated from other traditional tales in leading people toward a certain moral, often summarized at the end of the fable in a single line. Among fables, those of Aesop have been translated into various languages for children in many countries. The publication of Aesop's fables for children in various cultures could imply not only that Aesop's fables are one of the most familiar fables to children but also that their morals are generally acceptable in most societies. Thus it seems appropriate to use Aesop's fables and their morals as an alternative method of assessing moral reasoning.

There are previous empirical studies which have examined children's moral development through using fables. For instance, Chia (1993) and Dorfman & Brewer (1994) indicate that children develop an understanding of fables and their embedded morals based on their belief in a "just-world" during early childhood. Pillar (1983) states that the developmental patterns of the understanding of fables approximately coincides with those of Kohlberg's as well as Piaget's moral reasoning. Also, the relationship between children's cognitive and moral development (Lambrou, 1988) and Gilligan's moral orientations (Johnston, 1988; Daniels, D'Andrea & Heck, 1995) were examined by analysing children's responses to fables.

On the other hand, some studies point out that individuals' understanding of fables and their morals vary according to the content of fables and their own characteristics

such as age, gender and culture (e.g. Johnston, 1988; Lambrou, 1988; Lewis, 1993; Reinstein, 1983). The cultural differences in the understanding of fables and their morals suggest that Korean children would show peculiarity in terms of the understanding of fables in addition to the universal pattern of the understanding of fables.

Based on the literature review on children's understanding of fables and their morals, the second study of children's moral reasoning using fables was planned. In the second study, children's judgment regarding various aspects of fables such as characters, events and conclusion, as well as their ability to identify morals in fables, are examined. This has been conducted in order to supplement the findings on Korean children's reasoning obtained through using Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas and to explore the use of fables as an alternative method to assess children's moral reasoning.

In brief, the present study consists of two experiments using Kohlberg's dilemmas and fables respectively. The purpose of the present study is to examine the universality of Kohlberg's theory of moral development and the uniqueness of Korean children's moral reasoning by means of comparing the consistency and differences in moral reasoning, and to assess fables as an alternative to Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas for children.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL REASONING**

#### **2.1 THE 6 STAGES OF MORAL REASONING**

Kohlberg (1981) proposed three major levels in the attainment of moral understanding and divided each level into two stages; the preconventional level (stages 1 and 2), the conventional level (stages 3 and 4), and the principled or postconventional level (stages 5 and 6). These levels are differentiated from one another according to the individual's understanding of the relationship between the self and society's moral rules and expectations. According to Colby and Kohlberg (1987) the preconventional level is a perspective from which rules and social expectations are something external to the self. This level is found in the moral reasoning of most children under the age of 9, some adolescents and many adolescent and adult criminal offenders. Adolescents and adults in American society and in most other societies show the conventional level, in which the self is identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations of others, particularly those of authorities. Individuals in the postconventional level, who are a minority of adults usually aged over 20, are able to differentiate the self from the rules and expectations of others. They define moral values on the basis of self-chosen principles. Colby and Kohlberg argue that the conventional level does not mean that individuals at this level are unable to distinguish between morality and social convention but rather that morality consists of

socially shared systems of moral rules. In contrast, although individuals at postconventional level understand and generally accept the rules of the society, they accept the rules based on formulating and accepting the general moral principles that underlie these rules. Thus, when these principles conflict with the society's rules, the individuals at this level judge by principle rather than by convention. Those at preconventional level have not yet fully understood and accepted socially shared moral norms and expectations.

These three moral levels include two stages each. The social perspective and what is considered to be morally right in each moral stage are as follows. Also, Table 2.1.1 shows the characteristics of the six stages of moral development.

**Table 2.1.1** Six Stages of Moral Judgment

TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

*Source:* From Kohlberg, L. (1976) moral stages and moralization: The cognitive developmental approach in T. Lickona (ed.) Moral Development and Behaviour N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Wanstons

Stage 1 parallels the stage of heteronomous morality in the Piagetian sense. Moral realism does not appear yet at this stage. It represents a failure to differentiate multiple perspectives in the dilemmas. In other words, stage 1 involves only a concrete, individual point of view. In addition, the judgment between wrong and right is determined by authority and power. Stage 2 is regarded as a concrete individualistic and instrumental morality. There is an awareness that a number of individuals have their own interests to pursue and that these may conflict. Although there is a recognition of more than one perspective at this stage, it tends to be rigid. Individuals tend to take the viewpoint of one actor, and fail to provide consideration of what is best from everyone's viewpoint. Thus good behaviour in their perspective is that which allows people to satisfy their own needs or the needs of a particular person. Stage 3 represents interpersonal normative morality. At this stage, the separate perspectives of individuals are coordinated into a third person perspective, which is embodied in a set of shared moral norms according to which people are expected to live. These moral norms and expectations transcend or are

generalised across particular persons and situations. Individuals at this stage also emphasize a good, altruistic or prosocial role and motives as indicative of general personal morality. Based on these perspectives, they are particularly concerned with maintaining interpersonal trust and social approval, the so-called "good-boy orientation."

Individuals at stage 4, the stage of social system morality, tend to hold the viewpoint of the social system. They regard the social system as a consistent set of codes and procedures that apply equally to all members of the society. Thus, they decide what is right according to the point of view of institutional wholes rather than the point of view of shared relationships between two or more individuals such as relations based on caring, trust, respect and so on. That is, moral judgments at this stage are based on rules that maintain the social order so that showing respect for authority and doing one's duty are valued highly.

Stage 5 orients towards human rights and social welfare morality. Individuals at stage 5 recognise that the validity of actual laws and social systems can be evaluated in terms of the degree to which they preserve and protect these fundamental human rights and values. They also recognise that there are circumstances in which existing laws cannot bind the individual's behaviour. Thus individuals are sometimes aware of the conflict between moral and legal points of views, and experience difficulties in integrating them.

Stage 6, the highest stage, pursues the morality of reversible and prescriptive general ethical principles. Individuals at this stage define right and wrong on the basis of the

self-chosen ethical principles of his/her own conscience. These principles are not concrete rules but abstract principles of universal justice which are to be applied in all situations.

## **2.2 UNIVERSALITY OF MORAL REASONING**

### **2.2.1 Universality of Development of Moral Stages**

Kohlberg's claim that the moral stage model is universal is based on his belief that the moral reasoning of an individual develops according to his/her overall cognitive development. In other words, a universal and invariant cognitive developmental pattern rather than specific learnt moral rules underlies and organizes the development of moral reasoning. The claim of universality of moral development can be examined by means of three cognitive developmental criteria for the stage model; structure, sequence and hierarchy.

In terms of the structure, Kohlberg proposed the existence of a logical cohesiveness or unity of moral reasoning within each stage. That is, there is a relatively constant form of reasoning across varying contents and contexts. Consequently, individuals should be either "in" a stage or "in transition" between two adjacent stages, but not be in a combination of the three stages.

Another claim of Kohlberg is that the moral stage development has an invariant order in the acquisition of the stages that constitute the sequence. The development should progress irreversibly, one stage at a time, to the next higher stage with no regression or stage-skipping.

Kohlberg also discussed the hierarchy of the development of moral reasoning. Successive stages represent more equilibrated and complex levels of functioning, i.e. they provide increasingly adequate bases for moral decision making. The claim of the hierarchy is based on his view that moral reasoning is linked to cognitive development. This link between the development of moral reasoning and cognitive development was pioneered by Piaget. According to him, development is a procedure of transformation, reconstruction and reorganization from the preceding stage into the new stage rather than a simple addition or substitution of the stage for the previous stage. This procedure results from universal features of social experience, the latter is a process of reciprocal interaction between the self and others.

In his recent reformulation of the theory (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hower, 1983), Kohlberg eventually admitted the importance of the interaction and reciprocity of an individual with others which foster perspective-taking opportunities in line with the Piagetian view. Thus, he emphasizes not only cognitive development but also perspective-taking ability as necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for the development of moral stages. Moreover, he accepted the influence of cultural and class differences beyond the influence of other individuals. Therefore, he admitted that differences in social perspective-taking that exist across cultures and socio-economic class can speed up or slow down the development through the moral stages and even that it differentiates the endpoint of the development. These differences in moral reasoning across culture and social economic class will be discussed later on.

### **2.2.2 Universality of Moral Orientations**

It is true that Kohlberg's theory focused on the sequence of moral stages rather than the moral orientations, and consequently his theory is less well elaborated in terms of the orientations. Moral orientations represent conceptually distinctive perspectives for organizing and understanding the moral domain and provide an individual with justification of his/her moral reasoning. Kohlberg's claim that moral reasoning is universal applies to moral orientations as well as moral stages. He argued not only that progress through the moral stages is based on invariant cognitive development, but also that there are basic moral principles which are universally valid, such as justice. Kohlberg's theory is regarded as "justice-based" moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1981) believed that "virtue is not many but one, that is justice," influenced by Rawl's theory of justice (1971). Regarding this belief of Kohlberg's, Gilligan (1982) pointed out a bias in Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. According to her, morality has two distinctive orientations; a "care and responsibility orientation" and a "justice orientation." Based on this distinction, she has argued that Kohlberg's moral stages only focus on the development of justice so that Kohlberg's theory has failed to account for an important area of morality, the so-called "caring and responsibility" orientation. With respect to this claim, Kohlberg (1984) has argued that justice in his terms could include "care and responsibility" in Gilligan's terms. Although Kohlberg characterized his stage scheme as the development of justice reasoning, it does not mean that the system can handle only judgements that are explicitly rights or justice oriented (Kohlberg, 1984). Rather, he proposed four moral orientations which seemed universal and were reflected in responses to his hypothetical dilemmas; normative orientation, utilitarian orientation, ideal or



harmony-serving orientation and fairness or justice orientation.

The four moral orientations identified are described as follows. The normative orientation focuses on duty or rightness as deriving from “rulefulness” or “lawfulness.” That is, the basic considerations in decision making centre on the prescribed rules of the social or moral order. For example, it could be wrong to lie even to a murderer in order to save a victim from the murderer because such lying contradicts the universality of the norm of truth. The utilitarian orientation emphasizes the good or bad welfare consequences of action in the situation for others and/or the self. Actions are morally right if they maximize welfare and happiness and minimize pain and bad consequences for individuals or groups of individuals. The utilitarian orientation can be subdivided into egoistic utilitarianism and social utilitarianism. The concern of the egoistic utilitarianism is related to consequences to oneself whereas the concern of the social utilitarianism stands for consequences to the group. The fairness or justice orientation emphasises justice with a focus on liberty, equity and equality, reciprocity and contract between persons. Thus, for instance, it should not be wrong or unfair to lie to the potential murderer in order to protect the intended victim in terms of the fairness orientation. The ideal self or perfectionistic orientation focuses on an image of the actor as a good self or as someone with conscience, and to his/her motives or virtue (relatively independent of approval from others). That is, it is morally right to contribute to the harmony of the acting self or to the harmony of society. These orientations seem to be related to the content, rather than the structure, of moral reasoning. Thus it is possible to obtain an additional perspective on individuals’ moral reasoning that may be helpful in interpreting cross-cultural variability through analysing the usage of these orientations.

Table 2.1.2 summarises the elements included in each orientation. These elements represent the way of expressing an individual's orientation toward a particular moral norm, by indicating what value that norm holds in his/her moral reasoning.

Kohlberg (1976) divided each moral stage into two substages, Substage A and B according to the usage of orientations. The normative order, the egoistic consequences and the utilitarian consequences are grouped together to define Substage A at each stage and the ideal or harmony-serving consequences orientation and the fairness orientation are grouped together to define Substage B at each stage.

**Table 2.1.2** The Elements of Moral Orientations

TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES



*Source:* Colby and Kohlberg (1987)

Kohlberg hypothesised that Substage B represents the morally autonomous version of the judgment structure characteristic of a particular stage while Substage A represents the morally heteronomous version. On the basis of these hypotheses, the B substage is regarded as more developmentally advanced than the A substage.

With regard to these orientations, Gilligan (1982) argued that males typically had a justice/rights orientation whereas females tended to focus on a care/responsibility orientation so that Kohlberg's approach was not adequate for describing the moral thinking of females because his system was based on justice and rights. However, Kohlberg (1984) argued that, of the orientations proposed by him, only the fairness orientation explicitly focuses on justice while the other three orientations implicitly reflect justice. Justice within the normative order orientation is impartial or consistent with general rules. The utilitarian orientation regards justice as the operation of quantitatively maximizing social welfare consequences. Whereas in the ideal orientation, justice is considered as fairness or the avoidance of exploitation of others and the need to benefit them. Kohlberg pointed out that many or most moral concerns about care were concerns about enhancing the welfare of other persons, of not hurting them and about preserving and embracing relationships with others. These concerns could fall within the domain of justice as the utilitarian orientation of concern for others' welfare or the ideal orientation of promoting harmonious social relations. Thus Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning dealt with not only the morality of justice but also the morality of care and responsibility, counter to Gilligan's claims. However, he admitted that the most structurally distinctive feature of moral stages was in the fairness orientation, in which equality, reciprocity and contracts between persons were explicitly focused on.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MORAL REASONING**

#### **3.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF KOHLBERG'S MORAL STAGE MODEL**

Since Kohlberg claimed the universality of the development of moral reasoning, the claim has remained controversial among researchers. Many researchers have examined Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning in a variety of cultural settings in order to test the claim of universality. According to Snarey's review (1985), 45 studies - 38 cross sectional and 7 longitudinal studies - of Kohlberg's moral reasoning have been carried out in 27 different cultural areas, including the US, England, Guatemala, Japan, Kenya, Pakistan, Yucatan, Alaska (Eskimos), Israel, Turkey and India. The types of samples vary considerably in terms of not only the range of cultural diversity but also the range of age groups, from children to adults. Also, more than half of the studies included both male and female participants. Based on the review, it was suggested that Kohlberg's dilemmas are reasonably fair in terms of culture when the content is creatively adapted. The findings also indicated that stage skipping and stage regressions were rare and always below the level that could be attributed to measurement error. From these studies of moral reasoning, several well-designed studies are presented in this section.

Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) conducted a 20-year longitudinal study

of the development of moral reasoning in US males to attempt to document the basic assumptions of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. They assumed that moral stages would develop with age and argued that there would be differences in the moral stage according to the sociometric status and social class of participants. The postulation of an influence from sociometric status on the moral stages reflected Piaget's (1965) concept that peer group participation was an important determinant of moral reasoning maturity. Colby et al. (1983) also pointed out the socio-economic status as another aspect which was related to the moral stages. Kohlberg (1969), influenced by Mead (1934), had interpreted social class differences in the rate and terminus of development of moral stages as reflecting differential participation in and identification with society and its secondary institutions. Fifty eight boys, aged 10, 13 and 16 at time 1, were divided equally whose groups at each age by socioeconomic and sociometric status. In order to minimize the possibility that intelligence might affect their level of moral reasoning, participants were selected on the basis of having an IQ score in the range 100 to 120. They were tested at total of 6 times at 3-4 year intervals during the study. At each testing, participants were individually interviewed on their moral reasoning with respect to Kohlberg's nine hypothetical moral dilemmas (three dilemmas from each form; Form A, B and C). All scoring was done blind by individual dilemma to minimize the bias of scorers. Data were subjected to test-retest, alternative form and interrater reliability tests in order to estimate the measurement error for the invariant stage sequence. Validity of the instrument was also discussed.

With increasing age, participants showed development through the sequence of moral stages, without stage skipping. In only 4% of cases (6 occasions) of the adjacent

testing times was there a downward stage change. This percentage was less than the downward change based on test-retest reliability data (5-6%), thus it could be regarded as a measurement error. The findings implied that the moral stages developed in an invariant order as Kohlberg claimed. When factor analyses of issue and dilemma were administered for several age groups and for the sample as a whole, no more than one interpretable factor emerged. This study demonstrated the existence of a single factor of moral stage across varying contents and contexts. That is, there is a general dimension of moral reasoning that is not issue-specific.

Based on the results, it was concluded that a cognitive developmental stage model of moral reasoning was supported and that the standard scoring system was a valid measure of Kohlberg's moral stages. It was also found that the stage of moral reasoning was positively correlated with age, socio-economic status and educational level but not with sociometric status. Regarding educational attainment, it was confounded with social class. Middle-class individuals had usually had more post-compulsory formal education in comparison with those from a working-class background. According to the finding of the moderate relationship ( $r = .54$ ) between the moral stages and education, it seemed that development to higher stages was facilitated by educational experience. It implied that the moral stage development of an individual was influenced by not only his/her cognitive abilities but also the social environment surrounding him/her. Additionally, it was found that stage scores in childhood were significantly related to those in adulthood. However, participants in this study were limited to Western males. This was a limitation in terms of the claim of the universality of moral stages even though the study was well designed and carefully conducted.

The cultural universality of moral stages could be supported by longitudinal and cross-sectional studies in other cultural backgrounds. Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) conducted a study of moral reasoning in Turkey to examine the claim of the universality of moral stages, as a further step, by broadening and elaborating the study of Turiel et al. (1978). The aim of the study was to examine whether all observed individuals did develop in the sequence proposed by the theory. Participants aged from 10 through to 28 years were divided into two groups; participants from a fairly traditional rural village and participants from middle-class, city background. Interviewing took place four times in total in 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1976. Some of the participants were interviewed only once, while others were interviewed 2-4 times. All the participants were included in the cross-sectional study. In the longitudinal study, however, only the participants who were interviewed 2-4 times were included. Each participant was given an individual oral interview, including the same six hypothetical moral dilemmas and a standard set of probing questions. These dilemmas were revised versions of Kohlberg's standard stories, adapted to make them more suitable for the Turkish setting.

The results showed a sequential advance through the moral stages with age. Out of 35 changes, only 4 cases (11.4%) showed a regression against the prediction, a distribution whose chance probability is .001 by sign test. All participants were either at a single stage or at two adjacent stages but not at more than three stages. The results supported the claim of structural universality in moral reasoning; the Turkish responses fitted the moral stages and exhibited the claimed sequence in both the longitudinal and the cross-sectional studies. However, the claim of universality admits the possibility of differences in the rate and endpoint of moral development.

This study revealed such differences. Village participants showed a slower rate of development of moral stages than city participants. A comparison of the oldest participants in the village with those in the city showed a difference in the endpoint of moral stage between the two groups. Even though all the village participants over the age of 16 showed some conventional judgments, they seemed to stabilize at stage 3 whereas some city participants reached up to stage 4/5. This finding coincided with that of an earlier study by Edwards (1975) and, consequently, supported her suggestion that stage 3 was the final point of moral development in the traditional culture. On the basis of the findings, it was suggested that stage 3 was a necessary and sufficient level of functioning in societies having a social order based on face-to-face relationships and a high level of normative consensus. These conditions might not necessitate differentiation and integration beyond stage 3.

Before confirming the claim of universality, some methodological aspects of this study should be considered. Whether gender differences exist in development through the moral stages could not be considered because participants in this study were also limited to males. As in the previous US study, females were excluded. In addition, it should also be noted that the interviews in 1964 and 1966 were administered by only one interviewer. Thus there is a possibility of biases and/or misinterpretations of the responses.

Another well-designed cross-cultural longitudinal study that supported the claim of the universality of moral stages was conducted by Snarey et al. (1985). Ninety-two kibbutz-born and Middle Eastern Aliyah adolescents participated, and 64 of them were interviewed longitudinally over a two-to-nine year period. Kohlberg's moral



judgment interview, Form A, was used to collect the data. To maximize reliability, all interviews were scored blind from English transcripts, i.e. without knowing the participant's name, age, gender, cohort membership, time of testing or scorers assigned to other interviews. Interrater reliability and translations reliability were also administered. Further, a 13-point scale as well as a 9-point scale were used, thus, the developmental sequence and regression could be examined more carefully.

Stage change was found to be upward, gradual and without significant regression. In line with the two above studies, the findings also strongly supported Kohlberg's claims regarding structural wholeness and internal consistency. Age showed a positive relationship with stages. The age norms compared favourably with the findings from the US and Turkish longitudinal studies. The two previous longitudinal studies of moral stage development had used the same standardized scoring system as this study. The mean stage scores of the kibbutz participants was higher than those of other participants of parallel studies in the US and Turkey. The finding that higher scores of kibbutz participants than those of the participants in urban areas is somewhat different from the previous research that had found that individuals in rural areas generally progress more slowly than urban individuals (Edwards, 1975; Turiel, 1969).

Another cross-cultural study was carried out in Hong Kong, Mainland China and England (Ma, 1988a). A total of 507 participants (329 in Hong Kong sample, 78 in Mainland China sample, and 100 in England sample respectively) administered Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT). The sample consisted of both males and females aged from 16 to 26 years old. Generally speaking the findings in the Hong Kong and

England studies supported the claim of an ordered sequence of Kohlberg's moral stages measured by the DIT. The findings in Mainland China were less obvious. Ma attributed the reason mainly to the small sample size and the homogeneity in the age and education background of the participants.

Regarding gender differences, most findings have opposed Gilligan's claims (1982). Through abortion counsellors Gilligan found that when they encountered the matter of abortion, females tended to be more concerned with caring and responsibility rather than justice and rights. Based on these findings, she argued that Kohlberg's system based on justice and rights had a sexual bias against females as mentioned earlier in the previous chapter (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter II). She pointed out that males were encouraged to think of moral dilemmas as inevitable conflicts of interest between two or more parties in terms of laws and other social conventions, which were designed to be resolved (a perspective that represents stage 4 reasoning in Kohlberg's scheme), whereas females were encouraged to consider moral dilemmas as conflicts between one's own selfishness and the needs and desires of others (a perspective that approximates stage 3 in Kohlberg's scheme). It seems that females lag behind males in terms of moral stages. However, she claimed that the interpersonal oriented morality that females adopted was neither more nor less mature than the rule-bound morality of males based on the belief that males and females adopted different perspectives on moral issues. That is, she viewed these two moralities as "separate but equal" and suggested that females underwent a different series of moral stages rather than the same series as males.

As far as the moral stages were concerned, many studies showed no gender

differences (e.g. Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1989; Walker & Morgan, 1991). According to the review of gender differences in moral reasoning by Walker (1984, 1986b) a few studies have shown gender differences in moral stages. Moreover, when the gender differences occurred in childhood and early adolescence, studies tended to show more mature development for females although even these infrequent differences were relatively small. The precociousness of girls in moral reasoning was also supported by other studies. Gregg, Gibbs and Basinger (1994) examined differences in moral reasoning among 170 delinquent and 178 nondelinquent adolescents aged 13 to 18 through the Sociomoral Reflection Measure - Short Form (SRM-SF). In this study the moral reasoning of male adolescents (both delinquent and nondelinquent) was less advanced than that of females. Thoma (1986) also analysed findings from 54 studies in which the DIT was used. Gender differences favoured females among junior and senior high-school students, college youth and even adults (mean  $d$  (effect size) = .15, .17, .21, and .28, respectively). These findings were opposed to Gilligan's claim of gender differences favouring males.

Cohn (1991) pointed out gender differences in moral reasoning, ego development, aggression, and empathy during early and mid-adolescence, in favour of girls, and explained the overall precociousness of females in adolescence mainly by two factors; differences in maturation rate and socialization experiences. The former explanation was based on the assumption that psychological maturity accompanied physiological maturity. The most likely explanation was thought to be the factor of socialization experience. Lever (1978) studied the spontaneous play of 183 fifth-grade children and found gender differences in social activity. That is, boys played in large groups with little opportunity for discussion or conversation whereas girls tended to

experience extensive discussions and other social experiences during spontaneous play in dyads or small groups, in which they mimicked basic human relationships. The girls' activity might generate the growth of interpersonal awareness, which was more likely to be associated with development of moral reasoning.

Some studies in Walker's review (1984) indicated that in adulthood males showed more mature moral reasoning than females, in line with Gilligan's claim. However, in these studies, it was found that the apparent gender differences were actually confounded with differences in educational and occupational achievement. That is, participants who showed the highest levels of moral reasoning had had more education and occupational experience at higher levels and most of them were males. Against Walker's review, Baumrind (1986) argued that gender differences still remain through adulthood even when effects of educational and occupational status were controlled for. However, based on a meta-analysis - i.e. a statistical procedure for combining findings-, Walker concluded that there were no significant gender differences in the overall pattern of moral reasoning.

At the same time, it should be realized that the lack of evidence for gender differences in moral stages does not diminish the possibility of gender differences in the preferential use of various orientations in moral reasoning or in the content of reasoning within a stage such as reliance on particular norms. Gender differences in the use of moral orientations will be discussed later.

In summary, cross-cultural and longitudinal findings showed that Kohlberg's moral stage model seemed universal although there remains the possibility of differences in

the rate and endpoint of the development through the moral stages across variables such as ethnic or cultural background. There is evidence that individuals were relatively consistent in their moral stages across dilemmas of varying content and that their stage development was irreversibly progressive, one stage at a time. Additionally, the claim of gender differences in moral reasoning was not apparently accepted in so far as such differences were not salient.

### **3.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE STRUCTURE OF MORAL REASONING**

Regarding the structure of moral reasoning, it was assumed that there was cultural variation. Tappan (1997), in his recent paper, challenged Kohlberg's view of moral reasoning in the light of the Vygotskian perspective. Vygotsky (1934/1986) argued that the development of thinking is directed from the social to the individual rather than from the individual to the social. That is, an individual develops his/her thinking through communicative interaction with others, especially those who are at a more mature level of development, over years through using psychological tools such as language, and hence the psychological tools are crucial to maintain the interaction. It implies that social interaction always takes place in the context of culture because words, language and forms of discourse are inherently sociocultural phenomena. From this perspective, Tappan questioned Kohlberg's view that moral development is the result of a constructive process undertaken by a transcendental epistemic participant. Rather, he suggests an alternative perspective that an individual tends to develop the moral reasoning through conversations and interactions with others that occur in specific social, cultural and historical contexts. Furthermore, many studies have indeed found cultural differences in the content of moral reasoning (e.g. Dien,



1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker & Moran, 1991). The findings indicated limitations of Kohlberg's theory in its applicability to some cultures. However, it was suggested that although orientations of moral reasoning were different across cultures, the moral stages were at the same level. In this section, some studies that found cultural differences in the structure of moral reasoning will be presented followed by a section that presents studies which examined Kohlberg's model of moral orientation.

### **3.2.1 Empirical Studies of Cultural Variations in Moral Reasoning**

The study by Snarey et al. (1985) is one of the studies that found cultural variation in moral reasoning. In the study, a substantial difference was observed for reasoning on the Joe dilemma (Dilemma I), but not on the Heinz's dilemma (Dilemma III) nor in Officer Brown dilemma (Dilemma III'), between kibbutz and non-kibbutz youth, aged 15 to 17 years and at the conventional stages. The kibbutz-born youth nearly always chose the contract issue and argued that the father should keep his promises, whereas the Middle Eastern youth often made choice of the authority issue and advocated that the son should give his father the money. The study showed that participants who were primarily at the conventional stages were more likely to make moral choices that reflected the conventions of their society. However the youngest group, the 12-14 age cohort, were primarily at the preconventional stages, and seldom reflected cultural conventions in their moral reasoning. With respect to the oldest group, aged 18-26 years, they made greater use of the less convention-bound stages 4 and 4/5. That is, use of or conformity to conventions in moral reasoning decreased again in the oldest group. The findings implied that cultural differences in moral reasoning were more

likely to emerge in the reasoning of individuals who were at conventional moral stages than those at either preconventional or postconventional stages.

In addition, some difficulties in scoring the kibbutzniks' postconventional reasoning were reported. They argued that the kibbutzniks' communal emphasis, greater investment in the presentation of social solidarity, and greater emphasis on collective happiness seemed to have been missed or misunderstood when evaluated solely by the existing criterion judgments of the scoring manual (see Snarey et al., 1985 for examples and details). Some of the moral reasoning was guess-scored as being at stage 4 and 4/5 by the standard scoring procedure, which held a middle class American perspective. However, under a culturally sensitive second scoring, the same reasoning was evaluated as being at stage 5. The researchers suggested that culturally indigenous examples of higher stage reasoning should be included, that postconventional moral principles should be added to the scoring manual so as to avoid cultural bias, or both.

Tietjen and Walker (1985) examined the applicability of Kohlberg's approach to a collectively oriented, small-scale, traditional face-to-face society by interviewing 22 men in a Maisin village in Papua New Guinea. Participants were divided into four groups -traditional, government, and religious leaders and non leaders - and interviewed with a new, culturally appropriate dilemma as well as with Kohlberg's moral dilemmas (adapted to the setting).

Most responses of participants could generally be coded according to Kohlberg's system. However, it was found that some responses reflected particular cultural

concepts such as maintaining the harmony or amity within the community, and that those were not clearly matched to scoring criteria. For instance, all the men in the experiment said that the story character should not steal the drug to save his wife's life in Heinz's dilemma. According to Kohlberg's scheme, this response signifies that the men placed a higher value on obedience to the law than to life. However, in terms of the concepts of Maisin men, the salient moral issue in this dilemma seemed to be not life versus law but the individual versus the group, or personal gain versus causing a disruption of community harmony. Clearly such concepts were difficult to score with the existing scoring system. Thus, they pointed out that the Kohlberg's scoring manual was not able to deal with maintaining human relationships between the level of individual interpersonal relation and the level of society in general. Additionally, the findings concerning development through the moral stages in this study supported Edwards' (1975, 1978, 1982) contention that cultural variation also exists in the endpoint of moral development. For instance, stage 3 reasoning represented an appropriate form of moral reasoning for face-to-face traditional rural societies.

When interrater reliability was examined, 81.1% agreement, with 90.9% agreement on modal stage;  $r = .75$  for Weighted Average Scores (WASs), and  $r = .76$  for scoring of orientations reliability were reported. On the basis of these findings, the researchers concluded that the reliability was not substantially different from that in other studies although it was lower than ideal (see Walker's review, 1984). However, it should be noted that the sample size was so small that it was difficult to conclusively test the claims with these findings.



Some moral reasoning of Oriental people also seemed to be missing in Kohlberg's system. Dien (1982) claimed that there were cultural differences between the Western and Chinese society on account of the uniqueness of Chinese culture. The Western view of man is as an autonomous being who makes free and rational choices as a moral agent. This view was based on Christianity and is clearly reflected in Kohlberg's theory of moral development through his methodology and the hypothetical dilemmas. However, the Chinese view of man, which is based on the Confucian philosophy, is quite different from the Western view. They tend to regard man as an integral part of an orderly universe with an innate moral sense to maintain harmony. Further, the preferred manner of resolving human conflict in Chinese society tends to be reconciliation and collective decision making rather than individual choice, commitment, and responsibility as in the West. In light of these fundamental differences in the two cultural traditions, Dien questioned the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral reasoning to Chinese society even within the lower levels. Unfortunately, Dien could not provide any empirically comparable analysis to support her hypothesis conclusively.

Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985) supported Dien's hypothesis through their research with Chinese people living in Taiwan. They interviewed a total of 212 Chinese, aged 7 years to adulthood. When their moral reasoning was analysed, much of the reasoning could be scored by matching with the criterion judgments in the Standard Form Scoring Manual. However, a considerable number of participants' moral concerns were hard to score due to the lack of appropriate criterion judgments to match with. More interestingly, many Chinese participants gave reasons for their moral judgments in terms of traditional Chinese values, such as

filial piety and collective utility. However, examples of these values were absent in the criterion judgments given for the higher stages. For instance, filial piety was represented in the criterion judgments given for stage 3 - affiliation - but no example was given for stage 5. Regarding these unique cultural concepts, Lei and Cheng argued that the current scoring manual failed to capture certain concepts such as filial piety, and suggested that these concepts could be articulated at a number of structurally distinct levels.

Based on the literature review, Ma (1988b) also pointed out the cultural differences between Chinese and Westerners at least in the last three moral stages although the first three stages could be culturally universal. The Chinese perspectives, such as Confucianism, Taoism and common traditional thought seemed to influence the Chinese to have different moral reasoning from the Westerners. Thus Ma proposed Chinese sub-structures of the last three moral stages, apart from the Western sub-structure, through integrating the Chinese prospective into the general structure of moral reasoning. For instance, at the stage 4, both Chinese and Western people would think that it is important to maintain the stability and prosperity of the society. However, Chinese seemed to hold a strong collectivistic prospective which allows individuals less freedom to develop their own characteristics and personal opinions while Westerners tended to consider the relations between an individual and the group to be rational and individualistic. Later on, Ma (1992) proposed to integrate Kohlberg's and the Chinese perspectives on moral development into a single model, which places more emphasis on the affective aspect of moral development in comparison to Kohlberg's theories.

Similarly, Heubner and Garrod (1991, 1993) argued against Kohlberg's metaethical assumption on moral reasoning in their recent study of moral reasoning of adolescent and young-adult Tibetan Buddhist monks. They interviewed 20 monks living in a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Nepal using a culturally adapted form of Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. They (1993) were able to trace a developmental pattern of moral reasoning with age - from a mean stage of 2/3 to a mean stage of 3/4 - among the participants. However, they reported difficulties in interpreting the monks' moral reasoning using scoring categories provided by Kohlberg's scheme because they gave the reasons for their moral decision on the basis of the concept peculiar to Buddhists such as "karma." Thus Heubner and Garrod raised a profound question about the universality of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning since it disregarded socioculturally specific aspects.

As mentioned in Chapter I, Shweder et al. (1990) also supports cultural variations in the moral reasoning. They found that distinction between moral and convention is culturally relative on the basis of a comparative study between individuals in India and US and hence suggested that moral code might be different across cultures and questioned the universality of Kohlberg's moral development.

The empirical findings of the above studies highlighted two points in relation to cultural variation in moral reasoning. Firstly, moral reasoning was influenced by specific norms and values which were emphasised by the culture to which participants belonged. Secondly, Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were not adequate to account for the full range of cultural variation in moral reasoning. These cultural variations in moral reasoning seem to be verified through research on moral orientations.

### **3.2.2 Empirical Studies on Moral Orientations**

It is true that Kohlberg's model of moral orientation has not been examined as vigorously as his model of moral stages. However, there have been some studies that tried to ascertain differences in moral orientations across age, gender, as well as cultural background (e.g. Walker, 1986a; Walker & Moran, 1991; Walker, de Vries & Trevethan, 1987).

With respect to moral orientation, Tappan et al. (1987) analysed early empirical studies (e.g. Colby et al., 1983; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1985) in terms of moral types which were based upon differences in moral orientation. They divided four orientations into two types; the normative and utility orientations as Type A and the fairness and the ideal orientations as Type B. These corresponded with the substages of moral reasoning as mentioned earlier (see 2.2.2 in Chapter II).

Tappan et al. predicted that social relations and socio-cultural environment would have an effect on the development of moral type. For example, Type B would be more likely to occur in a social system stressing cooperation, sharing and equality. This prediction was clearly supported in an Israeli kibbutz sample. When analysing the reasoning of the kibbutz sample, a majority of the men and women aged 16 and almost all the participants aged 20 were categorised as Type B. However, the majority of a sample of American males did not show Type B until their early 30s. In other samples, Type B applied to the reasoning of a majority of 25 year old Taiwanese males and females and half of a small sample of 26 year old Turkish males. Two possible reasons for this difference between kibbutz and the other cultural groups

in terms of moral types were provided. One was that on the kibbutz the sanctity of life was much more highly valued than property rights were. Thus, the hierarchical valuing of life over property on the Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas (dilemmas III and III') represented the influence of the content of cultural values as an explanation for the high frequency of kibbutz participants scored as making Type B judgments. The other possible reason was that the kibbutz simply placed strong emphasis on the values that define Type B reasoning such as equality, cooperation and mutual respect in the social relations. In fact, the kibbutz group was found to stress these values more than the other three cultural groups did. The reasoning of the other cultural groups seemed to be a more complex mixture of both gerontocratic and democratic forms. Thus a relationship between cultural differences and moral orientations was partially supported by the above findings.

Walker and Moran (1991) also suggested cultural variation in moral orientation in their study of moral reasoning in communist Chinese society. Their study involved a total of 52 adolescents and adults drawn from five groups according to their social status; moral leaders, intellectuals, workers, college and junior high school students. They were asked to respond to hypothetical moral dilemmas and discussed a real-life dilemma from their own experiences in individual interviews. The interviews were scored in terms of the participants' moral orientations as well as their level on the moral stages in order to test the hypothesis that cultural variation exists in orientation of moral reasoning.

When the moral orientation of the five social groups was examined, significant differences between the groups were revealed. Moral leaders were more likely to

show the normative orientation whereas intellectuals tended to orient towards the ideal orientation. This pattern was somewhat different from that found in Tietjen and Walker's (1985) study in which the moral orientation of leaders and non-leaders in Papua New Guinea was examined. In their study, leaders oriented more to the ideal orientation and less to the normative orientation than non-leaders, which was similar to the intellectuals in the above study. The tendency of the moral leaders in communist China towards the normative orientation was explained in terms of the social environment of China. The moral leaders have been mandated to maintain a normative order. Thus their moral reasoning stressed the importance of obedience, meeting one's obligations and duties, rights and retribution. These findings revealed that moral orientation differs across social groups. Moreover, the differences across social groups can vary from one culture to another, thus implying the existence of cultural variation in moral orientation.

When the results of the study in China are compared to those of Walker's other studies (1986a, 1989) which involved samples of Canadian adults, the Chinese tended to orient more to the utilitarianism and less to the ideal consequences than the Canadians. Although this comparison appears to demonstrate the existence of cultural differences, it requires careful consideration because the cross-cultural samples were not exactly comparable in terms of their age and social status.

To summarize, empirical studies on moral orientation have generally shown various cultural differences in moral orientations. Thus it could be concluded that moral orientation does differ according to aspects of the cultural environment such as emphasised values and norms, and social relations.

Gender differences in moral orientations have also been investigated. Gilligan (1982) proposed two kinds of moral orientation: a “rights” orientation and a “responsibility” orientation (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter II). She argued that the former was typically used by males in their moral reasoning whereas the latter was used by females. Based on these hypotheses, she criticised Kohlberg’s approach to moral orientations claiming that it tended to undervalue the responsibility orientation, identifying such reasoning with lower stages of moral thought (also see section 3.1 in Chapter III).

In order to ascertain whether Kohlberg’s theory did simply reflect the rights orientation as Gilligan claimed, Walker et al. (1987) examined Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas in a study with 240 participants from 80 family triads (father, mother and child). The children were drawn from grades 1, 4, 7, and 10. Each individual was interviewed using three hypothetical moral dilemmas from Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) and one real-life dilemma. All the interviews were scored for both moral stages and moral orientations. The moral orientation seen in the responses to each dilemma was scored according to Lyons’ manual (1982, as cited in Walker et al., 1987) that was based on the moral orientations proposed by Gilligan. The participants were categorised as reflecting the responsibility, the rights or the split orientation. The split orientation was for participants who had an equal number for each orientation according to the manual. It should be noted that Gilligan’s theorizing about moral orientations was actually predated by Kohlberg’s moral orientations. Gilligan’s responsibility orientation is similar to Kohlberg’s utility and ideal orientations whereas her rights orientation shares features of his normative and fairness orientations.

The findings were that most individuals tended to use a considerable mix of both orientations for most dilemmas regardless of their gender. The study failed to support Gilligan's claim that there was a difference in moral orientation between males and females and that Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were biased against the female responsibility orientation. However this study examined moral orientations in terms of only Gilligan's model but not Kohlberg's model. In other words, it has not provided any particular pattern of the use of Kohlberg's moral orientations although the dimensions of moral orientations of Gilligan were originated from Kohlberg's moral orientations.

Walker's later study (1989) supported the findings of Walker et al (1987). In order to examine Kohlberg's model of moral orientation as well as Gilligan's, he extended the study of Walker et al. (1987) to a longitudinal study with 233 participants (from 78 families) who ranged in age from 5 to 63 years. They participated in 2 identical interviews separated by a two-year interval. In each interview, they discussed three hypothetical dilemmas from MJJ and a personally generated real-life dilemma. Responses to each of these were scored for moral orientation. One of the aims of the study was to see if the findings of Walker et al. (1987), i.e. the lack of gender differences in Kohlberg's moral orientations, were replicated. The results, again, did not support the claim that moral orientations were gender-related, in line with the findings of Walker et al. (1987). Gender differences were almost completely absent when the responses were analysed according to both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's moral orientations.

Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) also found that there was almost no significant gender



difference in the use of moral orientations. They asked 80 educationally advantaged adolescents and adults living in the US. The results showed, although women were more likely to focus on the care orientation and men on the justice orientation, two-thirds of the participants used both the orientations regardless of their gender.

In addition, a study of moral reasoning in China (Walker & Moran, 1991) showed somewhat interesting findings in relation to moral orientations. No significant gender differences were found in responses to Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas in terms of moral orientations or moral stages. However, regarding real-life dilemmas, it was found that Chinese females were more inclined towards a rights/justice orientation and less towards a responsibility/care orientation than were Chinese males. The findings were in contrast to Gilligan's claim that females were more likely to adopt the responsibility/care orientation than the rights/justice orientation.

To summarize, since Gilligan made the claim that there was a sexual bias in Kohlberg's model, gender differences in moral orientation have been examined. Although there is only limited empirical evidence, most findings did not support the existence of gender differences in moral orientation.

Tappan et al. (1987) found evidence of a significant relationship between age and moral orientation in a review of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies (e.g. Colby et al., 1983; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982). According to the findings, as participants get older, they tend not only to reach a higher moral stage but also to make moral reasoning on the basis of the ideal and the fairness orientations (Type B) more than the normative and the utilitarian orientations (Type A). Conversely, the younger the participant, the more likely he was to be

scored as making Type A judgments as well as to obtain the lower moral stage score. In addition, these longitudinal samples also provide some support for the relationship between age, moral stages, and moral orientations through shifts in the proportion of participants from Type A to Type B with increasing age. The developmental shift from Type A to Type B was two to four times more likely to occur in these samples than the Type B to Type A reversal.

Furthermore, the study with Canadians (Walker, 1989) revealed a relationship between moral stages and moral orientations although moral orientations were proposed to be conceptually independent from moral stages (i.e. stage development occurs in each orientation). According to the study, the moral reasoning of Canadian individuals at a lower moral stage was more likely to entail the normative and the utilitarianism orientations, whereas the reasoning of individuals at a higher moral stage tended to orient to a greater extent towards the fairness and the ideal orientations as Kohlberg claimed.

In summary, empirical findings indicated an age trend in moral orientations and, consequently, a possible relation between moral orientation and moral stages within Kohlberg's approach. That is, the normative and the utilitarianism orientations were more frequently expressed by younger people at lower stages whereas the ideal and the fairness orientations were more common in older people at higher stages.

Walker et al. (1987) also reported that different types of moral dilemma (that is, whether it is a hypothetical or a real-life dilemma) elicited differences in moral orientations. Hypothetical dilemmas generated more normative and fairness orientations whereas real-life dilemmas produced more utilitarianism and ideal

orientations. In addition, analyses of the content of real-life dilemmas revealed that, regardless of individuals' gender, the type of dilemma was clearly related to the use of moral orientations. That is, impersonal-relationship dilemmas were more likely to produce a rights orientation whereas personal-relationship dilemmas tended to elicit a responsibility orientation.

In this section empirical studies on moral orientation have been reviewed. In summary, the studies revealed that people generally use different moral orientations according to their cultural background, age, and even the type of moral dilemmas they are responding to, but not according to their gender. When age trends of moral orientations were considered, there was evidence that the orientations were related to moral stages that also develop with age.

### **3.3 CRITICISM OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY AND OTHER THEORIES**

In spite of reporting some variations in the rate and endpoint of moral stages across individuals' background with variables such as culture and gender, many researchers generally accept Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. However, Kohlberg's theory has not escaped legitimate criticism. Here, the criticism of Kohlberg's theory is reviewed, especially with reference to domain-specificity theory and cultural psychologists' theory.

#### **3.3.1 Criticism of Kohlberg's Theory**

Shweder et al. (1990) identified the limitations of Kohlberg's theory as follows. One criticism addresses Kohlberg's claim that the development of cognitive stages as described by Piaget, that is preoperational, concrete operational, and formal

operational stages, preceded the development of moral stages. Unfortunately, empirical studies have been inconclusive on the relations between performance on Piagetian logical tasks and performance on Kohlberg's moral dilemmas (Haan, Weiss, & Johnson, 1982). Moreover, Gelman and Baillargeon (1983) concluded that, unlike the Piagetian account, cognitive development is not stagelike. If cognitive development is not stagelike, then moral development based on it cannot be stagelike either. Like the cognitive stages, it may also be possible that the moral stages are flexible depending on how individuals perceive a moral dilemma and on the content of a moral dilemma. For example, an individual may show stage four when the dilemma concerns stealing but stage three when considering a dilemma about extramarital sex (Gilligan, 1982).

A second criticism is related to several biases in Kohlberg's moral stages. According to the findings of empirical studies (e.g. Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1984), higher stages are achieved by males compared with females, and by people in a certain social class, i.e. westernized elites such as Israelis of European origin, upper middle-class American and Western-oriented members of the urban elite in non-Western countries like Taiwan and India. Few researchers would deny that those who are schooled receive higher scores because they would have had more opportunities to think about or even write down the rules for moral or logical thinking. This seems to be an indication of bias in the moral stages in favour of certain populations.

A third criticism is that very few people are seen to reach the postconventional level of moral reasoning. On a worldwide scale, only 1 or 2 percent of all responses are

pure postconventional and even pure preconventional responses are rarely found (Snarey, 1985). The infrequency of the postconventional level raises doubts about the logic of Kohlberg's conceptual scheme, his method of interviewing, or both. With respect to the conceptual scheme, infrequency of the postconventional responses seems to occur because Kohlberg's conceptual scheme of morality contains not only mandatory but also discretionary concepts (Shweder et al, 1990). The mandatory concepts enable moral code to maintain its rational appeal whereas the discretionary concepts permit replacement by alternative concepts whose substitution into the code would not diminish its rational appeal. Therefore these discretionary concepts do not appeal to everyone, regardless of their culture. In other words, there are "divergent rationalities" in the moral domain (Shweder, 1986). Besides, Kohlberg's interview technique is criticised in relation to the rarity of postconventional level. His method presents the individual with a verbal production task that seems to require high ability to generate verbal arguments that represent complex concepts in order to obtain a high score of moral reasoning. However, much developmental research (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) has indicated that knowledge of concepts often precedes their self-reflective representation in speech. This implies that Kohlberg's method could underestimate the moral reasoning of individuals who do not have the ability to explicitly state the knowledge that they have.

Furthermore, there are also other researchers who criticize Piaget's and Kohlberg's structural explanations of moral development with reference to the theory of domain-specificity (e.g. Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1993; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1983) and cultural psychology (e.g. Shweder et al. 1990). Before describing this critique, Piaget's and Kohlberg's assumptions, the target of the criticism, will be briefly reviewed.

Piaget (1932/1965) considered moral development one type of specific branching from general cognitive development. Thus he attempted to formulate a theory of moral development which was closely related to his explanations of nonsocial cognitive development. Piaget's explanation of moral development contains two sequential levels of moral development: the heteronomous level and the autonomous level (see Chapter I for details). Piaget interpreted the moral development from heteronomy to autonomy as if there is a clear boundary between the two. The obedience of constraint of the heteronomous level, which is equated with custom and convention, precedes and is displaced by the concept of justice. In other words, it was proposed that, at this level, children are unable to distinguish morality from convention so that they regard all rules, whether they are moral or conventional rules, as externally determined and fixed by authority figures. By contrast, children at the autonomous level view rules as owing to mutual agreement or consensus, and thereby as changeable and relative to the social context, and recognize that obedience to authority is neither necessary nor always desirable. Also, they can distinguish between rules and their underlying justification. In other words, they make intrinsic moral judgments. The criteria of obligatoriness and universality, in their moral senses, apply to autonomous-level thinking in which concepts of justice, equality, and mutual respect are seen to be generalizable.

Since Kohlberg (1969, 1981) conducted his most extensive research of moral development on the basis of Piaget's work, their research on moral development shares some common features. For instance, Kohlberg, like Piaget, proposed that there are some general relations between the sequence of the development of moral reasoning and the sequence of nonsocial cognitive development. Also, Kohlberg's

primary assumption is parallel to that of Piaget. Both of them assumed that children view all rules as stemming from authority, so that they have a unitary concept of social rules and treat all social rules alike. Thus, Kohlberg characterized children as failing to differentiate between moral and nonmoral rules.

In spite of the commonness between the two theories, Turiel (1983) pointed out two major modification of Piaget's formulation made by Kohlberg. One is that, at the earliest levels, moral judgments are based not on respect for authority and feelings of sacredness for social rules, but on an orientation to power, punishment, and physical consequences. Although young children do equate right with obedience to adult authority, Kohlberg's explanation of children's obedience is based on a pragmatic orientation to the rewards and punishments administered by adults rather than on respect for authority. Similarly, Kohlberg interpreted children's belief in strict adherence to rules on the basis of fear and prudence, not a sense of sacredness. Thus, Kohlberg's position regarding punishment and sanctions in children's moral judgment is stronger than that of Piaget. The other difference between Kohlberg and Piaget is that Kohlberg argued that the conventional level occurs during adolescence so that autonomous morality is seen as developing during late adolescence or early childhood, which is later than Piaget's assumption (Turiel, 1983).

### **3.3.2 Domain-Specificity Theory; An Alternative Theory on Moral Development**

As opposed to the assumption of Kohlberg and Piaget, some researchers, based on empirical studies (e.g. Davidson et al, 1983; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Weston & Turiel, 1980), claim that young children can distinguish morality from other social rules such as conventional rules. Distinguishing morality from other

social rules presupposes that individuals think about social relationships, emotions, social practices, and social order, and that thinking about morality has features distinctive from other aspects of thinking about the social world. This is the idea of domain specificity (Turiel, 1998).

Domain specificity theorists (e.g. Smetana, 1993; Tisak, 1995) identified different domains of social judgment. Concerning the different domains of social judgment, Turiel (1975, 1978a, b, 1979, 1983) and Nucci (1981), according to the criteria of rule contingency and personal jurisdiction, identified three distinct domains of the development of social judgment: moral domain, societal domain, and psychological domain. The moral domain encompasses prescriptive judgments about how individuals ought to behave towards one another. Because moral issues pertain to matters of justice, fairness, individual rights, and welfare, moral rules are characterized by obligatoriness, generalizability, and impersonality across situations, and the wrongness of moral acts such as hitting, lying, or stealing is considered to be non-contingent on specific social rules or authority dictates. The societal domain includes concepts regarding systems of social relations, including groups, social conventions, social system, and social institutions. The concept of social conventions is the most researched area of the societal domain. Conventions are defined as behavioural uniformities reflective of shared knowledge that coordinates interactions within social system. Thus they are hypothesized to be contextually relative, arbitrary, and changeable, and the wrongness of conventional acts such as forms of dress and modes of address is thought to be contingent on the rules and dictates of authority within that context. The psychological domain includes judgments concerning people as psychological systems. Concepts of personality,



person, self and identity are aspects of this domain. The psychological domain is defined in terms of personal issues involving social actions outside both moral concern and societal regulation. Keeping correspondence private, joining a recreational group, and choosing of one's friends could belong to this domain. These actions primarily affect only the actor without yielding injustice to others or the disruption of social order.

The three domains described above are labeled "the moral," "the social conventional," and "the personal," respectively; some researchers have examined the development of social judgment pertaining to these three domains. Most studies of the domain model of social development have revolved around the moral and the social conventional domain distinction. As mentioned earlier, the theory of domain specificity began in opposition to Piaget (1932/1965) and Kohlberg's (1969, 1971) assumptions that morality and social conventions are part of the same conceptual domain, and therefore, that moral concepts (referring to justice) emerge from the non-moral (i.e. conventions). In contrast, Turiel and his colleagues, theorists of domain specificity (e.g. Turiel, 1977, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Weston & Turiel, 1980) argue that morality and conventions are two separate conceptual domains from the outset, so that each domain develops independently and entails differential social experiences. Indeed, their empirical findings showing young children's ability to distinguish between morality and conventions support their claims.

The study of Weston and Turiel (1980) examined the criterion dimensions of institutional practice, which is closely related to rule contingency, and jurisdiction or

power of authority, in order to ascertain how children relate the policies of the institution and of those in authority to their own judgments of actions. Children from 5 to 11 years of age were told hypothetical stories containing four types of action by a child; undressing on the playground, hitting another child, leaving toys on the floor in the classroom and refusing to share a snack with another child. In each case, children were asked to evaluate the actions, the school policies regarding each act (permitting or prohibiting), and teachers' responses to rule conformity and violation. It was found that children at all the ages did not accept the legitimacy of the school policy regarding hitting, an act in the moral domain. The majority (87%) said that a school policy that would allow people to hit and hurt one another was wrong because this could result in harm to persons. By contrast, more than half of the children accepted the legitimacy of the other three actions (67% for undressing, 60% for leaving toys, and 52% for refusing to share). Regarding undressing, an act in the conventional domain, most of the children (60%) stated that it would be wrong to be naked in school although they assumed that the school authorities could legitimize the policy. Similarly, children at all ages showed discriminations in evaluating an authority's (i.e. teacher's) response to children's acts. Children did not assume that a teacher would simply go along with a school policy regardless of the action; rather, they expected a teacher to respond to the actions according to the consequences of actions. In the case of the hitting story, a great number of children assumed that a teacher would reprimand a child for hitting even though the act was consistent with school policy. In the case of the other three acts, however, most children predicted that a teacher would reprimand children engaging in those acts only when the acts were prohibited by the school policy. The results demonstrated that young

children's evaluation of actions is related to the consequences of those actions on others, and not on the legitimacy of the action by an authority, showing that children made a clear distinction between a rule pertaining to persons causing physical harm to others and rules pertaining to nakedness, leaving toys on the floor and refusing to share a snack. Hence, the findings imply that young children distinguish between morality and conventions, since moral rules were evaluated on the basis of factors intrinsic to acts, such as harm inflicted on others and violation of rights and treated as unalterable.

The study by Smetana (1981) showed that children even between 2 ½ and 4 ½ years of age can distinguish between morality and social conventions. She examined middle-class preschool children divided into two age groups; those from 30 to 42 months old and those from 44 to 57 months old. The children were presented with pictures illustrating familiar moral and conventional transgressions. The moral items included hitting, not sharing, shoving, throwing water at another child, and taking another child's apple, while the conventional items were rules that were enforced at the nursery schools, including not participating in show-and-tell, not sitting on the rug during story time, not saying grace before snack, not putting a toy away in the correct place, and not putting belongings in the designated place. For each transgression, they were then asked, "Would the event be alright if there were no rules about it in the preschool?" (indicating rule contingency), and "Would the event be alright at home or in another school?" (indicating relativity). They were also asked about the seriousness of the acts and the amount of punishment the transgressor deserved, ("Whether the teacher should punish the transgressor," and if so, "a little or a lot"). Children judged nearly all moral transgressions to be more wrong in the absence of

rules, and evaluated all moral transgressions as more serious, more deserving of punishment, and less contextually relative than conventional transgressions. However, age trends were observed in children's judgments of rule relativity. Older children were more likely than younger children to regard moral transgressions as universally wrong. All children were more equivocal in their judgments about the relativity of conventional transgressions. The results indicate that preschool children as young as 30 months distinguish between moral and conventional rule violations. These overall findings are consistent with research on older subjects (Nucci, 1981; Weston & Turiel, 1980), but contradict Piaget and Kohlberg's description of young children's inability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules.

Another study by Davidson et al. (1983) found a similar pattern of children's judgments for moral conventional transgressions during middle childhood. In this study, 6, 8, and 10 year old children were asked to make judgments and to provide justifications for four types of social transgression: familiar moral (e.g. bullying), unfamiliar moral (embezzling), familiar conventional (eating with fingers) and unfamiliar conventional (changing husband surname to wife's after marriage). As expected, children distinguished between moral and conventional transgressions in terms of the acceptability of authority intervention, the relevance of expected punishment, and the acceptability of alternative rules. Furthermore, the types of reasons children at all ages gave differed for moral and conventional transgressions. Justifications for moral transgressions pertained to fairness, whereas justifications for conventional transgressions pertained to appeals to authority, punishment avoidance, and customs or traditions. Thus, in line with the above studies, Davidson et al.'s study also demonstrates that children distinguish morality from conventions.

Another study (Smetana, 1985) provides further information about children's conceptions of moral and conventional transgressions. In this study, preschool children were presented with stories describing familiar moral or conventional transgressions, or stories varying in the consistency of prohibitions regarding actions and in responses to events, but in which the events themselves were left unspecified through the use of nonsense words instead of actual words. In some stories, for instance, events were depicted as prohibited in two contexts (home and preschool), whereas in others events were depicted as prohibited only in preschool. This manipulation varied the consistency of prohibitions. Concerning variation in responses to events, some of the stories described "moral" reactions to the unspecified transgressions (e.g. another child cried) whereas other stories depicted teachers issuing commands to stop the behaviour. Children were then asked to justify the transgressions and make a series of judgments based on criteria such as permissibility, generalizability, seriousness, rule contingency, teacher's authority, and rule utility. As in other studies, children in this study differentiated between familiar moral and conventional transgressions. That is, children whose reasons reflected moral concerns (e.g. others' welfare, fairness to others) judged transgressions to be more serious than children who focused on the social conventional aspects of the transgression (e.g. maintaining order in the classroom). These results suggest that young children differentiate moral and conventional actions and that the basis for this differentiation lies in children's ability to infer different features of moral and conventional actions. In addition, the results also indicate that children do not make inferences solely through the knowledge of the content of specific acts that are prohibited or permitted. Instead, children tend to integrate information regarding

emotional reactions, contextual status, and generalizability to form different categories (moral and conventional).

Although children can distinguish between moral and conventional events from their early ages, age differences in their distinction and justifications were found (Davidson et al., 1983). In their study, the youngest children (the 6 years olds) distinguished between moral and conventional events more sharply on familiar than on unfamiliar issues. In other words, familiarity of the events could have an effect on younger children's responses, in particular. Thus it seems that children's ability to apply criteria to a broader range of social events increases with age. Development proceeds from a reliance on specific personal experiences to an ability to abstract or generalize to unfamiliar events. Also, there were age differences in the types of justifications used. For instance, although younger and older children were equally likely to explain that moral transgressions are wrong because they cause harm, older children were significantly more likely to refer to fairness in condemning these transgressions. So, in the moral domain, reasoning develops from a focus primarily on others' welfare to inclusion of a notion of reciprocity between individuals' rights. In contrast, a decrease with age in children's appeals to authority and the avoidance of punishment was observed in the conventional domain. Rather, the children were more likely to focus on the functions of convention in the coordination of social interactions. These results suggest that reasoning or level of conceptual understanding develops within a given domain and becomes more sophisticated with age.

Tisak and Turiel (1988) found similar age differences in children's judgments on the

seriousness of transgressions. In this study, children (1st, 2nd, and 5th graders) were asked to evaluate moral and social conventional transgressions when the magnitude of the consequences was controlled. The events consisted of a moral transgression with minor consequences (stealing an eraser from a classroom), a moral transgression with major consequences (hitting someone), and a conventional transgression with major consequences (wearing pajama to school). When asked to evaluate each act, most children considered both moral and conventional transgressions to be wrong. The conventional transgressions were wrong because they would result in much ridicule from peers and disruption in school whereas the moral transgressions were unacceptable because of negative consequences to others' (that is, others' welfare). However, children across all ages judged the major conventional transgression to be less wrong than either of the moral transgressions. These findings suggest that differences between morality and social convention are not solely quantitative or based on the seriousness of the transgressions, but rather are made on the basis of fundamental differences between the acts. Although the authors found that young children distinguish between the moral and the conventional acts regardless of the seriousness of the transgressions, they also reported age differences. When asked to indicate whether the conventional act would be right or wrong if an authority permitted it, the younger children still regarded the conventional transgression as wrong. Furthermore, Tisak and Turiel also found that, with age, children's moral reasoning shifted from focusing on others' welfare to focusing on fairness and rights. Concerning conventional acts, the level of children's reasoning about the role of conventions in structuring social interactions increased with age. These age differences in social reasoning are similar to those found by Davidson et al. (1983).

According to the findings of the above two studies, children, as their age increased, seem to apply the distinctions between moral and conventional acts to a broader range of social acts, including more abstract and unfamiliar social acts, even though they can distinguish between these different types of social acts at very early ages. Furthermore, the level of conceptual understanding within a domain changes with age.

In summary, Turiel and his colleagues, against Piaget and Kohlberg's assumption, found that even as young as 36 months of age children distinguish between moral and conventional rules. Tisak (1995) carefully reviewed the empirical studies examining children's ability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules in terms of their methodologies and findings. Tisak categorized methodologies into criterion judgments analyses, justifications, ratings and rankings, and then described findings in relation to each methodology. The criterion judgments analyses include evaluation (whether an act is right or wrong), permissibility (whether an individual should be permitted to do an act), alternativity (whether the rule can be changed or negated), rule contingency (whether an act is right or wrong regardless of existence of the rule regulating the act), authority contingency (whether it is right or wrong for an authority to permit an act), and generalizability (whether an act is universal or contextually relative). The findings consistently revealed that both moral and conventional transgressions were wrong. However, the moral transgressions were viewed as less permissible, less alterable, less contingent on rules and authority, and more generalizable than the conventional transgressions. Along with criterion judgments analyses, children's justifications were also considered to determine whether children distinguish between moral and conventional rules. Although children considered both a moral and a conventional transgression wrong, the



justifications children provided were different. The moral transgressions were evaluated on the basis of individuals' welfare and rights, justice, equity, and fairness, whereas evaluations of conventional transgressions were based on sanctions, custom, order, and authority. The methodologies of ratings and rankings also demonstrate that children differentiate moral from conventional acts. According to the findings, children considered moral rules to be more important than conventional rules; hence they considered moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. Also, moral transgressors were viewed to deserve more punishment than conventional transgressors.

Although young children as well as older children and adolescents can make moral judgments that are distinct from conventions, this does not imply that no moral developmental changes occur within the moral domain (Turiel, 1983). Concerning the development within a domain, Turiel and Davidson (1986) proposed that stage transition involves a change in the relation between the elements and regulations internal to a given knowledge structure, and that both elements and regulations are transformed during the consolidation of a structure. The findings of Davidson et al. (1983) and Tisak and Turiel (1988) showed the age-related development in moral judgments in relation to the above assumption of Turiel and Davidson (1986). As mentioned earlier, it has been found that moral judgment at age 6 years is limited to familiar issues. By the age of 10, however, children apply their moral reasoning to relatively unfamiliar as well as familiar issues. Also, 6 year old children's reasoning is systematic but regulated by concrete and categorical concerns with maintaining welfare and avoiding harm whereas the older children's judgments show a concern with maintaining reciprocity and justice (Turiel & Davidson, 1986).

A number of studies in non-Western cultures has been conducted in order to determine whether children in different cultures make similar distinctions between moral and conventional rules (e.g. Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Nisan, 1987; Shweder et al., 1990). In these studies, the moral transgressions pertain to events that are generally considered wrong in most cultures such as harming others or stealing whereas as the conventional transgressions are culturally specific. For instance, in the study in Korea, the conventional items included eating food with fingers, a girl wearing earrings and nail polish, and not putting shoes in the shoe rack before entering the classroom. In contrast, in Nisan's study in Israel, the items pertained to addressing a teacher by first name and bathing of boys and girls together.

Song et al. (1987) asked children between the ages of 5 and 18 to evaluate the moral and the conventional transgressions in terms of permissibility (whether the act is right or wrong), justifications (why the act is right or wrong), generalizability (if the act would be right or wrong in another country), and contingency (if it would be wrong if there were no rules about it here). The results indicate that Korean children, like American children, distinguish between moral and conventional rules from their early years. They treated moral transgressions as more generalizably wrong, less contingent, and less permissible than conventional transgressions. Also, Korean children referred to others' welfare, obligation and fairness in order to justify the wrongness of moral transgressions whereas they referred to authority, sanctions, social nonconformity, social coordination, custom, and tradition concerning conventional transgressions. These findings are very similar to the findings for American children (e.g. Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Turiel, 1980; Weston & Turiel, 1980). Furthermore, the age trends found in this study parallel findings of

other studies in America (Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). When children were asked to justify moral transgressions, reference to obligation increased with age whereas reference to others' welfare decreased. In the case of justifying conventional transgressions, children's pragmatic understanding and reliance on external sanction decreased with age whereas their understanding of social conventions as customary or as means of coordinating social interactions increased. However, some cross-cultural differences were found in children's justification only for conventional transgressions. Korean children tended to make much greater use of justifications pertaining to social status, social roles, appropriate role behaviour, and courtesy, which are not commonly observed in American children's reasoning.

On the basis of the overall findings, Turiel and Davidson (1986) argue that, in moral judgment, initially elements are not comprehensively defined and regulations are partial. However, age differences in children's moral judgments concerning familiar and unfamiliar issues indicate that older children show a more comprehensive understanding of moral elements than younger children. On the other hand, age differences in the types of moral justifications used indicate that older children's conceptual regulations are more comprehensive. For younger children, the concern for welfare and avoidance of harm is a consolidated regulation and regulations based on relational issues of justice are not elaborated. By the age of 10, children consolidate a more mature concern for maintaining justice, which includes a concern with achieving a just reciprocity between the welfare claims of various individuals. That is, the concern for welfare, a regulation in a prior structure, becomes an element in a subsequent structure (Davidson et al., 1983).

Turiel's studies (1978a, 1983) showed a similar age development within the conventional domain through cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. For instance, children conceive of conventions as empirical social uniformities at about 6 years, as concrete rules or authority expectations by age 10, and as mediated by social system by age 15. Turiel and Davidson viewed this age-related development of the conception of conventions as the formation-deformation process. That is, the shift in the conception of conventions between ages 6 and 10 involves a period of formation in which uniformities begin to be viewed as elements subordinated to concrete rules and authority expectations. Correspondingly, the shift between ages 10 and 15 involves a period in which rules and authority are rejected as regulations and begin to be regarded as elements that fall under the more general and adaptive concern with social organization.

Based on these findings on the development within each domain, Turiel and his colleague, the theorists of domain-specificity, view that the acquisition of each successive form of cognitive regulation entails a deformation of the prior form. This does not mean that prior cognitions disappear, but rather that they are subordinated to the subsequent structure in the form of elements. Therefore, earlier structures gradually become the basis for, and part of, later structures over a period of time (Turiel and Davidson, 1986). Furthermore, the development of social judgments entails individuals' social interaction. Individuals seem to broaden the range of components for evaluating social judgments and to further regulate those components as the complexity of their social interaction increased with age (Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986).

### 3.3.3. Culture as an Integral Part of Moral Development

As anthropologists have long noted the cultural variations in the social judgment of right and wrong (Murdock, 1980), cultural psychologists (e.g. Miller & Bersoff, 1995; Shweder et al., 1990) assume that conceptions of morality reflect views of self and problems in adaptation which are culturally variable, and hence that culture is an integral part of moral development. In their perspective, children are assisted in constructing their moral judgment and reasoning through communicating with others within a framework of tradition-based modes of apperception and evaluation. However, in contrast to assumptions of traditional learning theorists (e.g. Bandura, 1973), this does not mean that children merely passively receive, in unchanged form, the cultural understanding of adults. Rather, children negotiate, transform, and create social meaning through interactions. Thus, it is expected that although children's understandings are always constructed within a given cultural context, they may differ qualitatively from those of adults in ways that reflect the children's experiences and developmentally-related ways of interpreting the world (Miller, 1986; Shweder & LeVine, 1975).

This perspective challenged Kohlberg's claims that the idea of moral obligation universally develops out of the idea of conventional obligation and hence that there are no fundamental differences from culture to culture in the moral development; stated simply, the claim that cultural learning affects only the rate but not the path of development. Furthermore, cultural psychologists, in contrast to Turiel and his colleagues' view (e. g. Davidson et al., 1983; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985, 1993; Turiel, 1983; Turiel & Davisdon, 1986; Weston & Turiel, 1980) suggest that the

differentiation of moral events from conventional events is not a necessarily developmental universality and that the distinction between morality and conventions may well be culture-specific (Shweder et al., 1990). The overall findings of cross-cultural studies (e.g. Miller and Bersoff, 1995; Shweder et al., 1990) support the claim that moral development is culturally grounded.

In order to examine American and Indian childhood and adult interpretations and understandings of 39 behavioural cases, representing a range of family life and social practices, Shweder et al. (1990) adapted the form used by Turiel (1983) with a slight modification. The participants were asked to rank the seriousness of transgressions, to evaluate whether the behaviour is right or wrong, and to judge alterability, relativity, and generalizability of the behaviour. Concerning ranking the seriousness of transgressions, Shweder et al. (1990) found high correlations among Americans and high correlations among Indians but little correlation between the two groups, which indicates that Americans and Indians rank the seriousness of transgressions in very different ways. Similarly, Miller and her colleagues (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood 1990) consistently reported that American and Hindu Indian children's moral judgment regarding interpersonal responsibilities more closely resemble those of adults from their own culture than those of children from the comparison culture. This result, combined with the result of Shweder et al. (1990), could imply that qualitatively distinct types of moral codes develop in American and Hindu Indian cultures. However, Miller found certain commonalities among young children's judgments, which reflect that they do not merely passively take information provided by adults. For instance, young children in both cultures tended to treat interpersonal responsibilities as more obligatory than

do adults (Miller et al. 1990). Also, they were more likely than adults to absolve a transgression performed under specific types of emotional duress (Bersoff & Miller, 1993). Another interesting finding is that, with increasing age, Americans judged the issues in more relativistic ways and were more likely to take situational features into account. By contrast, with increasing age, Indians judged the prohibitions as applicable universally and across varying contexts. In light of Damon's suggestion (1988) that moral maturity in some cultures means an ever-expanding tendency to universalize one's beliefs whereas, in other cultures, moral maturity implies applying one's beliefs flexibly to an array of changing situations, Indians, in contrast to Americans, seem to have a tendency to universalize their morals. Although there was agreement between Americans and Indians in evaluating some moral issues dealing with harm, promises, assault, etc., as wrong, they also showed disagreement on issues pertaining to conventions, liberty, equality, sanctity, chastity and status. For example, Indians, but not Americans, viewed a widow eating fish as "a great sin." It was also found that Indians regarded more things as wrong than Americans. Indians considered some transgressions unalterable and universally wrong, and some unalterable but specific to the Indian context. Shweder et al. (1990) suggest that these types of judgments (unalterable and universal; unalterable and context specific) demonstrate that conventional thinking is almost a nonexistent form of thought in their Indian participants. Furthermore, there are some cases showing disagreement between the two cultures about the issue although the issue pertains to harm. For instance, both Americans and Indians regarded kicking a harmless animal or breaking promise as wrong. However, Indians, in contrast to Americans, viewed a husband is beating his wife "black and blue" after she disobeys him by going to a movie alone

without his permission as right.

Based on the cultural differences in moral judgment, Shweder et al (1990) claim that, although Indians as well as Americans recognize a domain of moral issues centred around issues of justice, there are more than one moral code across cultures. That is, in contrast to Americans, Indians tend to give great priority to duties relative to competing rights. Thus, they proposed a distinction between “justice-based” and “duty-based” moralities, which represent the morality of American and Indian cultures respectively. According to Shweder et al. (1990), in the right-based morality, the social order is separated from the natural order, which entails a definition of the moral as “free contracts, promises, or consent among autonomous individuals.” In the duty-based morality, however, the social order is the organizing features of moral rationality. Customary social practices are viewed as part of the natural law, but not as within individual discretion or as a function of social consensus. Individuals in this moral code are supposed to subordinate their rights and the domain of what is private to interpersonal duties.

The distinction between the two moral codes proposed by Shweder is supported by other studies which distinguish between Western and non-Western views of the self. It is generally claimed that Western people highly emphasize individualistic cultural views of self (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Dumont, 1965; Lukes, 1973) whereas non-Western people emphasize more relational or interdependent cultural views of self (Dumont, 1970; Kakar, 1978; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Markus and Kitayama (1991) described the differences in the view of self between



Western and non-Western cultures in terms of independence and interdependence. According to them, in most Western cultures, there is a faith in a clear separateness of distinct persons. Thus, the cultures require an individual to construct himself as an individual whose behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to his own internal repertoire of thought, feeling, and action. In contrast, in non-Western cultures, there is a fundamental connectedness of individuals to each other so that maintaining interdependence among individuals is imperative. The person conceived as an independent agent is central in the individualistic frame, whereas the group conceived as an interdependent network of relationships is central in the collectivistic frame (Turiel, 1998). Based on this distinction, Miller and her colleagues (e.g. Miller & Luther, 1989; Miller et al., 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1995) have also demonstrated that Indians are more likely than Americans to treat interpersonal responsibilities as socially enforceable moral duties rather than as matters of personal decision making and as applying across a wider range of need and role situations.

Up to now, the claims of cultural psychologists and the empirical findings supporting their claims have been reviewed. Based on their view of culture as the main source of morality, they argue that the view of universal stages of moral judgment proposed by Kohlberg is culturally biased in favour of a Westernized elite (Simpson, 1974) and that, in contrast to Kohlberg's assertion, there is more than one way to rationalize a moral code (Shweder et al. 1990). Duty-based morality is an example of an alternative moral code applied in India. Furthermore, incompatible with Turiel, they showed that even the distinction between morals and conventions is culturally relative. By asking Indians the same kind of questions put by Turiel (1983) to Americans,

Shweder et al. (1990) found that Indians often raised what Western people would consider to be conventions and traditions to the status of morals. Moreover, this tendency increased with age, strengthening the view that the content and structure of the moral domain were culturally determined and not universal.

Furthermore, it could be assumed that differences in moral reasoning exist not only between cultures but also within cultures (i.e. subcultures). Gilligan (1982) proposed that there are two distinct styles of thought on moral reasoning, which are gender-related. She argued that Kohlberg's moral theory reflected only males' perspective emphasizing the themes of justice, right and contract, and disregard females' view concerned with responsibility and caring (see Chapter II for details). Miller and Bersoff (1995) criticized the Gilligan gender-linked differences in moral reasoning stating that she did not pay attention to the many non-gender based differences in cultural meaning systems and practices that affect individuals' view of self, morality, emotion, and even attachment (e.g. Harwood, 1992; Harwood & Miller, 1991; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). As a consequence, they claimed, Gilligan ended up with the implausible prediction that concepts of self and morality would be more similar among individuals of the same gender from divergent cultural contexts as compared with among individuals of different genders from similar cultural contexts. For instance, a secular woman shared more similar moral concept with a traditional Hindu Indian woman than with a secular American man. However, Archer and Lloyd (1985) pointed out that most cultures clearly differentiated the subcultures of male and female, and asserted that their behaviours are consistent with the main parameters by which categorization within the culture takes place. Furthermore, there are many studies that show how boys and girls grow up with

different expectations, and are explicitly treated differently in a variety of ways, and how they define themselves as members of a social group according to the expectations and norms of group (e.g. Caldera, Huston, & O'Brien, 1989; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1982). On the basis of these findings of gender differences, Haste and Baddeley (1991), in contrast to Miller and Bersoff (1995), postulated that it would be sufficient to create separate cultures based on gender. According to them, women differ from men in terms of the framework they employ for understanding the world. The common features of the female perspective, in contrast to that of the male, is a preference for holism and connection, which can be interpreted as care and responsibility in Gilligan's terms, rather than separation and mastery.

In their study, Haste and Baddeley (1991) asked British adolescents aged between 12 and 17 a question, which represents the "private" moral domain: "Why is it important to keep a promise." They also examined the manifestation of different ways of understanding in the "public" domain in several ways, including a modified version of Adelson's "islanders story," which presents the situation of a thousand people marooned on an island confronting the problems of forming a community (see Adelson & O'Neil, 1966 for details). The results suggest that both boys and girls have access to each orientation (the justice and the care orientation) and each perspective (the connection and the separation) but that girls are more likely than boys to show greater mixture and move more easily between them. These gender differences consonant with other findings (e.g. Johnson, 1988; Wingfield & Haste, 1987) imply that the social life of adolescent boys tends to reinforce the individualism and autonomy ethos, and that there is little to counter it, whereas girls are exposed to the dominant cultural message as well as to the alternative female culture.

Furthermore, based on the findings, Haste and Baddeley (1991) suggest that Western culture consisting of a variety of subcultures is more complex than can be accounted for by a single dominant moral or social theory and that gender experience is at least a quasi-culture. However, the claim of existence of gender differences in moral reasoning is still controversial since many studies (e.g. Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1984, 1986b, 1989; Walker & Morgan, 1991) found no gender differences (see section 3.1 in Chapter III).

In summary, overall findings consistently revealed that children's development entails the formation of different but systematic types of domains of social reasoning as they interact with a varied social world. Furthermore, it is suggested that children's moral development needs to be understood alongside and in interaction with their understanding of various aspects of the culture which they belong to.

### **3.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MORAL REASONING IN KOREA AND UNIQUENESS OF KOREAN CULTURE**

#### **3.4.1 Empirical Studies on Moral Reasoning in Korea**

Theories of moral reasoning, especially Kohlberg's theory, have also been studied in Korea (e.g. Kang, 1994; Lee, 1981; Lee, 1985). However, most of these studies were limited to cross-sectional rather than longitudinal designs that examined relationships between moral stages and various variables such as age, gender, and SES. Additionally, there has been no empirical study that examined moral reasoning with respect to Kohlberg's moral orientations.

Lee (1981) examined the development of moral reasoning in a total of 738 children,

who were from primary, middle and high schools, based on the hypothesis that the moral stages varied across age, gender, social background and psychological home environment such as the quality of interaction with parents and the parents' discipline. The educational and economic levels of parents were investigated so as to be used as indicators of social background. In order to measure the psychological home environment, the Home Environment Diagnosis Test (Chung, 1969 in Lee, 1981) was carried out. Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, translated into Korean, were used to measure the moral stages of the children. Although the original type of response to Kohlberg's test was open-ended, a multiple-choice test was used in this study because of the difficulty in scoring a large number responses (i.e. this is extremely time consuming).

The results revealed that the moral stage attained by participants increased with age. Development through the moral stages with age was in line with the findings of other studies conducted in different cultures (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietzen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978; Walker, 1989). All differences between the age groups (the groups of the primary, the middle, and the high schools) were significant at the level of  $p < .001$ .

With respect to gender differences, the girls' scores were significantly higher than those of boys in all the three age groups ( $p < .01$ ). Lee attributed the gender difference to the characteristics of Korean society. Korean society was traditionally more likely to emphasise certain virtues such as gentleness, sincerity and decency for girls in comparison with boys. Thus girls may be more mentally mature than boys in certain respects including moral reasoning. However, based on other studies which

were mentioned earlier (e.g. Cohn, 1991; Gregg et al., 1994; Walker, 1984, 1986b), the gender difference in progression through the moral stages in adolescence, in favour of girls, seems to be universal trend rather than a phenomenon in one particular cultural context.

When the two further variables, social background and psychological home environment, were considered, no relationship between social background and the moral stages was found and the positive correlation between psychological home environment and moral stage was not statistically significant. However it has been suggested that psychological home environment seemed more crucial in the development of moral stages than social background.

The use of the multiple-choice test instead of the open-ended response in examining moral reasoning could limit the validity of this study. That is, it is possible that a child might choose an item presented even though the item did not exactly match the child's own moral reasoning, or even when the child did not understand it. The problem of validity in the two forms of the test was already reported by Rest (1986). He found out that a multiple-choice test of moral reasoning such as a Defining Issues Test (DIT) was easier than an open-ended test such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (MJJ). When the two tests were compared, DIT credited participants with more advanced thinking than did MJJ. For instance, in MJJ, stage 5 of moral reasoning was rare even among professional, middle-aged adults, whereas, when DIT was administered, stage 5 thinking was found even in adolescents. Therefore it was concluded that a multiple-choice test was vulnerable to overestimating the moral stages of participants while an open-ended test had a possibility of underestimation.

Lee (1985) conducted a study in Korea to examine the development of moral stages across gender and SES with 487 children aged 12 using the same method that Lee (1981) had used. In contrast to the findings of Lee (1981) and others (e.g. Kang, 1994; Park, 1983), this study showed no difference between boys and girls in moral stages. There have been other studies which have supported the absence of a gender difference (e.g. Ahn, 1987; Chung, 1987). With regard to Socio Economic Status (SES), Lee (1985) supported the findings of Lee (1981) that showed no significant relationship between SES and moral stages.

Cho (1990) also examined the relationship between moral reasoning and SES with 290 primary school children who were at third- or fifth-grade. The moral stage was measured with Kohlberg's moral dilemmas while SES was classified according to mother's education level and economic status. The findings revealed that older children showed higher moral stages than younger children. However, SES was not significantly correlated with the moral stages in either age group.

On the other hand, a significant relationship between SES and moral reasoning has been found in some studies (e.g. Kim, 1988; Kim, 1990; Park, 1983). Having adapted them to the Korean situation, Park (1983) administered Kohlberg's moral dilemmas to 353 students aged 10, 13 and 16 years. One of the hypotheses of the study was that the development of moral stages might differ according to parents' occupations that were used to indicate SES. Professional and administrative posts were regarded as upper-middle class, clerical workers, sales workers and skilled labourers as middle class and those in unskilled labour as lower class in this study. Differences in moral development according to the parents' occupations were found

in this study. The children whose parents' occupations fell into the upper middle class category attained a higher moral stage than children whose parents' occupations fell into the other two categories. Based on these findings, it was suggested that children with a higher SES background show a higher moral stage compared with those having lower SES backgrounds.

The above results concur with the findings of Kim (1988) and Kim (1990) who also examined differences in the development of moral reasoning according to parental occupation, but using DIT. DIT is closely related to the Kohlberg system and the two tests show similar kinds of longitudinal trends, correlational patterns and responsiveness to educational interventions (see Rest, 1983). Nevertheless, the DIT and the Kohlberg system should not be regarded as equivalent because there are methodological and conceptual differences between the two tests (see Rest, 1986). In addition, the correlation of the tests varied in the range of .3 to .7, depending on which version of the Kohlberg scoring system was being used and on sample homogeneity (Rest, 1983; 1986). Thus the findings of Kim (1988) and Kim (1990) should be carefully applied since the present research is aimed at examining Kohlberg's moral stage model in particular.

Conclusions drawn from the empirical studies in Korea were very similar to those based on studies carried out in other cultural contexts. First of all, Koreans also showed a clear trend towards the moral stages increasing with age combined with educational level. This suggested that Kohlberg's moral stage model is applicable to Koreans, at least in terms of the age trend. Secondly, there were few studies showing a gender difference. Besides, where a gender difference in moral stages



was found, girls tended to be superior to boys in terms of moral stages. The girl-superior trend could be explained with the overall precocity of girls by late adolescence since this is also a finding common across different cultures. Finally, the difference in moral stages across SES (Socio Economic Status) remains controversial. Where a difference was found, children from families with a higher SES showed more advanced moral reasoning than others.

Regarding the issue of translation of the dilemmas and coding system, most studies used materials that had already been translated, adapted and used by Koreans before. For that reason, the translation equivalence was not directly examined in most studies. Although the assumption is a little convoluted, Rest, Thoma, Moon, and Getz (1986) assume that if the translations are adequate, and if the theory of moral judgment applies to other cultures, then the translated materials given in other cultures should behave as the original materials do. Consequently, it is proposed that the degree to which translation provided similar patterns of reliability, the more appropriate are the translations. Based on these assumptions, test-retest reliability was provided as an indirect indicator of the equivalence even though it was only for DIT. Park and Johnson (1984) obtained a test-retest coefficient of DIT (.69) comparable with those found with the original DIT (.77) in a heterogeneous sample of Korean students. According to these reliability scores, the translations seemed adequate for Koreans.

As previously considered, Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) indicated that there may be differences in the endpoint of moral development according to ethnic or cultural background even if the sequence through the moral stages is universal. However, most studies conducted in Korea and presented here limited the samples to children

and adolescents. This means that the question of the development through the endpoint of moral stages for Koreans, which could be influenced by the uniqueness of Korean culture, remains unanswered.

Lastly, most empirical studies in Korea have examined Kohlberg's theory of moral development in terms of relationships between the moral stages and variables such as age, gender and socio-economic status and concluded that the theory was applicable to Koreans. However, these studies failed to explore cultural aspects peculiar to Koreans which might cause cultural differences in moral reasoning between Koreans and people from other cultures. This failure appears to be due to a lack of interest in cultural influence rather than the absence of the cultural influence itself. In the next section, uniqueness of Korean culture, which might affect Koreans' moral reasoning will be reviewed.

### **3.4.2 Uniqueness of Korean Culture**

Korean society has rapidly modernized in a few decades, but is still considered regarded as maintaining its own unique characteristics, which are different from those of Western societies (Song et al., 1987). That is, Koreans still strongly show traditional, authoritarian, conforming, and age-graded culture compared with Western societies (Park and Johnson, 1984). This uniqueness of Korean culture is probably based on a mixture of Buddhist, Confucian, and Korean traditional thought, which have mainly been employed to elaborate Koreans' perspective for a long time. In this section, some features of Korean society which could lead to cultural differences in moral reasoning will be reviewed.

First of all, filial piety is thought to be one of the most important virtues among

Oriental people, including Koreans and Chinese, and Middle Eastern people (Dien, 1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Song et al., 1987). In those societies, parental respect and authority are greatly emphasized on the basis of the traditional concept of filial piety. However, filial piety seems to be attenuated among Koreans (Kim, 1992) and Chinese people in recent years (Walker & Moran, 1991). Walker & Moran (1991) referred to the impact of the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent fading of the importance of elders in order to explain weakened filial piety in Chinese society. Similarly, Kim (1992) pointed out that Korean adolescents' concept of filial piety seems to have changed greatly within the last decade. In Kim's study (1992), when the adolescent participants were directly asked what they would do when their parents asked them to do something morally regarded wrong, 59% of them answered that they would not obey, 40% answered that they would obey and tell the parents that it was wrong afterwards, while only 2% said they would obey unconditionally. In 1984, in response to the same question, the first answer was given by 30% of the adolescents, the second by 63%, and the last by 7%, respectively. This change in the concept of filial piety seems to be due to a recent tendency of parents to be more tolerant of and less strict with their children owing to the decrease in the number of children in a family as well as the change of the family system to a child-centred nuclear family (Adolescent White Paper, 1992). Thus, these findings imply that child-centred family relationships have brought about changes in the concept of filial piety in Korea, such as the erosion of both the authority of the parents and absolute obedience of the children. However, it is true that Korean society still emphasizes filial piety and hence it could still affect Korean's moral reasoning as it did in other cultures (e.g. Dien, 1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as

cited in Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985).

The concepts of '*Chung*' and 'we' seem to be another concepts peculiar to Koreans and to influence their moral reasoning. *Chung* refers to the emotional bond, mostly in positive terms, between individuals that accumulates slowly over a long period of time. It is sometimes used as in contrast to the concept of "reason". Korean psychologists, Choi and Choi (1990a), stated that, if two people were tied based on *chung*, the boundary between individuals is dimmed and a sense of one-ness, same-ness, affection, comfort, and acceptance etc. emerges. They also pointed out Koreans' belief that one cannot consciously develop *chung* towards others, but that this spontaneously and involuntarily occurs in the heart. Ma (1988b, 1992) also found a similar concept, so-called '*ch'ing*' (human affection or sentiment), in Chinese people. According to Ma, Chinese people at Kohlberg's moral stage 4 would uphold or maintain the law. However, the Chinese view of law is less rational, objective or rigorous in comparison with the Western one, probably because of the emphasis on *ch'ing*. In fact, *ch'ing* in Chinese and *chung* in Korean are written with the same character only the pronunciation is different. This implies that Koreans and Chinese may have similar concepts of *chung*, although it might not be exactly the same. Therefore *chung* might affect moral judgment among not only Chinese people but also Koreans.

The concept of 'we' is one of the most important component of interpersonal relationships among Koreans (Choi, 1997; Choi & Choi, 1990b). According to them, being part of 'we' means that individuals develop close empathic interpersonal bonds, emotionally, experientially, and even cognitively with each other. Consequently, the

boundary between individuals becomes vague. The ideal relationship between individuals who were in the same 'we' group is to provide unlimited care, mutual dependency, and unconditional, self-sacrificing help for each other. The concept of 'we' appears even in the way of using language. Koreans tend to use the words 'we', 'our', and 'us' rather than 'I', 'me', and 'my'. For instance, a Korean would say 'our parents' rather than 'my parents' even though he or she is an only child. Choi & Choi (1990b) claim that the concept of 'we' is representative of collectivism among Koreans. In the collectivistic culture, the tranquillity of community sometimes takes precedence over the rights of individuals; thus the individuals are asked to relinquish some freedom and identity in order for society to function. (e.g. Dein, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985)

The concept of 'we' cannot be separated from the concept of *chung* (Choi, 1997; Choi & Choi, 1990b). That is, in order to share the strong concept of 'we' among individuals, there must be *chung* between themselves. At the same time, they must share the concept of 'we' in order to feel *chung* between them. Thus having the concept of *chung* as well as the concept of 'we' is fundamental in interpersonal relationships among Koreans. Besides, the findings of the present study indicate that Koreans tend to apply the concept of *chung* not only to the relationship between individuals but also to the entire society since they develop a concept that the society is a kind of 'we' group.

The concepts of *chung* and 'we' seem to relate to Koreans' general view of individuals. Western people view an individual as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who compromises a unique configuration of internal attributes

such as abilities, traits and values, and behaves primarily as a consequences of these internal attributes (Dien, 1982; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). In contrast, the Korean view of individuals is similar to the view, so-called interdependent self, commonly found in non-Western cultures, which have collectivistic perspectives (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In those cultures, an individual is viewed as an imperfect partial being in the surrounding context rather than an independent being. Thus, Koreans try to make close interpersonal relationships with other partial individuals by means of sharing the concept of 'we' and *chung*, which relates to emotional state (Choi, 1997).

Another value peculiar to Koreans is so-called "the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice," which means that virtue should be rewarded while the vice should be punished. This concept is distinguishable from Piaget's concept of "immanent justice" (1965/1932) although they seem similar. The "immanent justice" concept represents the young children's belief that "a fault automatically brings about its own punishment." Thus, although two events may not be related to each other, children tend to infer that a bad event is a result of a bad deed that occurred before, while a good event is a result of a good deed. For instance, if a boy stole an apple and fell down on the way home, children tend to believe that he fell down because he had stolen an apple before. However, concerning the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice, individuals simply believe that an individual should be punished when he/she acts badly and should be rewarded when the act is good without attempting to make a connection between unrelated events. The fact that most Korean folk tales contain the concept of the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice (Lee & Chang, 1986) indicates that Koreans have traditionally

valued these concepts. Korean children are exposed to many Korean folk tales teaching such values from an early age. Thus it might be natural for Koreans to internalize the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice and hence to demonstrate this concept in their moral reasoning.

Koreans' traditional tendency to expect men and woman to play different social roles could influence Koreans' moral reasoning although the different role expectation is greatly attenuated nowadays. "A wise mother and good wife" has been regarded as the ideal type of woman in Korea from the old days. The wise mother and good wife has to do her best and sometimes sacrifice herself for the sake of other family members. Based on this concept, in Korea, women are more likely than men to be asked from childhood to take account of the feelings of other family members in order to maintain family harmony. Thus Korean women may place a greater value on reconciliation and collective decision-making as far as interpersonal relationships within the family are concerned. If indeed different gender-role expectation is found to have an influence on Korean people's moral reasoning, it could partially support Gillian's claim of gender differences in moral reasoning.

Furthermore, since Korean culture is characterized as having a collectivistic perspective, Koreans may emphasize compromise and reconciliation rather than choice and commitment when confronting interpersonal conflict. Also, they give great consideration to maintenance of the normative order, showing a tendency to adhere to the norms and rules of society and the fulfilment of one's duty as a member of society. In fact, the importance of keeping rules, especially the law, is promoted through mass-media as well as within a unified school curriculum over the country.

Song et al. (1987) also pointed out that Korean society emphasizes the importance of authority, conformity, and duty, and uses them as public justification for adhering to all rules. These general characteristics of collectivistic culture could differentiate Koreans' moral reasoning from that of Westerners.

The uniqueness of Korean culture, which probably affects moral reasoning, can be inferred from studies conducted in China and Japan. These two countries share much common history and culture with Korea so their perspectives are very similar to one another. Ma (1992), in his study of Chinese people, asserted the existence of a commonly shared respect for all human and animal life based on Buddhism, and argued that this concept influences the moral development of Chinese. Buddhism teaches that benevolence should be applied to all living things in nature as well as to the human being (Tachibana, 1975). Since Koreans, like Chinese people, share a Buddhism tradition, the concept of respect for all lives may equally influence Koreans' moral judgment. Iwasa (1992), in a comparative study of moral reasoning between Japanese and Americans, found that the Japanese tended to prefer dying with a pure conscience over extending life with a contaminated conscience. According to the study, 10 out of 15 Japanese adults at postconventional level of Kohlberg's stages chose "a short life with honour and dignity" rather than "prolongation of life by illegal means," unlike Americans at the same level. Since Koreans also traditionally value "a life with honour and dignity" on the basis of Confucianism, this perspective may also influence their moral reasoning

Up to now, the uniqueness of Korean cultural thought patterns which might affect Koreans' moral reasoning was reviewed. Koreans generally emphasize the concepts



of filial piety, *chung* and 'we,' the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice, different gender-role expectation, compromise and reconciliation, the conformity to the norms and rules of society, fulfillment of one's duty, the respect for all lives, and a life with pure conscience or honour, and these concepts are considered to be different from those of Western people. The influence of these concepts on Koreans' moral reasoning will be examined in two separate studies in the present paper and described in the next chapters.

### 3.5 CONCLUSION

By and large, the literature review on Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning focused on several points of moral stages and the content of moral reasoning. Concerning the moral stages, some studies showed variations in the rates and endpoints of development across cultural backgrounds. However, most studies in various cultural settings supported the developmental sequence of moral stages regardless of individuals' background attributes such as culture, gender and socio-economic status. As to the content of moral reasoning, including moral orientations, not only age-related tendencies but also cultural and gender influences were indicated. In particular, many studies suggested that individuals' moral reasoning should be understood in connection with their cultural background. Based on these findings, the present study will examine two assumptions, namely that (1) Koreans follow Kohlberg's developmental sequence of moral stages in spite of a possibility of differences in the rate of the development, and (2) that concepts peculiar to Korean culture could affect Koreans' moral reasoning, especially the use of moral orientation.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **4.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Several questions will be addressed concerning the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning to Korean and British children, aged 7 to 16 years, in terms of the moral stages, orientations, chosen issues and responses unscorable with Kohlberg's criteria judgments. The questions are as follows.

##### **1. Development through Kohlberg's moral stage**

- i) Do children show an increase through the moral stages with age?
- ii) Is there any difference between the two cultures in children's progression through the moral stages?
- iii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in their progression through the moral stages?
- iv) Is there any interaction between these variables (culture, age, gender), which affects the development of moral stages?

##### **2. Usage of Kohlberg's moral orientations**

- i) Does the usage of moral orientations differ according to age?

ii) Is there any difference between Koreans and British children in the usage of moral orientations?

iii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in the usage of moral orientation?

iv) Is there any interaction between these variables (culture, age, gender), which affects the usage of moral orientations?

v) Is there any age, cultural, and/or gender difference in children's chosen issues for each dilemma in connection with the use of moral orientations?

### 3. Chosen Issues

i) Is there any age difference in children's chosen issues?

ii) Is there any difference between the two cultures in children's chosen issues?

iii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in their chosen issues?

iv) Is there any interaction between these variables (culture, age, gender), which affects the development of moral stages?

### 4. Unscorable responses

Are there any responses that are not able to be matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments due to cultural uniqueness?

In summary, Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, orientations, and chosen issues will be examined in relation to age, gender and culture and children's unscorable

responses are explored.

## 4.2 PARTICIPANTS

A total of 128 children were selected as participants. They were evenly divided into subgroups by their cultural background (i.e. Korean and British), age, and gender: eight boys and eight girls were chosen from each age group of 7, 10, 13 and 16 years old in each cultural group (Table 4.2.1).

All children had similar socio-economic status (SES) and level of academic achievement in order to control any effect of these variables on moral reasoning. Children's SES levels were based on the educational level and the occupations of their parents. All parents of children in the sample had at least 12 years of education or were educated to university level, and most were in "white collar" occupations.

**Table 4.2.1** Subgroups of Participants

Nation	Koreans									
Age	7 (16)		10 (16)		13 (16)		16 (16)		Total (64)	
Gender	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (32)	Girls (32)
Nation	British									
Age	7 (16)		10 (16)		13 (16)		16 (16)		Total (64)	
Gender	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (8)	Girls (8)	Boys (32)	Girls (32)
Age	7 (32)		10 (32)		13 (32)		16 (32)		Total (128)	
Gender	Boys (16)	Girls (16)	Boys (16)	Girls (16)	Boys (16)	Girls (16)	Boys (16)	Girls (16)	Boys (64)	Girls (64)

( ) = numbers of participants.

The teachers selected the children as being average or just above average in academic level. The teachers selected them according to certain criteria: reading age for British children and their academic rank in the classroom for Korean children. One of the aims of the present study is to investigate differences in moral reasoning between the Western and non-Western culture. Thus, for the British sample, only those who had a Christian-based background (that is, English children) were selected for interviews. "Christian-based" did not mean that it was necessary for subjects to be religious. Rather, that the child experienced a typical Western culture. Ethnic minority groups such as other Europeans, Muslims or Asians were excluded in order to represent British culture as Western culture.

#### 4.3 INSTRUMENT

Kohlberg's moral judgment inventory, Form A was used for the interviews. Form A consists of three stories: these are Dilemma III, the classic Heinz's dilemma, Dilemma III', Officer Brown's dilemma and Dilemma I, Joe's dilemma. Each story presents a different type of dilemma between two issues such as life vs law for Heinz's dilemma, morality and conscience vs punishment for Officer Brown's dilemma, and contract vs authority for Joe's dilemma.

For Koreans the dilemmas and probe questions were translated into Korean and were also back-translated in order to ascertain the preciseness of the translation. These materials were hardly modified except for characters' names and the unit of currency.

Some difficulties in terms of understanding the stories were found in 7 year old children during the pilot study. Thus the stories and probe questions were slightly modified for 7 year old children based on the pilot study (see the section on the pilot

study for details).

10-12 probe questions were provided for each story to clarify a participant's moral judgment and the reasons for it. According to the manual it was possible to eliminate some of the questions in certain occasions such as when time for interviewing was limited. The questions which could be eliminated were identified in the manual. In addition flexibility was admitted so that an interviewer could slightly modify them according to the circumstances even though the questions were standardized. In the present study participants were asked approximately 10 questions for Heinz's dilemma, 6 questions for Officer Brown's dilemma, and 11 questions for Joe's dilemma. In Officer Brown's dilemma there were originally 12 questions to be asked. However questions 7- 12 were eliminated as these were originally designed to elicit the participant's theory of ethics and not be scored for moral stage so those questions were eliminated. There were two main reasons for this elimination. First of all, the interview would be too long for children if all the questions were asked. Secondly the questions seemed too abstract for children to answer. The set of questionnaires is presented in the appendix.

#### **4.4 PROCEDURE**

##### **4.4.1 Administration**

Oral interviews were conducted individually for all the children in the schools which they were attending. It took approximately 30 minutes for an interview. All interviews were administered individually, tape-recorded, and transcribed for scoring afterwards.

#### 4.4.2 Scoring

Children's responses to the dilemmas were scored in two ways in order to examine moral stage and moral orientation respectively. The scoring followed the manual, the Measurement of Moral Judgment vol. II: Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

##### Moral Stage

Each dilemma represents a conflict between two moral issues such as life vs law in Heinz's dilemma. The participant is asked to make a choice as to which issue should take priority. That is, the issues reflect what the participant thinks should be done. The scoring procedure begins by determining the "chosen issue" (i.e. the action choice favoured by the participant in each dilemma) through reading over all the participant's responses and asking what basic choice the participant makes. For instance, if a child mostly argued that Heinz should steal the drug for his wife during the interview, he or she is presumed to have chosen the life issue.

The next step is to classify all the responses according to not only issue but also norm and element. The norm represents the moral value or object of concern that is being brought to bear by the participant in justifying a choice. In other words, the norms could clarify the rationale for why the participant chose the issue. The moral norms include life, property, truth, affiliation, authority, law, contract, conscience and punishment. Kohlberg defined these norms based on fundamental human rights and freedom and he assumed these rights to be universal. These rights and freedom are right to life, the protection of law, freedom of conscience (moral-religious beliefs) and affiliation (freedom, marriage, parenting), the right not to be subject to arbitrary

authority or punishment, the right to voice in the government or political authority system, right to property and the freedom to make contractual agreements. The element provides the different ways in which the significance of a norm may be explained. An element is the reason given for endowing the norm with value. The 17 elements are presented in Table 2.2.1 in Chapter II. The issues, norms and elements of the criterion judgments have been strictly classified in the scoring manual. For instance, regarding Heinz's dilemma, if a participant said that "Heinz should not steal the drug because it is the druggist's, he invented it," the manual indicates that he/she chose the law issue, stage 2, based on the "property" norms and the "having a right" element (#CJ 6; the number of the Criterion Judgment, 6).

The issue, norms and elements of participants' responses can be coded by means of a careful comparison between the responses and the criterion judgements. There were two types of match between a response and a criterion judgements; the clear match and the marginal match. The clear match demands at least the minimum number of required critical indicators to be presented in the interview response. The marginal match includes some ambiguity between a response and criterion judgement although the interview judgement is essentially the same as the criterion judgement. Also a guess score was assigned in certain cases such as where no interview judgement and criterion judgement matches had been found not in the relevant issue but other issues. Concerning the response for Officer Brown's dilemma, "the judge should let Heinz go free because he might steal the drug out of a great responsibility to care for his wife," there is no criterion judgment applicable to this response under the morality and conscience issue, the relevant issue. However a guess score can be assigned in this case since the responses matched a criterion judgment in the life issue of Heinz's



dilemma (#CJ 21). The scoring of all the interview judgements was followed by assigning stage scores. It started with calculating the stage score for each issue. The obtained issue scores were used to calculate not only a global score as a whole but also a weighted average score (WAS).

In calculating issue scores, all the numbers of interview judgement and criterion judgment match in each stage for an issue were added. When a match was on a stage transition each stage was counted as half. The stage which was represented by 25% or more of the scores was regarded as the issue score. If two or more stages were represented by 25% or more of the scores and the frequency was the same, then a transition score was assigned to the issue. Two or more stages were over 25% and one stage was represented more than the other(s) then the former stage was the “major” stage while latter stage(s) was(were) “minor” stage(s). If a child had two responses scored at stage 2, one response scored at stage 2/3, and one response scored at stage 3 for the life issue in Heinz’s dilemma, the child’s stage for the life issue consists of 63% (2.5 out of 4) of stage 2 and 38% (1.5 out of 4) of stage 3. Both the stages 2 and 3 are over 25% and consequently the child’s stage for the life issue in Heinz’s dilemma is stage 2/3.

The global stage score was computed through calculating each stage score of the six issues. The weights of issue scores were different in computing the global score. Scores for chosen issues were given the greatest weight (3 points) followed by those of nonchosen issues (2 points). The guess scores were given the least weight (1 point) regardless whether on a chosen or a nonchosen issue. Table 4.4.1 shows how to score for each issue in detail. Then the weighted points of each stage was

**Table 4.4.1** The Way to Weight Points for Chosen and Nonchosen Issues and Guess Scores

TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

*Source:* Colby and Kohlberg (1987)

converted into percentage and the global stage score was assigned according to the percentage. If a stage was over 25% of the total number of weighted points then the stage was the global stage for the interview. If two or more stages reached at least 25% then a mixed stage that included all stages at or above the 25% level was assigned. If a child was scored stage 3, 3(2), and 2/3 for the chosen issues and stages 2/3, 2, and 2(3) for nonchosen issues for the dilemmas respectively the total weighted points for stage 3 is 8.2 (55%) and for stage 2 is 6.8 (45%) according to Table 4.3.1. Since both stages are over 25%, the global stage of the child is 2/3.

To calculate WAS, each stage represented in the interview was multiplied by the weighted points for that stage and then the product for all the stages were added. The sum of the products was divided by the total number of weighted points and then multiplied by 100.

When WAS of the child in the above example is calculated according to the formula,

$$\{(2 \times 6.8 + 3 \times 8.2) / 15\} \times 100 = 255$$

2, 3 ; stages 2 and 3 respectively

6.8, 8.2 ; the weighted points for stages 2 and 3 respectively

15 ; the total number of weighted points

Thus, the WAS of the child is 255.

It was assumed that the WASs showed more precise moral scores of individuals. That is, the global stage only indicated the stage at which weighted points reached at least 25% of the total weighted points and ignored the other stages of which scores were under 25% of the total weighted points. However the WAS did consider all the scores that a participant obtained. Thus, it was possible for individuals to have different WASs although they were at the same global stage. It even happened that a participant who was at higher global stage than the others showed a lower WAS than the others. For this reason WAS tended to be used more frequently than the global stage when difference of moral reasoning across sub-groups, such as age groups, gender groups, and ethnic groups, were compared.

#### Moral Orientation

Each participant's use of moral orientations was also scored through matching the participant's responses with criterion judgments. These matches indicate which elements the participant used, and the elements were classified into five orientations (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter II). Consequently the use of the orientations can be generated from the use of the elements. For instance, the response for Heinz's dilemma, "Heinz should steal the drug because the druggist was trying to rip him off" matches the criterion judgment (#CJ 5), which indicates that the retributing element was used under the life issue. Therefore the individual is scored as using the normative orientation for the moral reasoning since the retributing element falls under the normative orientation.

### **4.5 RELIABILITY OF MJJ**

Reliability data have been compiled from several studies on MJJ for moral stages and

orientations. These will now be reviewed.

#### 4.5.1 Review of Reliability Studies

##### 4.5.1.1 Reliability of Moral Stages

The reliability of Kohlberg's moral judgement interviews for assessing moral stages have mainly been examined by means of test-retest interviews and interrater agreement. Colby and Kohlberg (1987) conducted test-retest interviews with 84 individuals using Form A, B or both. The same forms were used at Time 1 and 2 in consistent testing conditions and the intervals between the two tests ranged from 3 to 6 weeks. Approximately equal numbers of males and females, aged 8 to 28 years were chosen from elementary to graduate schools in the Boston area. Correlations between Time 1 and 2 for Form A and B are both in the range of .96-.99. Comparison with the these reliability figures of DIT, .68-.92 (Rest, 1979), further supports the fact that MJI is highly reliable. With regard to percentage of absolute agreement, complete agreement between scores at Time 1 and 2 occurred in 75%-88% of responses for the 9-point standard scale (the five stages and the four transition points between stages) and 53%-78% for the 13-point scale (this includes two transition points between each stage, e.g. stage 1, 1(2), 2(1), 2). Overall, it appears that almost all participants received scores within one third of a stage of each other (one step-from 1 to 1(2), 1(2) to 2(1), 2(1) to 2 and so on) on the two interviews.

With respect to interrater reliability, Snarey (1985) reviewed the interrater reliability data of studies conducted in various cultural settings such as United States, Kenya, Taiwan, Turkey. Ten studies used the latest version of Kohlberg's moral judgement, the 1978 standardized manual, and had an interrater reliability in the range from .75

to .98. Colby and Kohlberg (1987) also examined interrater reliability with twenty Form A interviews which were used for the test-retest reliability, and scored independently by five raters. The raters included both experienced and new scorers. Percentage agreement figures for interrater reliability on Form A ranged from 88% to 100% for agreement within a third of a stage, from 75% to 88% for complete agreement using the 9-point scale, and from 53% to 63% for complete agreement based on the 13-point scale. With respect to interrater reliability figures, Colby and Kohlberg (1987) compared the MJJ with Loevingers Sentence Completion Test (1970, as cited in Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). Interrater agreement on total protocol Sentence Completion scores using a 10-point scale is reported to range from 50% to 80%, which is lower than the agreement on MJJ, using the 13-point scale as well as using the 9-point scale. Other studies also show high figures of interrater reliability (e.g. Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991; Walker et al., 1987). In the study of Walker et al. (1987), interrater reliability was determined by a second rater who independently scored 24 randomly selected interviews. In terms of the 9-point scale, there was 87.5% complete agreement between the raters and, for WASs, the correlation is .94.

#### 4.5.1.2 Reliability of Moral Orientations



It is true that the research on the reliability of MJJ in relation to moral orientations is not as active as the research in connection with moral stages. There are two studies which examined interrater reliability of MJJ for moral orientations which will be briefly reviewed here. Walker (1989) determined the agreement between two raters, who independently scored 32 randomly selected interviews. Reliability coefficient

for the moral orientation was .80. In the study of Walker and Moran (1991), 15 interviews were randomly selected in order to assess the interrater reliability and a correlation of .85 was revealed.

In conclusion, the data that examined the reliability of MJJ in terms of moral stages and orientations were presented here. The reliability of MJJ for moral stages was assessed by means of test and retest interviews and interrater agreement, while with respect to moral orientations, only the interrater reliability was used. According to these data, the instrument has proven to be highly reliable.

#### **4.5.2 A Reliability Test of the Present Study**

The present study conducted an interrater reliability test for both children's moral stages and use of moral orientations. The reliability test was separated into two parts according to cultural groups. Two second raters whose mother tongues are Korean and English respectively, were asked to score Korean and British children's responses to dilemmas respectively. Both the raters have completed a Masters course in psychology. A total of 40 interviews, 20 interviews from each cultural group, were selected for the reliability test. In order to strengthen the reliability, three to four interviews were randomly selected from each stages (stage 1, 1/2, 2, 2/3, 3, and 3/4). In addition, a 13-point scale (stage 1, 1(2), 2(1), 2, 2(3), 3(2), 3,...) was used for the reliability test although the children's moral stages were scored with a 9-point scale(stage 1, 1/2, 2, 2/3,...) in the main study. Concerning moral stages, there was 60% perfect agreement between the two raters for Korean children's moral stages and 65% for British children's. In terms of WASs,  $r = 0.97$  for Korean children and 0.93 for British children. Figures 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 show the correlation between the two

**Figure 4.5.1** The Correlation between the Two Raters in terms of Korean Children's WASs**Figure 4.5.2** The Correlation between the Two Raters in terms of British Children's WASs

raters scoring Korean and British children's WASs respectively. For the interrater reliability of moral orientations, 20 moral orientations, one from each interview scored by a second rater, were randomly selected and agreement between the two

**Table 4.5.1** The Agreement between the Two Raters  
for Korean Children's use of Moral Orientations

Children	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1st Rater	n	n	f	e	u	e	u	i	u	i	f	i	n	u	f	i	e	i	e	f
2nd Rater	n	n	f	<b>u</b>	<b>u</b>	e	u	i	u	i	f	i	n	u	f	i	e	<b>e</b>	<b>e</b>	f

n = The Normative Orientation    e = Egoistic    u = Utilitarian    i = Ideal    f= Fairness

The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.

**Table 4.5.2** The Agreement between the Two Raters  
for British Children's use of Moral Orientations

Children	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1st Rater	<b>u</b>	<b>u</b>	<b>u</b>	n	i	e	e	f	f	u	u	n	n	i	e	n	<b>n</b>	f	<b>f</b>	i
2nd Rater	<b>i</b>	<b>u</b>	<b>u</b>	n	i	e	e	f	f	u	u	n	n	i	e	n	<b>e</b>	f	<b>i</b>	i

n = The Normative Orientation    e = Egoistic    u = Utilitarian    i = Ideal    f= Fairness

The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.

raters was computed using Cohen's kappa. As a result,  $k = .875$  for Korean children and  $.81$  for British children. Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 indicate the agreement between the two raters scoring children's use of moral orientations.

#### 4.6 PILOT STUDY

The pilot study was conducted in order to ascertain whether the dilemmas were recognized as conflicting and relevant by children at the age of 7 to 16, especially by younger children. It was claimed that Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were generally not meaningful to children under the age of 10, although some studies (e.g. Lei, 1980, 1981, see Snarey, 1985; Lei & Cheng, 1984, also see Snarey, 1985; White, 1975; White, Bushnell, & Regnemer, 1978) used the dilemmas for 7 year old children.



Thus it was necessary to examine whether the dilemmas were suitable for younger children (i.e. 7 year old children).

Participants interviewed were 22 children aged 7 to 16 having either Korean or British cultural background. The sample consisted of 6 Koreans, aged 10 to 16, who currently live in London, two 7 year old Koreans in Korea, six British aged 11 to 14 and eight British boys and girls, aged 7. In the cases of 10 to 16 year old Koreans, children who were born and had lived in Korea and recently moved to London were selected so as to minimize the British cultural influence. The instrument and procedure of interviews in the pilot study were the same as those that were described in the sections on instrument and procedure.

During the interviews with the 7 year old children, it was observed that they had difficulties in understanding the original stories completely, although they could grasp the content. Thus the stories and probe questions had to be slightly modified for the 7 year old children. Some difficult words were changed to relatively simpler and

**Table 4.6.1** Moral Stages and WASs of Each Participant

NATION		CASE 1	CASE 2	CASE 3	CASE 4	CASE 5	CASE 6
KOREANS	AGE (Gender)	10 (B)	10 (G)	13 (B)	13 (G)	16 (G)	16 (G)
	STAGE	2/3	1/2	2/3	2/3	3	3/4
	WAS	235	175	263	262	320	331
BRITISH	AGE (Gender)	11 (B)	11 (G)	13 (B)	13 (G)	14 (B)	14 (G)
	STAGE	1/2	1/2	2/3	2/3	2/3	3
	WAS	172	182	267	248	258	289

B = Boys, G = Girls

easier ones. Also, the stories were described more specifically than the original ones so as to help them understand the stories more clearly. For instance, the word, “drug” was changed to the word, “medicine” in order to prevent children from confusing drugs as a medicine and drugs used for recreational purpose such as cocaine. The sentence that “a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer” changed to the sentence that “a woman was very ill so she was nearly dying.” After the modification, 7 year old children were interviewed using the modified stories in order to examine whether the dilemmas could be used for 7 year old children.

When the interviews were analyzed it was found that most answers which were obtained from the children were able to be scored according to the manual. Furthermore, age trends in moral stages were observed (Table 4.6.1). That is, the moral stage -from stage 1/2 to stage 3/4- and WAS increased according to age. Regarding cases 1 and 3 of the Koreans, although both cases were stage 2/3, the case 1 was closer to stage 2 (64%) than stage 3 (35%) while case 3 showed 37% of stage 2 and 63% of stage 3. Based on these results, it seemed that Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas were applicable for children aged 10 to 16 years in both Korean and British cultures with a little modification, and with an easier version for 7 year old children in terms of testing moral reasoning. Unfortunately, the size of sample was too small to conduct statistical analyses, thus it was impossible to report whether these differences were statistically significant. The sample that was used in the pilot study was not included in the main study.


## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **RESULTS**

The present study examined Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning through analysing children's spontaneous responses to moral dilemmas. The background of the children varied across age, culture and gender so as to enable a comparison of the moral reasoning of children in different groups. The comparison was carried out in terms of moral stages, moral orientations, and chosen issues. With regard to moral orientations, the differences in the usage of orientations in the three dilemmas were examined as a whole as well as separately. The findings on moral stages, orientations, and chosen issues are presented below. When analysing Korean children's responses, it was not possible to match some of them to Kohlberg's criteria judgments. The responses that were unable to be matched are also described in the present chapter.

#### **5.1 MORAL STAGE**

Kohlberg established the universal theory of moral stages which inferred that moral reasoning developed with age in a sequence. Although a number of studies supported the universality of Kohlberg's moral stage model, some variation in the moral stage model across cultures was indicated by empirical studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982). Furthermore, Gilligan (1982) claimed the

**Figure 5.1.1** The Distribution of WASs

possibility of gender differences in the development of moral stages. One aim of the present study is to examine these differences in moral stages in addition to the applicability of the moral stage model to both Korean and British children by analysing the moral reasoning of children in different groups according to their age, cultural background and gender. The group difference was statistically examined

**Table 5.1.1** Analysis of Variance; Differences in WASs

	F	DF	Significant
Within & residual		112	
Age	252.05	3	.000
Culture	3.11	1	.081
Gender	1.38	1	.242
Age by Culture	.68	3	.563
Age by Gender	2.27	3	.084
Culture by Gender	.83	1	.364
Age by Culture by Gender	.33	3	.804

**Table 5.1.2** Age differences in WASs (Moral Stages)

Age	Mean	S. D.	N	F	DF	P
7	170.25 (1/2)	29.97 (.37)	32	245.75 (144.72)	3, 124	.001
10	225.78 (2)	26.75 (.36)	32			
13	271.06 (3(2))	17.61 (.24)	32			
16	325.09 (3)	18.32 (.23)	32			

( ) indicates figures for moral stages.

through comparing WASs (weighted average scores). The range of WASs was from 122 to 373, which is equivalent to the range of moral stages from stage 1 to 4. Since WASs seemed to be normally distributed (Figure 5.1.1), it was subjected to ANOVA, in combination with Scheffe test, a post-hoc test, at  $p < .05$ .

The results showed a strong tendency for WASs (moral stages) to increase with age,  $F(3, 124) = 245.75$ ,  $p < .001$ , but neither cultural nor gender difference was indicated, at least within the limits of the sample. In addition, no interaction among variables was observed as shown in Table 5.1.1. According to the post-hoc test, all the differences among the age groups were significant at  $p < .05$ . Tables 5.1.2 shows the mean and the standard deviation of each age group. Additionally, in order to get more specific information, the differences in WASs across the age groups were examined separately within each of 8 sub-groups; 2 cultural groups (the Korean and

**Table 5.1.3** Analysis of Variance; Age Differences in WASs for Sub-Groups

Sub-Groups	F	DF	Sub-Groups	F	DF
Korean Boys	63.51*	3, 28	Boys	139.72*	3, 60
Girls	38.08*	3, 28			
Children	92.19*	3, 60	Girls	116.55*	3, 60
British Boys	68.18*	3, 28			
Girls	115.25*	3, 28	Total	245.75*	3, 124
Children	174.77*	3, 60			

\*=  $P < .001$

**Table 5.1.4** Mean and Standard Deviations for WASs (Moral Stages)

Age	Nationality	Gender	Mean	S. D.	N
7	Koreans	Boys	165.50 [1/2]	23.63	8
		Girls	190.75 [2(1)]	37.70	8
		Children	178.13 [1/2]	33.07	16
	British	Boys	159.38 [1/2]	27.11	8
		Girls	165.38 [2(1)]	24.38	8
		Children	162.38 [1/2]	25.10	16
	<b>Overall</b>		<b>170.25 [1/2]</b>	<b>29.97</b>	<b>32</b>
	Koreans	Boys	223.13 [2]	28.62	8
		Girls	238.38 [2(3)]	24.15	8
		Children	230.75 [2(3)]	26.77	16
10	British	Boys	217.38 [2]	32.10	8
		Girls	224.25 [2]	21.51	8
		Children	220.81 [2]	26.63	16
	<b>Overall</b>		<b>225.78 [2]</b>	<b>26.75</b>	<b>32</b>
	Koreans	Boys	278.88 [3(2)]	18.67	8
		Girls	264.00 [3(2)]	21.70	8
		Children	271.44 [3(2)]	21.01	16
	British	Boys	276.13 [3(2)]	16.44	8
		Girls	265.25 [2/3]	9.47	8
		Children	270.69 [3(2)]	14.12	16
	<b>Overall</b>		<b>271.06 [3(2)]</b>	<b>17.61</b>	<b>32</b>
13	Koreans	Boys	322.00 [3]	24.99	8
		Girls	331.00 [3]	19.96	8
		Children	326.50 [3]	22.08	16
	British	Boys	322.50 [3]	17.94	8
		Girls	324.88 [3]	10.41	8
		Children	323.69 [3]	14.22	16
	<b>Overall</b>		<b>325.09 [3]</b>	<b>18.32</b>	<b>32</b>
	Koreans	Boys	322.00 [3]	24.99	8
		Girls	331.00 [3]	19.96	8
		Children	326.50 [3]	22.08	16
16	British	Boys	322.50 [3]	17.94	8
		Girls	324.88 [3]	10.41	8
		Children	323.69 [3]	14.22	16
	<b>Overall</b>		<b>325.09 [3]</b>	<b>18.32</b>	<b>32</b>
	Koreans	Boys	322.00 [3]	24.99	8
		Girls	331.00 [3]	19.96	8
		Children	326.50 [3]	22.08	16
	British	Boys	322.50 [3]	17.94	8
		Girls	324.88 [3]	10.41	8
		Children	323.69 [3]	14.22	16
	<b>Overall</b>		<b>325.09 [3]</b>	<b>18.32</b>	<b>32</b>

[ ] indicates mean of moral stages.

the British groups), 2 gender groups (the boys and the girls groups), and 4 culture x gender groups (the Korean boys and the girls, and the British boys and the girls groups). All comparisons within each sub-group also indicated the significant relationship between moral stages and age (Table 5.1.3). The post-hoc test, as a further analysis, revealed that all the age differences in each sub-group were

**Table 5.1.5** Cultural and Gender Differences in WASs

Koreans		British		Total		F	D. F	Sig.
M	S. D.	M	S. D.	M	S. D.			
251.70	60.48	244.39	63.53	248.05		.45	1, 126	.5

Boys		Girls		Total		F	D. F	Sig.
M	S. D.	M	S. D.	M	S. D.			
245.61	64.77	250.48	59.28	248.05	62.09	.20	1, 126	.5

significant at  $p < .05$ , except the difference between 10 and 13 year old Korean girls. Thus, the evidence of increase in moral stage with age was found in line with other studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978), which also supported Kohlberg's theory of the moral stage model. The mean and the standard deviation of each group are represented in Table 5.1.4.

With respect to cultural background and gender, neither cultural nor gender difference was found as far as the moral stage model was concerned as mentioned before (see Table 5.1.5). It indicated that the children traced the moral stage model at a similar rate without regard to their culture and gender.

In summary, children's moral reasoning on the three different dilemmas was analysed in order to ascertain Kohlberg's moral stage model. When differences in the moral stages of the children across age, culture and gender were examined, only the age difference was observed at least up to the moral stage 4. Based on these findings, it was concluded that the development of moral stages with age was applicable to both Korean and British children regardless of their gender. The findings will be discussed in the next chapter.


## 5.2 MORAL ORIENTATION

It was postulated that the content of dilemmas as well as children's background attributes such as age, gender, and culture are related with their choice of moral orientations, independent of moral stages. On the basis of this hypothesis, the children's spontaneous responses to three moral dilemmas were analysed in order to examine the differences in the use of each orientation across age, culture, gender, and the content of dilemmas. For statistical analyses, the children were divided into two categories, "no mention (NM)" and "mention (M)," according to whether they referred to the orientation. After categorizing the children according to their responses, differences in the use of each orientation across sub-groups, divided by age, culture and gender, were examined by means of comparing the numbers of children in each category for each orientation. The statistical approach taken to analyze the association between mention of the orientations and age, cultural background, and gender was to conduct hierarchical loglinear analyses with backward elimination unless crosstabs analyses of the two-way associations revealed unsatisfactorily low expected frequencies, i.e. expected frequencies less than 1 or more than 20% expected frequencies less than 5 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, chi-square was used as a post-hoc test as necessary. These statistical methods allow for the identification of factors and interactions among factors which influence children's use of moral orientations. The findings on differences in the use of orientations through these comparisons are as follows.

### 5.2.1 The Patterns of Orientations in Dilemma III, Heinz's Dilemma

The children's spontaneous moral reasoning regarding Heinz's dilemma was analysed



**Figure 5.2.1** Percent Usage of Orientations for Heinz's Dilemma

in terms of the use of 5 moral orientations. Each orientation was considered separately on the basis of the hypothesis that the children might use the orientations in different ways according to their age, cultural background, and gender.

Differences in the use of orientations were found. The normative orientation was used by a number of individuals (72%; 92 out of 128) whereas the fairness orientation was hardly mentioned (6%; 8 out of 128). When comparing the proportion of those using the other orientations, a great difference among them was not found. Rather, they referred to the orientation in about equal percentages: 55%, 38%, and 44.5% of children used the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations, respectively (Figure 5.2.1). Table 5.2.2 shows the numbers of children who mentioned the orientations according to age, culture, and gender.

Concerning the use of the normative orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis with

**Table 5.2.1** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for Heinz's Dilemma

		Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b>	Korean boys	7	2	5	0	0
	girls	6	3	3	1	0
	children	13	4	8	1	0
	British boys	4	7	3	0	0
	girls	3	7	2	0	0
	children	7	14	5	0	0
	<b>overall</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>10 years</b>	Korean boys	1	6	5	3	1
	girls	6	5	3	5	0
	children	7	11	8	8	1
	British boys	5	6	4	3	0
	girls	4	7	0	1	0
	children	9	13	4	4	0
	<b>overall</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>13 years</b>	Korean boys	7	6	1	5	0
	girls	8	7	4	5	0
	children	15	13	5	10	0
	British boys	7	2	3	3	0
	girls	5	7	3	6	1
	children	12	9	6	9	1
	<b>overall</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>16 years</b>	Korean boys	7	1	3	6	1
	girls	7	3	3	5	3
	children	14	4	6	11	4
	British boys	8	1	2	8	2
	girls	7	0	5	6	0
	children	15	1	7	14	2
	<b>overall</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>6</b>

backward elimination was conducted as the crosstabs analyses revealed no unacceptably low expected frequencies. The statistical analysis identified a minimal model including an effect of age and an interaction between culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(18, N = 128) = 14.83, p = .67$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 17.75, p < .001$ , culture  $\times$  gender, likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 128) = 4.0, p < .05$ . As table 5.2.2 suggests, the use of the orientation increased with age. A post-hoc comparison of 7 and 10 year-olds with the two older age groups showed a significant difference (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 128) = 16.15, p < .001$ ). The interaction between culture and gender reflects the lack of difference between boys of the two cultures (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 64) = .58, n.s.$ ), but the Korean

**Table 5.2.2** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for Heinz's Dilemma

Orientations	Age Differences	Cultural Differences	Gender Differences
Normative	Increase with Age	Koreans > the British in the Girls' Group	
Egoistic	Decrease with Age	none	none
Utilitarian	Steady across Age	none	Girls < Boys in the Younger Group
Ideal	Increase with Age	none	none
Fairness	Increase with Age	none	none

girls mentioned the orientation more often than the British girls (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 5.08, p < .05$ ).

In the use of the egoistic orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis with backward elimination identified a minimal model that indicates an interaction only between age and culture. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 128) = 11.16, p = .8$ . According to a post-hoc comparison, the British children showed a clear tendency to use the orientation as age decrease (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 30.24, p < .001$ ). In the Korean group, however, the 7 year old children unexpectedly used the orientation as much as the 16 year old children (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 15.47, p < .001$ ) (see Table 5.2.1).


With respect to the use of the utilitarian orientation, an interaction between age and gender was identified as a minimal model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 128) = 9.35, p = .90$ . A post-hoc comparison showed that there was no substantial change with age in the use of the orientation. However, a gender difference in the use of the utilitarian orientation among younger children was observed: the boys in the 7 and the 10 year old groups used the orientation more than the girls in the same age groups (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 5.41, p < .05$ ).

Also, the boys at the younger ages were more likely to refer to the orientation than those at the older ages (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 4.20, p < .05$ ).

Concerning the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations respectively, each statistical analysis identified a minimal model showing only an effect of age. The model for the use of each orientation was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 14.94, p = .92$  for the use of the ideal orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 11.08, p = .99$  for the use of the fairness orientation. A post-hoc comparison revealed that the use of the ideal orientation increased with age (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 47.82, p < .001$ ). However, in the case of the fairness orientation, only a few children (8 out of 128; 6%) referred to it, which means that expected frequencies less than 5 are over 20%. Thus, Fisher's exact test was used in order to ascertain whether the age difference was statistically significant. Since,  $p < .005$  using a two-tailed test, it was affirmed that the oldest children used the orientation more than others. The differences in the use of the five orientations across age, culture, and gender are described in Table 5.2.2.

### **5.2.2 The Patterns of Orientations in Dilemma III', Officer Brown's Dilemma**

The usage of each moral orientation was also compared across children's age, cultural background and gender. The method of comparison was the same as was used for Heinz's dilemma. The usage of orientations in Officer Brown's dilemma varied across children's age, culture and gender. With respect to the proportion of mentions, the orientations were spread over a wide range (Figure 5.2.2). Children used both the normative and the utilitarian orientations the most (66%; 85 out of 128 for both),

**Figure 5.2.2** Percent Usage of Orientations for Officer Brown's Dilemma

whereas they used the egoistic orientation the least for their moral reasoning (11%; 14 out of 128). The ideal and the fairness orientations were mentioned by 21% and 33% of children respectively. The numbers of individuals who mentioned orientations for Officer Brown's dilemma are presented in Table 5.2.3. As far as the normative, the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations were concerned, hierarchical loglinear analyses yield a final model for the use of each orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 12.94$ ,  $p = .97$  for the use of the normative orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 7.77$ ,  $p = .99$  for the use of the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 15.10$ ,  $p = .92$  for the use of the ideal orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 12.45$ ,  $p = .97$  for the use of the fairness orientation.

Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the children in the oldest group were more likely

**Table 5.2.3** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations  
for Officer Brown's Dilemma

		Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b>	Korean boys	6	0	3	0	0
	girls	5	2	6	0	2
	children	11	2	9	0	2
	British boys	6	1	4	0	0
	Girls	4	2	5	1	0
	Children	10	3	9	1	0
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>10 years</b>	Korean boys	6	1	7	3	4
	girls	3	1	8	1	3
	children	9	2	15	4	7
	British boys	5	3	6	2	1
	Girls	1	4	6	0	2
	Children	6	7	12	2	3
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>13 years</b>	Korean boys	6	1	6	1	3
	girls	6	0	2	3	4
	children	12	1	8	4	7
	British boys	5	1	5	3	1
	Girls	3	1	8	3	2
	Children	8	2	13	6	3
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>16 years</b>	Korean boys	7	0	5	2	4
	girls	8	0	3	1	6
	children	15	0	8	3	10
	British boys	6	0	6	3	4
	Girls	7	0	5	5	5
	Children	13	0	11	8	9
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>19</b>

to orient themselves towards the normative concern for this dilemma in comparison with children in other age groups (likelihood  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 11.41, p < .01$ ). Only 1 out of 32 (3%) of the youngest children mentioned the ideal orientation. However, the use of the orientation slightly increased with age and reached 34% (11 out of 32) by the age of 16 (likelihood  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 13.76, p < .005$ ). The use of the fairness orientation also increased with age (likelihood  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 19.37, p < .001$ ). Two great increases in these cases occurred between the ages of 7 and 10 and between the ages of 13 and 16. Unlike the age tendencies in the use of the normative, the ideal, and the fairness orientations, the use of the egoistic orientation decreased with age. Only a few children (14 out of 128; 11%) used this orientation

**Table 5.2.4** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for Officer Brown's Dilemma

Orientations	Age Differences	Cultural Differences	Gender Differences
Normative	Increase with Age	none	none
Egoistic	Decrease with Age	none	none
Utilitarian	Younger > Older Korean Girls Group Koreans > the British in the 13 Year Old Girls Group		
Ideal	Increase with Age	none	none
Fairness	Increase with Age	none	none

across all the age groups. At the age of 16, none of them mentioned it. However, when the younger group (the 7 and the 10 year olds) was compared with the older group (the 13 and the 16 year-olds) in the use of the orientation, the preponderance of younger children over older children in the use of the orientation was revealed (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 128) = 5.42, p < .05$ ).


With respect to the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis generated a final model identifying an interaction between age, gender, and culture. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(0, N = 128) = .00, p = 1.00$ . Younger children used the orientation more than the older children only in the Korean girls group (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 128) = 11.30, p < .001$ ). In addition, at the age of 13, Korean girls used the orientation less than British girls (Fisher's exact two-tailed test  $p < .01, N = 16$ ). Fisher's exact two-tailed test was used as a post-hoc comparison here since expected frequencies less than 5 are over 20%. The differences in the use of the five orientations across age, culture, and gender are described in Table 5.2.4.

### 5.2.3 The Patterns of Orientations in Dilemma I, Joe's Dilemma

The usage of orientations for Joe's dilemma was carefully analysed in order to examine differences in each orientation in terms of children's age, cultural background and gender. The same types of analyses used for Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas were conducted here. The children used the orientations in the range of 36% to 58 % (Figure 5.2.3). The fairness orientation was referred to the most, at a level of 58%, followed by the utilitarian (49%), the egoistic (48%), and then the ideal orientations (40%). The children used the normative orientation the least in dealing with the moral dilemmas in Joe's story (37%). Table 5.2.5 shows the numbers of individuals who mentioned orientations for Joe's dilemma according to age, culture and gender.

Since the crosstabs analyses revealed no unacceptably low expected frequencies, a

**Figure 5.2.3** Percent Usage of Orientations for Joe's Dilemma





**Table 5.2.5** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for Joe's Dilemma

		Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b>	Korean boys	4	5	4	0	1
	girls	6	8	5	1	4
	children	10	13	9	1	5
	British boys	1	6	2	0	1
	Girls	5	5	1	0	0
	Children	6	11	3	0	1
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>10 years</b>	Korean boys	4	7	1	1	4
	girls	3	6	5	3	4
	children	7	13	6	4	8
	British boys	3	4	6	0	2
	Girls	5	4	3	0	3
	Children	8	8	9	0	5
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>13 years</b>	Korean boys	2	1	4	6	8
	girls	1	2	6	4	7
	children	3	3	10	10	15
	British boys	2	3	6	4	6
	Girls	2	2	3	5	5
	Children	4	5	9	9	11
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>16 years</b>	Korean boys	1	1	3	7	8
	girls	3	3	7	6	8
	children	4	4	10	13	16
	British boys	2	2	5	7	6
	Girls	3	2	2	7	7
	Children	5	4	7	14	13
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>

hierarchical loglinear analysis was used in order to examine the use of orientations for this dilemma as it was used for Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. When the use of each orientation was analysed, the final models in the use of the normative, the egoistic, and the ideal orientations each indicated only an effect of age. The model was a reasonable fit; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 128$ ) = 11.48,  $p = .98$  for the use of the normative orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 128$ ) = 12.56,  $p = .97$  for the use of the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 128$ ) = 12.49,  $p = .97$  for the ideal orientation. According to post-hoc comparisons, younger children (the 7 and 10 year-old groups) distinctly used the normative (likelihood  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 128$ ) = 7.67,  $p < .01$ ), and the egoistic orientations (likelihood  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 128$ ) = 27.33,  $p < .001$ ) more than older children (the 13 and 16 year-old groups) whereas a tendency

**Table 5.2.6** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for Joe's Dilemma

Orientations	Age Differences	Cultural Differences	Gender Differences
Normative	Decrease with Age	none	none
Egoistic	Decrease with Age	none	none
Utilitarian	Steady across Age	Korean Girls < Korean Boys & British Girls	
Ideal	Increase with Age	none	none
Fairness	Increase with Age	Koreans > the British	none

to increase with age occurred in the use of the ideal orientation (likelihood  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 68.15, p < .001$ ).

With respect to the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis generated a final model showing an interaction between culture and gender in the use of the orientation. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 12.85, p = .97$ . A post-hoc comparison indicated a strong tendency among the Korean girls to use the utilitarian orientation as compared with the British girls (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 12.67, p < .001$ ) and Korean boys (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 7.80, p < .01$ ). Interestingly, amongst British children, boys used the orientation more than girls (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 6.47, p < .05$ ).

Concerning the use of the fairness orientation, the analysis identified a minimal model including an age influence and a cultural influence on the use of the orientation. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(22, N = 128) = 13.03, p = .93$ . Eliminating either influence produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 49.40, p < .001$ , culture, likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 128) = 6.34, p < .05$ . As shown in Table 5.2.5, the use of the orientation increased with age especially at the ages of 10 and 13, and Korean children generally used the


orientation more than British children regardless of age and gender. Table 5.2.6 describes general differences in the use of moral orientations for Joe's dilemma.

#### 5.2.4 The Patterns of Orientations in the Three Dilemmas as a Whole

The three dilemmas appeared to draw forth from the children different patterns of moral reasoning about the characters and events in them. The children's spontaneous use of the five orientations were analysed by the numbers of mentions by children of different ages, cultures, and gender. The numbers of individuals who mentioned the orientations for the three dilemmas are shown in Table 5.2.7. Each orientation to morality was considered separately and differences across the three dilemmas are presented as follows.

The children evenly expressed their moral reasoning for the three dilemmas by using the 5 orientations in the range of 61% to 94% (Figure 5.2.4). Amongst the orientations, the normative (94%) and the utilitarian orientations (94%) were used the

**Figure 5.2.4** Percent Usage of Orientations for the Three Dilemmas as a Whole



**Table 5.2.7** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations  
for the Three Dilemmas as a Whole

		Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b>	Korean boys	7	6	8	0	1
	girls	7	7	7	1	4
	children	14	13	15	1	5
	British boys	8	8	6	0	1
	Girls	7	7	6	1	1
	Children	15	15	12	1	2
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>10 years</b>	Korean boys	7	8	8	4	7
	girls	8	7	8	7	5
	children	15	15	16	11	12
	British boys	7	8	8	4	2
	Girls	7	7	8	1	4
	Children	14	15	16	5	6
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>13 years</b>	Korean boys	8	6	7	7	8
	girls	8	7	8	7	8
	children	16	13	15	14	16
	British boys	8	5	8	7	6
	Girls	5	7	8	8	5
	Children	13	12	16	15	11
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>16 years</b>	Korean boys	8	2	7	8	8
	girls	8	5	8	8	8
	children	16	7	15	16	16
	British boys	8	2	7	8	7
	Girls	8	2	8	8	8
	Children	16	4	15	16	15
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>

most, followed by the egoistic orientation (73%) and then the fairness orientation (65%). The children mentioned the ideal orientation the least (62%). In spite of an approximately equal level of the usage of orientations for the three dilemmas as a whole, the children showed differences in the amount of use of the orientations across dilemmas when the dilemmas were considered separately. The children seldom used some orientations for certain dilemmas. For instance, only 14 out of 128 (11%) of children referred to the egoistic orientation for Officer Brown's dilemma. Moreover, the fairness orientation was used the least for Heinz's dilemma; only 6% (8 out of 128) of children quoted it. These differences indicated that the usage of orientations could fluctuate according to the contents of dilemmas.

A hierarchical loglinear analysis with backward elimination yielded a minimal model for the use of each orientation. With respect to the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations, each final model included only an effect of age. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 22.65, p = .97$  for the use of the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 9.49, p = .97$  for the use of the utilitarian orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N = 128) = 14.81, p = .92$ . However, in the use of the utilitarian orientation, the existence of an age difference was not acceptable because expected frequencies less than 5 were 50% (see Table 5.2.7). Concerning the egoistic orientation, a post-hoc comparison showed that the younger children used the orientations more than the oldest children (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 128) = 30.87, p < .001$ ) whereas the use of the ideal orientation increased with age (likelihood  $X^2(3, N = 128) = 91.11, p < .001$ ).

In the use of the normative orientation, the statistical analyses revealed no age difference when considering the three dilemmas as a whole. This is probably due to the fact that the age tendency in Joe's dilemma is opposed to those in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. Older children were more likely to use the orientation than younger children regarding Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas whereas younger children mentioned it more than older children in Joe's dilemma. The preponderance of older children over younger children in the use of the orientation contradicted the findings of Walker (1989). Walker's study indicated that the normative orientation was common in childhood and decreased with age as shown in Joe's dilemma. This contradiction will be discussed later.

Concerning the use of the fairness orientation, the analysis generated a final model

including an age influence and a cultural influence on the use of the orientation. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (22,  $N = 128$ ) = 14.81,  $p = .87$ . Removing either influence resulted in a less adequate fit; that is, in both cases the data deviated significantly from the model: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (3,  $N = 128$ ) = 51.87,  $p < .001$ , culture, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 128$ ) = 7.82,  $p < .01$ . The use of the orientation increased with age regardless of culture and gender, and Korean children generally tended to use the orientation more than British children. It seems that this cultural difference is mainly due to the cultural differences demonstrated in Joe's dilemma. In addition, the same pattern of culturally variable to Officer Brown's dilemmas (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 128$ ) = 3.57,  $p < .05$ ) seems to strengthen the overall cultural difference.

In summary, age differences occurred in all the orientations although the patterns were varied from one to another. Generally, the use of the ideal, and the fairness orientations increased with age whereas the use of the egoistic orientation decreased. These age tendencies coincided with the findings of other studies (Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). The various patterns of age differences suggested a general tendency in children to favour certain moral orientations at a certain age. That is, children favour the egoistic orientation for their moral reasoning in the early years and gradually use the ideal and the fairness orientations more often as they get older. However, it should be noted that the 7 year-old Korean children unexpectedly used the egoistic orientation as little as 16 year-old Korean children in Heinz's dilemma. Concerning the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations, the present study found no substantial age tendency in contrast to the findings in other studies (Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). As for cultural differences in the use of the orientations

**Table 5.2.8** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations  
for the Three Dilemmas as a Whole

Orientations	Age Differences	Cultural Differences	Gender Differences
Normative	Steady across Age	none	none
Egoistic	Decrease with Age	none	none
Utilitarian	Steady across Age	none	none
Ideal	Increase with Age	none	none
Fairness	Increase with Age	Koreans > British	none

for the three dilemmas as a whole, the present study shows a difference only in the use of the fairness orientation. Some cultural differences were found only in several sub-groups concerning certain dilemmas. The present study shows an effect of gender not by itself but in combination with other effects of age, culture, or both regarding certain orientations in each dilemma. Table 5.2.8 shows general differences in the use of the orientations for the three dilemmas as a whole.

According to all the findings, children's use of moral orientations varied across age, culture and gender. Moreover, it seems that the content of the dilemmas was also related to children's choices of moral orientations. A discussion on the basis of these findings will be presented in the next chapter.

### 5.3 CHILDREN'S CHOSEN ISSUES FOR DILEMMAS

During the interview, the children were asked to choose one of the two moral issues, which each dilemma contained. For instance, concerning the Heinz's dilemma, children had to choose either the life issue (i.e. Heinz should steal the drug) or the law issue (i.e. Heinz should not steal the drug) as the first step and then explain the

reasons for their moral choice. Some of the empirical studies (e.g. Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1984) pointed out cultural differences in the chosen issues. Thus it was necessary to examine the differences in children's chosen issues according to their background in order to ascertain similarities and differences in the development of moral reasoning. The present study examined the differences in the chosen issues according to age, culture and gender. As a result, some differences were found in the three dilemmas. Table 5.3.1 indicates how many children chose which issue for each dilemma.

Concerning Heinz's dilemma, even though a final model generated an interaction between age, gender and cultural factors, the expected frequencies less than 5 were more than 25%. It means that the interaction cannot be significant. However, the chi-square test showed cultural differences in combination with age differences, gender differences, or both. Children at the age of 7 were more likely to choose the law issue (i.e., Heinz should not steal the drug) over the life issue (i.e., Heinz should steal the drug) regardless of their culture and gender. At the age of 10, girls tended to choose the law issue over the life issue while boys chose the life issue over the law issue (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 32) = 6.37, p < .05$ ). Among the older age group, Korean girls still showed a tendency to adhere to the law issue while most Korean boys as well as British children chose the life issue. Consequently, the adherence of Korean girls to the law issue resulted in gender differences in the Korean group (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 64) = 6.35, p < .05$ ) as well as cultural differences among older girls (likelihood  $X^2(1, N = 32) = 7.2, p < .01$ ). These findings imply that children at a young age tend to consider obeying the law more important than saving a life; this trend reversed as the children got older. However, Korean girls even at older ages



**Table 5.3.1** The Number of Individuals for Chosen Issues for Dilemmas

		Heinz's Dilemma		Officer Brown's Dilemma		Joe's Dilemma	
		Life	Law	Morality	Punishment	Contract	Authority
7 years	Korean boys	3	5	2	6	6	2
	girl	2	6	3	5	5	3
	children	5	11	5	11	11	5
	British boys	2	6	3	5	6	2
	girls	0	8	4	4	7	1
	children	2	14	7	9	13	3
	overall	7	25	12	20	24	8
10 years	Korean boys	5	3	4	4	3	5
	girl	2	6	4	4	4	4
	children	7	9	8	8	7	9
	British boys	6	2	6	2	6	2
	girls	2	6	6	2	6	2
	children	8	8	12	4	12	4
	overall	15	17	20	12	19	13
13 years	Korean boys	7	1	4	4	6	2
	girls	3	5	2	6	8	0
	children	10	6	6	10	14	2
	British boys	5	3	4	4	6	2
	girls	6	2	7	1	8	0
	children	11	5	11	5	14	2
	overall	21	11	17	15	28	4
16 years	Korean boys	6	2	3	5	7	1
	girls	4	4	2	6	8	0
	children	10	6	5	11	15	1
	British boys	6	2	5	3	7	1
	girls	8	0	5	3	8	0
	children	14	2	10	6	15	1
	overall	24	8	15	17	30	2
Total	Korean boys	21	11	13	19	22	10
	girls	11	21	11	21	25	7
	children	32	32	24	40	47	17
	British boys	19	13	18	14	25	7
	Girls	16	16	22	10	29	3
	Children	35	29	40	24	54	10
	overall	67	61	64	64	101	27

still chose the law issue over the life issue. It seemed that Korean girls had a stronger tendency to adhere to social rules than the others.

With respect to Officer Brown's dilemma, cultural differences in chosen issues were found. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 128$ ) = 22.65,  $p = .97$ . Korean children were more likely to choose the punishment issue (i.e. the judge should give Heinz a sentence for stealing) over the morality and conscience issue (i.e. the judge should let Heinz go free) while the British children showed the opposite pattern (likelihood  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 128$ ) = 8.08,  $p < .005$ ). The cultural

difference in chosen issues was salient among older girls (likelihood  $X^2 (1, N = 32) = 8.37, p < .005$ ) to the same degree it was concerning Heinz's dilemma. The results of chosen issues concerning Officer Brown's dilemma indicate that Korean children, especially girls, are more likely to be strict about breaking the law than the British children.

Concerning Joe's dilemma, the statistical analysis identified a final model showing an age effect. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2 (24, N = 128) = 22.65, p = .97$ . The 10 year-old children were more likely to choose the authority issue (i.e., Joe should give the money to his father) than those in the other age groups. However, children in all age groups tended to choose the contract issue (i.e. Joe should not give his father the money) over the authority issue.

The results showed that the children chose different issues according to their background attributes. Cultural and/or gender differences tended to be more apparent during late childhood to adolescence than in early and mid childhood. It seems that children in late childhood and adolescence are under greater influence of their social environment than those at younger ages in terms of overall decision-making. Furthermore, it can be assumed that children's chosen issues are related with their use of the moral orientations since most reasons that the children gave fell into the five moral orientations. Thus, the findings on the chosen issues, especially the cultural influence on chosen issues, will be discussed in connection with children's use of moral orientations in the next chapter.

#### 5.4 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES

Some empirical studies (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in

Snarey, 1985; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990) claim that there are some features of moral reasoning that Kohlberg could not capture and hence that Kohlberg's theory is not sufficient to assess the moral development in some cultures, especially from stage 3 to the last stage. In line with the claims of the above studies, the present study found some responses which were unscorable with Kohlberg's manual although it was possible to assess children's moral stage and use of the orientations through analysing scorable responses.

First of all, Korean children at the age of 7 showed unscorable responses. Kohlberg made criteria judgments for young children based on the assumption that they make a moral decision in order to avoid punishment or seek reward and to obey the superior power of authorities. As Kohlberg claimed, most 7 year old British children, in their moral reasoning, used the elements Kohlberg defined, such as avoiding punishment or seeking reward (e.g. Heinz should not steal the drug, otherwise he will be locked up) or blaming or approving (e.g. He should not steal it because it is against the law). However, 7 year old Korean children were more likely than British children of the same age to take into account the emotional aspect of a certain person, although the emotional concern seemed to be fixed on one person, rather than the physical consequences when a moral decision was made. For instance, a 7 year-old child responded to Officer Brown's dilemma as below;

"The judge should let Heinz go free because Heinz will be upset if he is caught."

There is a similar response from another 7 year old child to Joe's dilemma;

"Joe should give his father the money, otherwise the father will be sad."

They gave no further explanation for their moral choice except simply expressing

their sympathy for one of the characters in the dilemmas. Thus, this sympathy is defined as “the restricted-simple sympathy” in the present study. This type of reasoning partially supports Kohlberg’s claim that children at stage 1 do not relate two points of view and hence have a rigid perspective that considers only one person’s view. However, unlike Kohlberg’s claim, many Korean children referred to emotional aspects as well as physical consequences to explain their judgment. This implies that Korean children make moral decisions based on something that Kohlberg missed, such as the restricted-simple sympathy even at a young age.

Children in older groups also showed unscorable responses. Some older children, the 16 year olds in particular, tried to solve conflict by means of a compromise agreement. This tendency was more apparent among Koreans rather than the British. Below is an example of the responses;

“Joe should refuse to give his father the money... the most responsible thing to do is... it is okay for Joe to keep the money, it was not wrong. But it would be better for Joe to kindly explain the situation to the father and to make an agreement with his father to give the father the rest of the money. Then the father adds some more money borrowed from his friend to the rest of money Joe gave and could go fishing as well. So both of them will be satisfied.”

Although most Korean children at the age of 16 argued that Joe should refuse to give his money to his father, many of them tried to find a way that would satisfy both the father and the son (e.g. compromise) in the end rather than take sides with either of them.

They also showed an attempt to find a compromise in Officer Brown’s dilemma:

“Officer Brown should persuade Heinz to confess his crime himself instead of reporting him because it is the best way for both of them. If he reported Heinz, he would feel sorry for Heinz, and if he (Officer Brown) didn’t, it means that he neglected his duty so he would feel bad as well.”

The responses showing that reconciliation between persons through compromising is the best way to resolve conflict indicate Koreans’ general tendency to value unity and harmony with others.

Some responses containing the concept of filial piety were also unscorable. The following is an example:

Q: “What is the most important thing a son should be concerned about in his relationship to his father?” and “Why?”

A: “To respect and to obey him even if he does not treat his son well. That is what a son should do, the fulfilment of filial piety. Because he is his father, he bore and brought him up. The relationship between father and son is something unique. It is more complicated than the simple relationship between two persons... But he doesn’t need to obey unreasonable demands of the father. That is not filial piety. But the son should still respect his father and do his best for his father.”

The above response demonstrates not only the showing of respect for the father based on the unique relationship between father and son, but also disobedience to unreasonable demands of the father. Based on the response, filial piety seems somewhat different from the element of the obedience to authority (i.e. A son should respect, honour or obey his father because he is head of the household) in Kohlberg’s system even though it seems to contain such an element. Besides, the element of reciprocity or positive rewards (i.e. A son should show appreciation, gratitude, or

respect for everything his father has done for him) also seems insufficient to correlate with the above response since he said that “A son should respect and obey his father even if the father does not treat him well.” Thus, Koreans’ reasoning using the fulfilment of filial piety seemed to be deeper than the criteria judgment using reciprocity between two individuals or obedience to authority.

The Korean children at older age were more likely to give unscorable responses based on the concept peculiar to Koreans, “*chung*.”

“Even though he doesn’t love her, he should steal the drug. It is said that husband and wife live together based on *chung* rather than love. They (Heinz and his wife) might also have *chung* between them since they have been together for a long time.” (A response of a 16 year-old child to Heinz’s dilemma)

The above response implies that *chung* plays a great part in moral judgment and sometimes overwhelms rational thought among Koreans.

The responses of Korean children showing collectivism are also unable to be scored. The examples are below.

“Heinz should not steal the drug because he should not harm others in a community in order to achieve his purpose. He should try other legal ways.”

“ People should obey the law otherwise it could harm others... Why should we not harm or disturb others? Because we are in a society. We must consider our society before an individual’s welfare.”

The responses indicate that, in Korean society which emphasizes the importance of collectivism, individuals are sometimes asked to relinquish their rights in order for society to function. This type of response can often be found in collectivistic non-

Western society (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Korean children at the age of 16 show some interesting but unscorable responses in relation to conscience concerning Heinz's dilemma.

"He should not steal the drug. If she knew later on that her husband stole the drug for her, she might thank him but it would weigh her down."

"He should not steal because if she realized the fact, she would take a turn for worse."

"The most responsible thing to do is to do his best in nursing his wife instead of stealing so as to let her die with peace of mind. This is probably what she wants him to do."

Based on the responses, although they could not elaborate on their idea further, it seems that the children somehow valued dying with a pure conscience more than extending life with a contaminated conscience.

To summarise, the present study found that some Koreans' responses to dilemmas were unscorable with Kohlberg's manual. These unscorable responses mainly pertained to the concepts of the restricted-simple sympathy, compromise agreement as a mean to solve conflict, filial piety, *chung*, collectivism, and pure conscience. The findings will be fully discussed in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **DISCUSSION**

In the present study, Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning was mainly examined in terms of moral stages and moral orientations and children's chosen issues for dilemmas. The present study also dealt with some unscorable responses. The findings will be discussed below.

#### **6.1 MORAL STAGE**

Kohlberg claimed that the sequential development of moral stages with age at least up to stage 4 was universal across culture and gender. Based on Kohlberg's claim of universality, a comparative study between British and Korean children was conducted. The findings generally showed the applicability of Kohlberg's moral stages to both Korean and British children up to stage 3/4.

First of all, the present study showed the development of moral stages with age, regardless of children's cultural background and gender. The tendency of moral stages to increase with age strengthened Kohlberg's claim on the universal sequence of moral stages in line with other studies carried out in Korea as well as in other cultural settings (e.g. Cho, 1990; Colby et al., 1983; Lee, 1981; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1985).

Regarding culture, Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) pointed out a possibility of difference



in the rate and endpoint of moral stages in spite of the universal sequence of moral stages. Cultural variations in moral stages were also found in other studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; 1978; 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). These studies indicated in common that individuals from a small-scale traditional society showed a slower rate in the development of moral stages compared with those from a large-scale modernized society. Moreover, with respect to the endpoint, it seems that the former was not able to exceed beyond stage 3 whereas the latter reached up to stage 4/5. Korean society has rapidly modernized in a few decades but is still considered a traditional, authoritarian and conforming non-Western society (Song et al., 1987). Based on these characteristics, it was proposed that Koreans might show differences from the British in the rate of moral stages. Unfortunately, it was impossible to examine the differences in the end point of moral stages in the present study since the present study involved children only up to 16 years old. Concerning the rate of the development of moral stages, however, the present study showed no difference between Koreans and the British. Furthermore, the children in the present study showed moral stages at a similar or more advanced level than those in other studies (Colby et al., 1983; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al., 1985) when the mean and range of the children's moral stages at each age were compared. Table 6.1.1 shows this in detail. Finding no difference in moral stages between Korean and British children may be due to the participants in the present study being drawn from an urban population. Park and Johnson (1984) found more rapid development in urban Korean children than rural Koreans. Thus previous observations of cultural variation in the rate of moral development may be more a matter of sampling differences within the societies than general differences between the societies.

**Table 6.1.1** Mean and Range of Moral Stages across Cultures

TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

*note:* Studies with \* are from Snarey et al. (1985)

On the other hand, Ma (1988b) claims that Kohlberg's last three stages (i.e. stages 4 to 6) might have a cultural component and hence suggests that these three stages could be adapted through integrating the perspectives of a particular culture so as to measure the moral stages of individuals in that culture more appropriately. In spite of the plausibility of Ma's claim, based on the findings of the present study, Kohlberg's moral stages, at least up to stage 4, seem to be applicable to Koreans. However, it should be noted that the applicability of Kohlberg's moral stages to Koreans does not mean that certain perspectives peculiar to Koreans have no influence at all on their moral reasoning. Such cultural influence on moral reasoning could be revealed clearly when moral orientations rather than moral stages are examined.

As far as gender differences in moral stages are concerned, many researchers (e.g.

Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991) reported no gender difference as opposed to Gilligan's claim (1982) that males are more likely to be mature than females in Kohlberg's moral stages. Furthermore, the studies of Gregg et al. (1994), Kang (1994), Lee (1981), Park (1983) and Thoma (1986) showed a tendency for males to lag behind females during adolescence when comparing their moral stages. Cohn (1991) pointed out that girls are more mature than boys not only in terms of moral development but also in terms of other areas including ego development, aggression, and empathy during childhood and early- and mid-adolescence. Cohn explained the overall gender differences, including the differences in moral reasoning, with mainly two factors; gender differences in biological maturation and gender differences in socialization experiences. The former explanation is derived from the assumption that psychological maturity accompanies physiological maturity. In general, girls are physiologically precocious in comparison with boys. With regard to the latter explanation, Lever's findings (1978) on gender differences in social activity support the explanation. According to the observation of spontaneous play of 183 fifth-grade children, boys tended to play in large groups with little opportunity for discussion or conversation whereas girls played in small groups, often dyads, in which they mimicked basic human relationships. The pattern of girls' play was more likely to accelerate the development of personality, including moral reasoning, than the pattern of boys' play. As a result, girls appear to be more mature than boys in the development of moral reasoning during childhood and adolescence.

However, the present study showed no significant gender difference in either the Korean or the British children. This coincided with some studies carried out in

Korea (e.g. Ahn, 1987; Chung, 1987; Lee, 1985). Also, Walker (1984) reviewed gender differences in 31 studies, involving a total of 2,879 participants who ranged in age from about 5 to 17 years, and found that gender differences in moral reasoning in childhood and early adolescence were infrequent; only 5 out of 41 samples showed gender differences and all the differences revealed more mature development for females. Because only a few samples showed gender differences, Walker tended to disregard the differences. Thus it could be concluded that gender differences in moral stages are apparently rare although gender differences in favour of females during the early life-span were observed in several studies. However these discordant findings among studies suggest that further research on gender differences in moral stages during childhood and adolescence needs to be conducted.

To summarize, the present study showed the development of moral stages with age as many other studies did. Both Korean and British children revealed a similar rate in the development of moral stages with age, as opposed to studies that have compared a modernized large-scale society and a traditional small-scale society. While Korean society keeps its own traditions and norms, it is as much a modernized large-scale society as is British society. The scale and modernization of the society may diminish cultural differences in moral stages. Neither culture nor gender difference in the development of moral stage was shown, so the present study does not support either the findings that females are more mature than males or the claim of Gilligan (1982) that Kohlberg's moral stages is biased towards males. Overall the findings do not challenge the applicability of the developmental sequence of Kohlbergian moral stages, at least up to stage 3/4, to Koreans as well as to the British.

## 6.2 MORAL ORIENTATION

Kohlberg was certainly more interested in the sequence of moral stages and less in elaborating moral orientations so that most of his studies concentrated on examining the moral stages without taking into account the moral orientations. Following questions about gender bias in Kohlberg's moral orientations (Gilligan, 1982) and cultural differences in moral reasoning (Dien, 1982), moral orientations have been examined in various ways (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989; Walker et al., 1987; Walker & Moran, 1991). However, studies on moral orientations still seem insufficient. Thus, the use of moral orientations was examined in the present study. The present study was carried out in order to ascertain whether children's choice of moral orientations varied across their background taking into account age, culture and gender and the content of dilemmas on the basis of other empirical studies.

### 6.2.1 Age Tendencies

As far as age was concerned, Tappan et al. (1987) carefully reviewed empirical studies and pointed out a significant relationship between age and moral orientations. According to the findings, older people tended not only to reach higher moral stages but also to use the ideal and the fairness orientations more than younger people. Conversely, the normative, the egoistic and the utilitarian orientations were more common in younger people, who were probably at lower stages. Walker (1989) reported similar age tendencies in moral orientation. Walker also found that the latter 3 orientations - the normative, the egoistic and the utilitarian orientations - were common in childhood and decreased with age, whereas the former orientations increased with age.

With respect to the egoistic, the ideal and the fairness orientations, the present study clearly showed age tendencies similar to those found by Walker. Concerning the egoistic orientation, younger children tended to use the orientation more than older children and the oldest children clearly used it the least. The use of the ideal and the fairness orientations generally increased with age. The findings partially support the findings of Tappan et al. (1987) and Walker (1989) that individuals tend to orient towards the ideal and the fairness consequences as they get more developmentally advanced in moral reasoning.

When the age tendency in each dilemma was examined separately in the present study, the amount of the use of each orientation was not consistent across dilemmas. Only a few children, even in the younger age groups, mentioned the egoistic orientation for Officer Brown's dilemma. It was even rarer in the responses of older children. Regarding the use of the fairness orientation, a few children mentioned the orientation in Heinz's dilemma. The various number of children who mentioned orientations across dilemmas imply the possibility of a variation of age tendency in using the orientation across the content of dilemmas. In general, children seem to favour particular orientations at certain ages. However, they are not likely to adhere to the orientations irrespective of the dilemma. Rather it seems that they allow flexibility in selecting moral orientations across the content. Concerning flexibility in age tendency to use the orientations it also should be noted that 7 year old Korean children but not British children exceptionally referred to the egoistic orientation as seldom as the oldest children with respect to Heinz's dilemma. The exception that 7 year old Korean children rarely used the egoistic orientation for Heinz's dilemma indicates that the children's background such as culture and gender as well as the

content of dilemmas should be taken into account in order to explain flexibility in age tendency.

In the present study, age tendencies in the normative and the utilitarian orientations were somewhat different from those in other studies. Earlier studies (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989) reported that the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations decreased with age. However, these studies did not examine the use of the utilitarian orientation on its own but in combination with the egoistic orientation (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991). Unlike previous empirical studies, the present study was carried out to examine the utilitarian orientation separately from the egoistic orientation so as to understand more precise age tendencies. When the use of the utilitarian orientation in the three dilemmas was examined respectively, age tendency was found in combination with either gender or cultural differences concerning Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. In Heinz's dilemma, younger boys were more likely to refer to the orientation than older boys. Regarding Officer Brown's dilemma, only Korean girls showed an age tendency where younger girls used the orientation more than older girls. Concerning the normative orientation, the decline with age shown in other studies was observed only in Joe's dilemma. Both the age tendencies in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas were opposed to that of Joe's dilemma. That is, older children were more likely to orient towards the normative concern in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. Although age tendencies were found in certain dilemmas, neither the normative orientation nor the utilitarian orientation showed substantial age tendency when the three dilemmas were taken into account altogether. Most children in each age group referred to both these orientations in at least one dilemma. It means that

children tend to maintain the use of each orientation at a similar level across age although the usage differs across the content of dilemmas. Based on these findings, it seems difficult to determine any particular age tendency in the use of the normative or the utilitarian orientations unlike other studies that have shown a decreasing age tendency.

The discrepancies between the present study and previous studies could be due to an error in measurement in the present study. However, as far as the use of the normative orientation was concerned, the present study shows that a strong tendency to increase with age ( $p < .001$  for Heinz's dilemma and  $p < .01$  for Officer Brown's dilemma respectively) occurred regardless of children's cultural background and gender. Thus the tendency to increase with age at least in the use of the normative orientation seemed too explicit to be attributed to an error of measure. Concerning the utilitarian orientation, other studies reporting a decline with age did not examine the orientation separately from the egoistic orientation. This indicates the possibility that the strong tendency for the use of the egoistic orientation to decrease with age could be screening the actual age tendency for the use of the utilitarian orientation to maintain a similar level of the use across age.

However, interesting findings were indicated when the use of the five orientations in each age group was considered at the same time. Although it is uncertain whether the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations decreases after adolescence since adults were not involved as participants in the present study, the present study indicates that the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations did not decrease with age at least up to the age of 16. This finding is opposed to the claims of other



studies (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; & Walker & Moran, 1991). However, younger children apparently used the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations more than the ideal and the fairness orientations. That is, children seemed to adhere to the former three orientations at the early ages. The adherence was attenuated with age and, at the age of 16, children used all orientations for their moral reasoning except the egoistic orientation. This could mean that children develop the concept of ideal concerns and fairness later than the other concepts. Consequently, the use of moral orientations seems diversified rather than transferred from one to another orientation as children get older. This age tendency, in a way, seems to be consonant with the claim by domain-specificity theorists (e.g. Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986) on moral development that individuals seem to consider a broader range of components for their social judgments and to regulate the components as their social interaction increases with age. On the other hand, as far as children up to the age of 16 are concerned, the findings of the present study partially support other studies on age tendency in the use of moral orientations (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; & Walker & Moran, 1991). Additionally, variations of age tendency within an orientation across dilemmas and cultural and gender groups seemed to support the claim that the use of moral orientations might differ across not only children's background but also the content of dilemma.

### **6.2.2 Cultural and Gender Differences**

When Tappan et al. (1987) analysed early empirical studies, cultural variations in the use of moral orientations were found. For instance, the use of the ideal and the

fairness orientations was more likely to occur in a society emphasising cooperation, sharing and equality, such as an Israeli kibbutz, compared with other societies. According to other studies (Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker, 1986a, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991), it was also suggested that moral orientations seemed to be used differently across cultures depending on its environment such as what kind of values and norms and social relations the society emphasizes. Korean society also strongly maintains their own culture which is different from Western cultures (Song et al., 1987). Thus, it was proposed that the usage of orientations would be clearly different between Koreans and the British. However, in contrast to the hypothesis, only a few cultural differences were found in the present study and some of them related to other variables such as gender and age.

Unexpectedly, the present study shows that Koreans used the fairness orientation more than the British in Officer Brown's (see section 4.2.4 in Chapter V.) as well as Joe's dilemmas. The preponderance of Koreans to the British in the use of the fairness orientation is possibly explained through an emphasized value peculiar to Koreans, namely "the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice," which means that virtue should be rewarded while vice should be punished (see section 3.4.2 in Chapter III for details). In the present study, Korean children tended to reveal the concept of the punishment of vice when regarding Officer Brown's dilemma while the concept of the reward of virtue seemed to appear in responses to Joe's dilemma. In Officer Brown's dilemma, many Korean children said that Heinz should be punished in some way for his misdeed even though the circumstance and the motivation were taken into account. The children also justified the judge sending Heinz to prison in terms of maintaining equity in the society. These responses seem to reflect the

internalized concept of children that the punishment of vice is fair. The concept of the reward of virtue might be inferred through children's responses concerning Joe's dilemma. For instance, children said that the father should be rewarded for the upbringing of the son on the one hand, and on the other hand, that the son should also receive compensation for working hard. Such responses reveal the children's belief that the upbringing of offspring as well as hard work are virtues worthy of reward. Furthermore, the fact that most Korean folk tales clearly show the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice (Lee & Chang, 1986) reflects the importance of this concept for Koreans. Korean children are exposed to such folk tales from an early age so that it might be natural for them to internalize the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice and to give moral reasoning based on the concept.

Concerning the utilitarian orientation, the present study reveals variant cultural differences between Korean and British children across the content of dilemmas. Walker and Moran (1991) pointed out a tendency for the Chinese to orient towards utilitarian consequences more than Canadians in Walker's previous study (1989). This tendency of the Chinese was also shown in other studies. Dien (1982) claimed that differences in traditional values and norms between Chinese and Western societies brought on differences in moral reasoning between the two cultures. In order to resolve human conflict, Westerners seemed to emphasize individual choice, commitment and responsibility whereas reconciliation and collective decision making, concepts of utilitarianism, tended to prevail among Chinese. Additionally, in the study of Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985), many Chinese were found to give their moral reasoning in terms of Chinese traditional values. Korea adjoins

China so that Koreans and Chinese have shared their traditional perspectives such as Confucianism for many years. Based on that, it was proposed that Koreans would often use the utilitarian orientation in their moral reasoning. However the present study did not confirm this. A strong tendency of the Chinese to orient towards utilitarian consequences has been proven in many studies, whereas the present study shows such a cultural difference only in Joe's dilemma, moreover, in combination with gender differences. In other words, only Korean girls used the utilitarian orientation more often than British girls whereas Korean boys showed no difference from British boys. Also, Korean girls mentioned the orientation more than Korean boys. When the responses of the Korean girls were analysed, many of them referred to the matter of "hurting one's feeling." Since a gender difference was found only in Joe's dilemmas showing a conflict between family members, the concept of "being a wise mother and good wife," the ideal type of woman in Korea, could explain this gender difference between Korean boys and girls. This traditional concept reflects Koreans' tendency to expect different roles between males and females at least in family matters. Based on this concept, in Korea, girls are probably asked from childhood to consider the feelings of other family members more than boys in order to maintain family harmony. Thus Korean girls' greater use of the utilitarian orientation in Joe's dilemma may reflect the Korean girls' tendency to place greater value on reconciliation and collective decision-making as far as interpersonal relationships within the family are concerned. The gender difference observed in the Korean group partially supports Gilligan's claim (1982) that girls typically use the responsibility orientation (i.e. the egoistic, the utilitarian and the ideal orientations) whereas boys use the right orientation (i.e. the normative and the fairness orientations).

However, in contrast to Gillian's claim, the younger children showed a gender difference that the boys used the utilitarian orientation more than girls concerning Hienz's dilemma. Furthermore, except these variant gender differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation, no gender difference was found in the present study. Thus, the present study suggests that gender differences in the use of orientations could be understood in relation to the content of dilemmas, the cultural background of the participants and, probably, their age.

Cultural differences were also found in the use of the normative orientation only concerning Heinz's dilemma. However, this will be mentioned in the next section in connection with cultural differences in children's chosen issues.

In brief, the findings indicate that some concepts peculiar to Koreans seem to affect Korean children's use of moral orientation and hence lead to differences between Korean and British children and gender differences between Korean boys and girls. One is the concept of the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice. This traditional concept has a stronger influence on Korean children's orientation toward fairness in comparison with British children, especially in Officer Brown's and Joe's dilemmas. The other concept is the emphasis on being a wise mother and good wife. It seems that Korean girls used the utilitarian orientation more than Korean boys and British children on the basis of this concept but this is only found in Joe's dilemma that presents a conflict between family members. Thus it could be concluded that some concepts peculiar to a certain culture affect the use of moral orientations. However, it should also be noted that the influence of the concepts on the use of the orientations varies according to the content of dilemmas.

### 6.2.3 Influence of the Content of Dilemmas

Some researchers (e.g. Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991) examined differences in the use of moral orientations between hypothetical and real-life dilemmas in order to figure out the differences in the use of orientations across the types of dilemmas. Among them, Walker (1989), using Gilligan's categorization of Kohlberg's orientations, found that in real-life situations personal-relationship dilemmas tended to elicit the responsibility orientation more than dilemmas of impersonal matters, such as one involving an issue primarily intrinsic to self or one involving institution, regardless of individuals' gender. In addition, when real-life dilemmas and Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were compared, the right orientation was used more in the hypothetical dilemmas whereas real-life dilemmas drew out the responsibility orientation. Walker's study indicates that the use of Kohlberg's orientations may differ between real life and hypothetical dilemmas. However, it has not been examined prior to this study whether the use of orientations might vary across contents within hypothetical dilemmas. The present study found differences in the use of the orientations across dilemmas. For instance, children seldom used the fairness orientation in Heinz's dilemma whereas they mentioned it the most in Joe's dilemma. With respect to the egoistic orientation, the children mentioned it in Heinz's dilemma almost 5 times more than in Officer Brown's dilemma. Furthermore, differences in the use of the orientations according to children's background also varied across the content of dilemmas. These differences indicate that the children could use different orientations for their moral reasoning according to the content of dilemmas.

#### 6.2.4 Summary

The findings of the present study indicate that there are differences in the use of orientations according to individuals' background such as age, culture, and gender. Concerning the age tendency, the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations increased with age while the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations maintained similar levels across age. Only the use of the egoistic orientation decreased with age. The findings of the present study also imply the influence of the concepts peculiar to Koreans on the use of the orientations through showing cultural differences in the use of the utilitarian and the fairness orientations. The finding that the Korean children used the fairness orientation more than the British children was explained with Koreans' traditional concept of the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice. Cultural differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation occurred only in the case of girls. Korean girls used the utilitarian orientation more than Korean boys and British children. This probably reflects different social expectations for boys and girls in Korean society. However, these general differences only appeared in some dilemmas. In addition, children showed differences in the use of some orientations across dilemmas. Thus it seems that the content of dilemmas is also an influential factor in children's use of the orientations.

### 6.3 CHOSEN ISSUE

With respect to children's chosen issues for each dilemma, cultural differences were also found in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. In Officer Brown's dilemma, cultural differences among older children were observed in terms of chosen issues. At the age of 7, children in both cultural groups are more likely to choose the

punishment issue than the morality and conscience issue. However, after the age of 7, Koreans, and especially girls, still chose the punishment issue more than the morality and conscience issue, whereas British girls chose the latter issue more frequently. That is, the Koreans were more likely to argue that the judge should give Heinz a prison sentence rather than to let him go free. Moreover, many Koreans who chose the punishment issue explained their choice in terms of the importance of individual citizens obeying the law and public officials - i.e., the judge and the police officer - doing their duty. These findings imply that the Koreans tended to adhere to the concept of law-abiding and fulfilment of one's duty. Concerning the concept of law-abiding, the children's responses to Heinz's dilemma showed that Korean girls seemed to adhere to the concept more strongly than Korean boys. Korean girls, regardless of their age, chose the law issue more than the life issue while those in the other groups, including the Korean boys, shifted from the law issue to the life issue as they got older. The Korean girls who chose the law issue tended to give the reason for their choice on the basis of the concept of obeying the law. That is, they argued that, although his wife was dying, in order to keep the law Heinz should not steal the drug. When they mentioned law-abiding, many Korean girls did quote the saying, "even a vicious law is still a law to be obeyed." This gender difference in Heinz's dilemma seems to show that the emphasis of Korean society on abiding the law affects the moral reasoning of girls more strongly than that of boys. Furthermore, Korean girls were more likely to refer to the normative orientation than the British girls regarding Heinz's dilemma which reveals the tendency of Korean girls to orient towards normative order. This seems to strengthen the findings on the Korean girls' adherence to social rules including the law.



These overall findings probably reflect the characteristics of Korean society which stresses the importance of conformity to social rules. In fact, the importance of keeping rules, especially the law, is promoted through mass-media as well as within a unified school curriculum over the country. Song et al. (1987) also pointed out that Korean society emphasizes the importance of authority, conformity and duty and uses them as public justification for adhering to all rules. In addition, the difference between Korean boys and girls in Heinz's dilemma implies that at least in Korean society girls are more likely to conform to the demands of society than boys.

Surprisingly, there was no significant difference in chosen issue concerning Joe's dilemma. Although the Koreans chose the authority issue slightly more than the British, many Koreans chose the contract issue rather than the authority issue as did the British. That is, the children in both cultures argued that keeping contract between individuals took precedence over children's absolute obedience to their parents. The preponderance of the contract issue to the authority issue among Koreans indicates that the Koreans did not advocate only the father in Joe's dilemma. Rather, they considered the son's right to be equivalent to the father's. This could imply that filial piety is attenuated among Korean children in these days although filial piety is thought to be a traditional concept that oriental people, including Koreans, greatly emphasized (Dien, 1982; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Song et al., 1987).

However, when asked the questions "What is the most important thing a son should be concerned about in his relationship to his father?" and "Why?" many Korean children in all age groups still mentioned the concept of "filial piety."

These are some responses of children at the age of 7, 13 and 16 respectively.

“The most important thing is listening to the parents and massaging their shoulder when they were tired because that is filial piety. We all should fulfil filial piety. Because the parents bore us and brought us up. (7 year old)”

“To respect and to be polite to the father. Because the father is the person who let the son be today...but the son does not need to be absolutely obedient if the father asked to do something wrong. I don’t think that is the filial piety, but you have to respect and to be polite to him. (13 year old)”

“He should fulfil filial piety. Because, if he is an human being, he should be amenable to reason of human being and the filial piety is the reason. (16 year old)”

Although the responses indicated that the concept of filial piety is still regarded as one of the most important virtues among Koreans, Korean adolescents, within recent decade, seem to have changed in the way they perceive the concepts of filial piety such as the erosion of the authority of the parents and absolute obedience of the children, as Kim (1992) pointed out. This change in the concept of filial piety seems to be due to a recent tendency of parents to be more tolerant of and less strict with their children owing to the decrease in the number of children in a family and the change of the family system to a child-centred nuclear family (Adolescent White Paper, 1992).

In short, there were differences in chosen issues between the Korean and the British children concerning Heinz’s and Officer Brown’s dilemmas. The Koreans, especially girls were more likely to choose the issues relevant to obeying the law and fulfilling one’s duty. This reflects that Korean children, especially girls, hence internalized the characteristics of Korean society that emphasize conformity to

societal rules. Concerning Joe's dilemma, Koreans still regard filial piety as an important virtue. However, the finding that they chose the contract issue rather than the authority issue implies a change in the concept of filial piety among Korean children.

#### 6.4 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES

Some empirical studies conducted in non-Western cultures (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Lei & Cheng, 1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990) found some features of moral reasoning that Kohlberg could not capture and hence lead to question the sufficiency of Kohlberg's system to assess the moral development in some cultures. For instance, Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985) and Ma (1988b) also claim that Kohlberg's theory is not sufficient to assess moral reasoning in Oriental cultural settings since Kohlberg seemed to overlook oriental perspectives on moral judgment, such as filial piety and collective thinking. The present study also found some responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system.

First of all, some responses of 7 year old Korean children were unable to be scored. According to Kohlberg, young children tend to make a moral decision in order to avoid punishment or seek reward and to obey the superior power of authorities. However, 7 year old Korean children were likely to take into account the emotional aspect, defined as "the restricted-simple sympathy." This implies that Korean children could make moral decisions based on something that Kohlberg missed such as the restricted-simple sympathy even at a young age (i.e. preconventional level) although other empirical studies (e.g. Ma, 1988b) pointed out that the first three stages of Kohlberg's system could be culturally universal.

However, Korean children in the older group, in comparison with those in the younger group showed more various unscorable responses. These responses contained the concept of compromise agreement, filial piety, *chung*, collectivism, and pure conscience.

Referring to a compromise agreement as a mean to solve is a type of unscorable responses that older Korean children, 16 year olds in particular, used. This tendency was salient among Koreans in comparison to the British. The responses showing that interpersonal reconciliation through compromise is the best way to resolve conflict implies that Koreans value unity and harmony with others. Tietjen & Walker (1985), in their study in Papua New Guinea, found a similar concept, "*marawa wawe*," which is best translated as a state of being in harmony or amity with others. According to their findings, the people in Papua New Guinea tend to make moral judgment based on *marawa wawe*. Such judgments were usually scored at stage 3, with the element of social ideal/harmony and the norm of affiliation in Kohlberg's system. However, Tietjen & Walker argued that Kohlberg's system is insufficient to score some traditional concept in non-Western cultures and suggested that the moral concept, *marawa wawe*, can be used at several different cognitive-developmental levels just as the Western concept of "justice" on which Kohlberg's system is based, can be used at different levels. Unfortunately, the present study did not involve adults as participants so that it is difficult to ascertain how to develop the concept of unity and harmony with others from adolescence to adulthood. However, the present study suggests that the emphasis on this concept seems to emerge during adolescence.

Some responses containing the concept of filial piety, which was mentioned earlier in section 6.3 in Chapter VI, Chosen Issues, were also unable to be scored. Lei and Cheng (1984, as cited in Snarey, 1985) already pointed out that the criteria judgments represented by Kohlberg did not properly grasp the concept of filial piety of Chinese and hence it was undervalued. In line with the claim of Lei and Cheng, the present study found difficulties in matching some responses mentioning filial piety with Kohlberg's criteria judgments. Thus, the concept of filial piety seemed to be a concept peculiar to Oriental people and it is difficult to be scored with Kohlberg's system.

The present study found *chung* as another concept that affect Korean children's moral reasoning. It seems to be natural that *chung* affects the Korean children's moral reasoning since *chung* is one of the most important concepts in order to understand psychological aspects of Koreans (Choi & Choi, 1990a) as mentioned earlier (section 3.4.2 in Chapter III). However, the fact that only the oldest children referred to *chung* for their moral reasoning implies that the children, at least before mid-adolescent, could not clearly apply the concept of *chung* in their moral reasoning although they might be vaguely aware of the concept.

Collectivism is a representative concept of non-Western society that Kohlberg did not take into account in his system (Dien, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). Choi & Choi (1990b) claimed that the concept of "we," one of the most important components of interpersonal relationship among Koreans, showed the existence of collectivism among Koreans. That is, Koreans as well as non-Westerners, probably tend to make moral judgment based on collectivism. In the

present study, a sense of collectivism among Koreans was clearly captured in the 16 year old children's moral judgment of Heinz's dilemma. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that Korean society, like other non-Western societies, is a collectivism-based culture and collectivism affects the moral judgment of Koreans.

The present study showed another type of unscorable responses of 16 year old Korean children in relation to conscience concerning Heinz's dilemma. Although they could not elaborate their idea further, they valued dying with a pure conscience more than extending life with a contaminated conscience. Similar responses were found in the comparative study of moral reasoning between Japanese and Americans (Iwasa, 1992). According to the study, 10 out of 15 Japanese adults at postconventional level of Kohlberg's stages chose the law issue rather than the life issue (i.e. Heinz should not steal the drug) unlike Americans at the same level. When looking into the responses, the majority of Japanese at postconventional level said that the most important thing was not just to make the wife's life longer by any means, but to live gracefully with human dignity. Based on these responses Iwasa argues that the Japanese seemed not to choose the law issue as opposed to the life issue but chose "a short life with honour and dignity" rather than "prolongation of life by illegal means." Overall findings on similar responses found in Koreans and Japanese indicate that both Korean and Japanese people are more likely to value "pure conscience" or "a life with honour and dignity" than "a life itself" and that this is another concept that Kohlberg missed. Furthermore, this concept seems to emerge during adolescence and, presumably, to deepen afterwards through late adolescence and adulthood. However, it is impossible to examine whether Koreans maintain the concept and how they develop it during adulthood since the present study did not involve adults as participants.

In short, some responses which were unscorable with Kohlberg's manual were found through analysing Koreans' responses to dilemmas. These findings of the present study in combination with those of other empirical studies imply that not only the concept of justice but also some other concepts such as *chung*, collectivism, and filial piety are used for moral judgment in some non-Western cultures and that Kohlberg missed or misunderstood these concepts. Furthermore, the present study also found unscorable responses even in the 7 year old group but only among Koreans. That is, their moral judgment was based not only on physical consequences, as Kohlberg claims, but also they restricted sympathy to only one person in the dilemma. These unscorable responses are probably due to the influence of the unique Korean culture. Therefore, unlike claims by other studies that Kohlberg's lower moral stages but not higher stages could be universal (e.g. Ma, 1992; Snarey, 1985), the findings show a possibility that individuals not only at higher stages but also at lower stages could make moral judgment based on some concepts that were different from those used in Kohlberg's system.

## 6.5 CONCLUSION

The present study shows some significant findings on children's moral stages, use of orientations, chosen issues and unscorable responses. The findings partially support Kohlberg's theory of moral development and, at the same time, found some cultural differences in the development, which imply the insufficiency of Kohlberg's theory.

Concerning the moral stages, that the children in the present study developed moral stages with age regardless of gender and cultural background coincided with those in other empirical studies (e.g. Colby et al., 1983; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey et al.,

1985). This implies that Kohlberg's moral stages are applicable to not only Western societies but also large-scale modernized societies even though they have different traditions and norms from each other.

Concerning the use of moral orientations, there are also some significant findings. First of all, various differences in the use of the orientations according to the content of dilemmas were found in the present study. Kohlberg posited that individuals were relatively consistent in their moral stages across varying contents of dilemmas. However, he passed over the possibility of differences in the use of moral orientations across the contents. In addition, differences in the use of the orientations across the content of Kohlberg's dilemmas had not been examined until now although a few studies indicated differences in the use of the orientations between Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas and real-life dilemmas. The present study earnestly analysed the use of the orientations in each dilemma, and hence pointed out that the content of dilemmas as well as individuals' age, cultural background, and gender could affect the use of the orientations. Secondly, the present study examined the use of the egoistic orientation separately from that of the utilitarian orientation for the first time. So far, empirical studies considered the use of the egoistic orientation to be included in the use of the utilitarian orientation so that they examined the egoistic orientation in combination with the utilitarian orientation. This indicated a decrease in the use of the combined orientation with age. However, the present study found that the age tendencies of the two orientations were different from each other. The use of the egoistic orientation apparently decreased with age while the utilitarian orientation showed no substantial age difference. Thus it is suggested that age tendency in these two orientations should be examined separately. Thirdly, in the present study the age



tendency in the use of the orientations is viewed in a somewhat different way. Walker's study (1989) showed that the use of the normative, the egoistic and the utilitarian orientations decreased with age whereas the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations increased with age. It could be interpreted that children seem to have a tendency to transfer their moral orientations from the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations to the ideal and the fairness orientations with age. However children in the present study showed such decrease only in using the egoistic orientation but not in using the normative and the utilitarian orientations. With regard to the age tendency to increase, similar patterns were observed as found in other studies. That is, younger children tended to concentrate on the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations in order to underpin their moral reasoning while older children used the ideal and the fairness orientations in addition to the normative and the utilitarian orientations. The older children rarely mentioned the egoistic orientations. These general age tendencies in the use of the orientations indicate that children seem to take into account more various moral orientations as they get older. In other words, it seems that children added newly developed orientations to the orientations which were already used for the moral reasoning as they get older. Thus the present study suggests that the use of moral orientations tends to be diversified with age rather than swapped from one to another orientation. This suggestion is somewhat consonant with the claims of the domain-specificity theorists (e.g. Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986).

Apart from the age tendency, cultural differences in the use of the normative, the fairness and the utilitarian orientations were found. Korean children used the fairness orientation more than the British children. Concerning the normative and

the utilitarian orientations, the cultural differences were combined with gender differences. That is, Korean girls mentioned the utilitarian orientation more than the British children and Korean boys. Korean girls also referred to the normative orientation more than the British girls.

Moreover, children also revealed cultural differences in their chosen issues. Korean children, especially girls, tended to choose the law and the punishment issues over the life and the morality and conscience issues in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. These cultural differences seem to indicate that characteristics of society affect children's moral choice and their reasoning underlying the choice.

Concerning unscorable responses, Korean children in all the age groups gave some unscorable responses although older children were more likely to show the unscorable responses than younger children. It seems that the concepts peculiar to Koreans such as filial piety, '*chung*', collectivism, compromise agreement to solve a conflict, and having a pure conscience influence the moral judgment of children, especially when they are older, and hence generate unscorable responses since Kohlberg missed or misunderstood the concepts.

However, the present study has some limitations. First of all, the size of the sample was small. Although a total of 128 children were interviewed, the age range was wide. The children were divided into four age groups in addition to two cultural groups and two gender groups. This means that actually only 8 boys and 8 girls were in one age group within the same cultural group. Secondly, participants were drawn only from middle class families in an urban area. Having such a small size of sub-group, combined with its socio-economic status limited to middle class in an

urban area, difficulties in applying the findings overall to Korean and British children remain.

Bearing these limitations in mind, it could be concluded that Kohlberg's system of moral development is generally applicable but insufficient to assess individuals especially in non-Western cultures based on overall findings of the present study. In order to confirm or refute the findings above, a second study was carried out to assess children's development of moral reasoning with fables as an alternative method.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **FABLES AS AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ASSESSING MORAL REASONING**

The empirical findings presented in the earlier chapters showed variation in children's moral reasoning according to the content of dilemmas as well as children's background when Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were used to evaluate moral reasoning in various cultural settings. Moreover, some limitations in the use of Kohlberg's dilemmas suggest that it would be useful to seek alternative assessments of children's moral reasoning. Hence, a further study has been planned to use children's responses to fables as an alternative method of assessing moral reasoning in order to supplement the findings of the study using Kohlberg's dilemmas. This chapter will present the justification for using fables as an alternative method and the characteristics of fables, followed by several studies on children's understanding of fables and their morals, and lastly an outline of the further study.

#### **7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF KOHLBERG'S DILEMMAS**

Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller (1992) pointed out at least two contributions that the use of Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas made to moral reasoning assessment. First, the process of abstract moral consideration can be facilitated through concrete situational details provided in the dilemma - e.g. a dying wife, a desperate husband, a life-saving

drug, a selfish druggist. Individuals are more likely to give reasoning about moral values such as human life, affiliation, property, and the laws of society as they attend to the relevant details of the dilemma. Second, moral dilemmas promote the likelihood of eliciting moral reflection from individuals without interference from preconceptions. In other words, the moral dilemmas render the production of reasoning more likely thus making it amenable to being assigned to categories. Actually several researchers (e.g. Lei & Cheng, 1984, see Snarey, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) have indicated that the use of the moral dilemma prompted most people in a wide range of cultures to describe reasoning that was amenable to Kohlberg's predefined categories. In line with the above studies, most children in the present study understood the dilemmas and their moral reasoning matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments, which enabled their moral stages to be assessed.

However, Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas have been criticised as artificial, inappropriate, or irrelevant to children (Anderson, 1980; Damon, 1977), females (Skoe & Diessner, 1994; Gilligan, 1982), and individuals in certain cultures (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Shweder et al., 1990). For instance, Anderson (1980) argued that Kohlberg's dilemmas were irrelevant to children because they were basically a set of abstract, largely adult moral dilemmas. Furthermore, Davidson, et al. (1983) found that the young children (the 6 years olds) distinguished between moral and conventional events more sharply on familiar than on unfamiliar issues and this difference between familiar and unfamiliar issues attenuated with age. This finding implies that moral development proceeds from a reliance on specific personal experiences to an ability to abstract or generalize to unfamiliar events. Thus, on the

basis of the findings of the two studies (Anderson, 1980; Davidson, et al., 1983), it could be assumed that it is difficult to precisely assess children's moral reasoning, especially at their young ages, through using Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. On the other hand, some studies (e.g. Boyes and Walker, 1988; Shweder et al., 1990) pointed out that there might be other moral issues or concepts which Kohlberg's approach missed, misunderstood or misconstrued because of the irrelevant content of the dilemmas in certain cultures. The limitations of Kohlberg's approach due to cultural variation were actually found in the early studies of Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) and Edwards (1975). Additionally, the findings of the present study shows not only differences in the use of moral orientations between the two cultural settings (i.e. Korea and Britain) but also differences according to the content of dilemmas in accordance with Walker's findings (1989). In addition, the findings that some responses of Korean children to dilemmas are unable to be scored with Kohlberg's system imply that Kohlberg did not grasp some concepts peculiar to Koreans that affect their moral reasoning.

Based on the findings, it seems that Kohlberg's system is applicable but insufficient to assess Korean children's moral reasoning. In order to ascertain and to supplement the findings, the second study in the present research was planned to assess the children's moral reasoning by an alternative method. In so far as only children, not adults, are engaged in the present study, the present study attempted to seek an alternative method in terms of the two aspects; one is that the stories should be able to draw moral judgment from children and the other is that the content should be more appropriate and relevant to children. Fables seem to satisfy the above aspects since they are well-known in children's literature as well as containing morals. The

following section describes in detail the justification for selecting fables as an alternative method.

## 7.2 FABLES AS AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ASSESSING CHILDREN'S MORAL REASONING

The present study selects fables as an alternative method of assessing children's moral reasoning. Fables are brief narratives and have world-wide repute as didactic stories. This world-wide reputation of fables implies that their morals are generally accepted in almost every culture. The fact that a number of versions of fables are published especially for children across various cultures indicates that fables are particularly regarded as literature for children. In addition, Chia (1993) and Dorfman (1988, 1989, as cited in Chia, 1993) reported that even more than 80% of children as young as 7 years old seem to be able to identify morals in fables. Thus, where children are concerned, the use of fables for assessing their moral reasoning seems potentially useful because of the familiarity of fables, the acceptability of their morals to children, and the ability of children, even at a young age, to identify morals in fables.

In Korea, where the present study was carried out, a large amount of didactic stories like fables and folk tales are particularly widespread. The stories are introduced to children in the form of books, cartoons, and children's TV programmes. Thus Korean children seem to be fully exposed to "reading," "listening," and "watching" the didactic stories even before school age. Furthermore, they are taught some didactic stories and the embedded morals at school. It seems that children are generally encouraged to experience didactic stories and to draw morals from them.

One of the most available volumes of didactic stories to children in Korea is Aesop's fable. Not only are a number of Aesop's fables books published but also some of the fables appear in primary text books in order to teach children the embedded morals. Korean children are therefore quite familiar with Aesop's fables and have little difficulty in understanding the fables and their morals. Thus it is plausible to use fables as an alternative method of assessing Korean children's moral reasoning. In fact, some researchers have already attempted to assess moral reasoning by means of fables (e.g. Daniels et al., 1995; Johnston, 1988). Here, the characteristics of fables are presented, followed by a review of empirical studies on the understanding of fables and their morals.

### **7.2.1 Characteristics and History of Fables**

Reinstein (1983) states that fables are regarded not only as classics of children's literature but also as an important source of popular culture in America. Such a conception of fables seems not only applicable to Americans but also to people in other cultures, including the Korean and British cultures.

Lenaghan (1967), in his introduction to Caxton's Aesop, defines the characteristics of fables as follows.

- 1) It is fiction in the sense that it did not really happen.
- 2) It is literacy entertainment.
- 3) It is poetic fiction with double or allegorical significance.
- 4) It is a moral tale, usually with animal characters.



Huck, Hepler, and Hickman (1993) describe the characteristics of fables in more detail. According to them, fables are brief, didactic tales mostly having no more than two or three characters who perform simple and straightforward actions that result in a single climax. The central characters are usually animals, or occasionally the elements, that talk and behave as human beings. These characters represent various aspects of human nature - for instance, the lion stands for kingliness, the fox for cunning, the sheep for innocence and so forth. The moral in fables is either implicit or explicit in accordance with their aim to instruct.

Although fables are currently thought of as literature for children, this is not how they originated, especially with respect to Aesop's fables which can be considered representative of fables in general. The change in the status of fables occurred as follows; Aesop, who it is believed was a Greek slave circa 600 BC originally designed fables to criticise politics in a repressive era. It is widely believed that he collected and retold a large number of didactic tales through his talent for storytelling and shrewd observation of human nature. On the other hand, because of an enormous amount of work and the existence of similar fables to Aesop's in China and India, his actual existence is doubted and his works are thought to be the product of several story tellers (e.g. Muggeridge, 1973). Nevertheless, over the years the fables have been recommended and supported as children's reading by a number of notable writers such as Francis Bacon and John Locke. Since Aesop's fables were first edited specifically for children to read in 1692, numerous versions of the fables for children, illustrated and elaborated have been published (Reinstein, 1983). Eventually, they became part of specialist children's literature not only in Western countries but also Oriental countries (Anno, 1991).

Considering the aims of the present study, the most notable characteristic of fables is to convey the human and cultural values of a society in short story form. Most stories in Aesop's fables also present a fairly consistent world view and a prescription for right and wrong behaviours. For instance, the lessons that self-protection and hard work are important and that evil is punished while goodness is rewarded are repeatedly expressed in his fables. These lessons seem to be acceptable in almost every culture since a number of versions of fables have been published across various cultures. In connection with the above characteristics of fables, empirical studies on understanding fables and their morals and influential factors on that understanding will be reviewed in the following section.

### **7.2.2 Empirical Studies on Children's Understanding of Fables and Their Morals**

There are few but some useful studies on the understanding of fables or using fables in order to research various areas of human development which employ a variety of approaches. For instance, Reinstein (1983) studied cultural influences on appreciating fables and Lewis (1993) pointed out the influence of a reader's experience on drawing morals from fables. Abrahamsen and Sprouse (1995) used fables in order to study language deficits, and difficulties in understanding figurative language, particularly in children with learning disabilities. Relevant to moral development, there are some studies using fables to research belief in a just world (Chia, 1993, 1995; Dorfman & Brewer, 1994), the aspects of moral judgment on the basis of Piaget's moral development (Pillar, 1983), the relationship between children's cognitive and moral development (Lambrou, 1988) and Gilligan's moral

orientations (Johnston, 1988; Daniels et al., 1995). Some researchers have studied the connection between fables and morals. Empirical studies on understanding fables and their morals are reviewed below.

Dorfman and Brewer (1994) postulated that individuals are able to understand the moral of fable that the author intended to convey in a fable by means of reflecting the outcome of the central action in the fable on the basis of a belief in a “just world.” Just world belief is seen as developing early in the moral development process and in playing a central role in the organisation of human experience. Piaget (1965/1932) originally describes the concept of “immanent justice,” the young child’s belief that “a fault automatically brings about its own punishment.” This concept is shaped and modified to the notion of a “just world” belief by Lerner (1980). This is defined as the social expectation that individuals who perform good deeds will be rewarded while wrongdoers will be punished. For example, with respect to “the Shepherd and the Wolf,” the boy’s immoral action (dishonesty) resulted in the negative outcome (loss of his sheep). Through this relationship between the action and the outcome, the individual can infer that the author believes lying to be morally wrong. If the boy had lost his sheep in spite of being honest, most readers might perceive it to be unfair and have difficulties in deriving a moral from the fable. That is, individuals are more likely to derive the moral from the fables if their reasoning is based on belief in a “just world.”

In order to test the just world belief that underlies the understanding of fables, Dorfman and Brewer asked 60 undergraduate students to point out the morals underlying traditional Aesop’s fables and three types of modified fables devised for

the experiment. The traditional fables included “The Ass Carrying Salt,” “The Boy Who Cried Wolf,” “The Goose and the Golden Eggs” and so on. The three types of modified fables were neutral-action fables (neutral actions paired with positive or negative outcomes), no-outcome fables, and reversed-outcome fables (positive moral actions paired with negative outcomes and negative actions with positive outcomes). For the experiment, two coders rated 207 fables in terms of how explicitly the moral is stated and selected eight of them, which were rated as clearly didactic.

The results revealed that there was no difficulty for participants in drawing the moral from the traditional fables regardless of the degree of familiarity of the fables to them. A comparison of the traditional fables with the modified fables showed that the former received the highest points in the assessment of clarity and fairness. Additionally, the individuals not only agreed with the instruction of the traditional fables the most but also preferred the traditional fables to any other modified fables. These findings indicate that most adults tend to capture the intentionally embedded moral in the fables according to the just world belief.

Jose’s work (1990) also supports the findings of Dorfman and Brewer with respect to the just world belief through examining the understanding of short stories. Although fables were not used, the structure of the stories was similar to, and even more complicated than, that of the fables in Dorfman and Brewer’s study. Three factors; motive (good or bad motive), outcome (positive/negative) and causality (causal/noncausal) were combined to create eight types of stories. For instance, in one type, a character with a bad motive receives a negative outcome which was noncausally related to the previous motive. When children in grades 1, 3, and 5, as

well as college students, were asked to rate the fairness of stories, participants of all ages agreed that the positive outcome in the good motive stories and a negative outcome for a bad motive were fairer than the reversed combinations, i.e. negative outcomes following the good motives and positive outcomes for bad motives.

However, Jose and Brewer (1984), in their earlier study, pointed out a developmental trend concerning preference for outcomes. The children in the second grade, the youngest children in the sample, depended almost entirely on outcome information in judging the degree of their liking for the story. The fourth graders tended to combine character information with outcome information to determine their liking for the ending of the story but the influence of the outcome is still dominant. The sixth graders clearly showed the ability to integrate the nature of character and that of outcome in a pattern reflecting the just world belief. In sum, these results indicate that young children like positive outcomes regardless of whether the characters are good or bad. With increasing age, children are more likely to prefer positive endings for good characters and negative endings for bad characters. However, aside from their preference for outcomes, children as young as those in grade 1 or 2 still recognized the stories providing positive outcomes for good deeds and the negative outcomes for bad deeds as the fairest stories.

In Chia's (1993) study with Chinese and Malay children, aged 7, 9, and 11 years, in Singapore, most children could identify the "moral" in fables and in just world stories in which human beings are the characters. However, the children showed developmental trends in outcome preference and judgements of outcome fairness. In line with the findings of Jose and Brewer (1984), the study reveals a moderate

tendency for younger children to prefer positive outcomes with less concern for the nature of characters. Children's preference for positive outcomes for good characters and for negative outcomes for bad characters gradually increased with age. With respect to outcome fairness, more of the older children reflected the just world belief compared with younger children. These age differences were only significant for the fables. In accordance with the findings of Jose (1990), no significant age difference is reported for the human just world stories.

According to the findings of the empirical studies, the claim that individuals seem to derive morals from fables not only on the basis of their belief in a just world but also factors such as the fable's outcome. Children were postulated to have difficulties in understanding a moral presented in reversed-outcome fables (i.e. negative outcomes for good deeds and positive outcomes for bad deeds) because of the inconsistency of these fables with the just world belief. Contrary to this expectation, approximately half of the children did produce morals from the fables although the morals were sometimes not intended by the writer (Dorfman and Brewer, 1994; Chia, 1993). For example, an 11 year old child extracted the moral; "Even though you have treated your friends badly they will still help you" from the fable, "The Shepherd Boy and a Wolf," with the reversed outcome. Moreover, this tendency shows no significant decrease with age, again counter to the hypothesis (Chia, 1993). These findings challenged the claim that individuals' understanding of fables is only derived from their belief in a just world. In order to provide an account of how morals are derived from reversed-outcome fables, Dorfman and Brewer (1994) suggest that some individuals use only the fable's outcome to detect the moral instead of using the just world belief. For example, concerning the fable, "The Ants and the Grasshopper,"

the diligent ants have positive outcomes while the lazy grasshopper receives negative outcomes. Thus the individuals can deduce from the outcome that diligence is morally good while laziness is not. At the same time they could produce another point from the fable as its outcome is reversed. Apart from the issue of the just world belief, the universality of children's understanding of fables and their morals was indicated by the congruent findings of the cross-cultural study of Chia (1993) with those of other studies conducted in the Western countries. Furthermore, these empirical studies demonstrate that many children, even at 7 years, as well as adults, are capable of understanding morals embodied in fables, although this understanding continues to develop during childhood.

The claim that 7 year old children are able to identify and to generate morals in fables (Chia, 1993; Dorfman, 1988, 1989, as cited in Chia, 1993) challenged an early finding of Piaget's. In a study on children's understanding of metaphors, Piaget (1959) examined children's understanding of proverbs, which can be conceived of as metaphors. Most children at the age of 9 to 11 in his experiment did not understand the proverbs although they thought they had understood them and gave the illusion of understanding. By analysing their explanations, Piaget figured out so-called "syncretism"; children tend to fuse the two sentences idiosyncratically, applying the whole before understanding the parts.

An 8 year old girl showed almost pure syncretistic reasoning as below.

She connects the proverb: "When the cat's away the mice can play," with the following phrase: "Some people get very excited but never do anything." She, who would understand the meaning of each of these sentences if they were separate, yet declares

that they mean “*the same thing*.” – “Why do these sentences mean the same thing?” -  
*Because the words are about the same* - What is meant by ‘some people’ ... etc? – “*It means that some people get very excited, but afterwards they do nothing, they are too tired. There are some people who get excited. It’s like when cats run after hens or chicks. They come and rest in the shade and go to sleep. There are lots of people who run about a great deal, who get too excited. Then afterwards they are worn out, and go to bed.*”

Based on the findings, Piaget linked children’s ability to understand proverbs with formal operations and metalinguistic skills which develop late in the linguistic repertoire. He suggests that children as young as 7 years old might not be able to understand the morals in fables since they have not yet reached the formal operational stage, which is contrary to the findings of Chia (1993) and Dorfman (1988, 1989, as cited in Chia, 1993).

Furthermore, according to various findings, it could be concluded that there is a marked improvement in the ability of children ages 9 to 14 years to understand and explain figurative language, including idioms (Ackerman, 1982; Cacciari & Levorato, 1989; Gibbs, 1987; Lodge and Leach, 1975; & Prinz, 1983); similes (Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer, & Wolf, 1978; & Malgady, 1977); metaphors (Demorest, Silberstein, Gardner, & Winner, 1983; Nippold, Leonard, & Kail, 1984; Winner, Rosenstiel, & Gardner, 1976); and proverbs (Douglas & Peel, 1979; Resnick, 1982; Richardson & Church, 1959) although some rudimentary understanding of metaphor may occur even in the preschool years (Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983; Vosniadou, Ortony, Reynolds, & Wilson, 1984). However, it should be noted that the above studies, including Piaget’s, on figurative language have not used fables, unlike Chia’s and



Dorfman's studies, so that it is impossible to make an exact comparison between the studies. The findings of Abrahamsen and Sprouse (1995) imply difficulties in comparing findings from studies which have used different materials. They found out that children tended to generate morals in some fables more easily than in other fables in the study of fable comprehension by children with and without learning disabilities. They suggest that the differences in generating morals across fables could be due to various factors including vocabulary, the degree of the fable's adherence to story grammar, inclusion of one primary actor versus a relationship between actors, and the children's familiarity with the relationships portrayed in the fables. Thus, in the light of their study, those factors could also account for the age variation in children's understanding of figurative language across studies.

Cultural influence is another issue in studying the understanding of fables and their morals. There are several studies showing cultural influences on individuals' responses to fables. Reinstein (1983), by means of surveying the attitudes of college students in America, found variation in individuals' acceptance of fables according to their social background. This finding seems to disagree with the general assumption that fables provide an effective method for teaching morals that are valued in a culture because the fables are well-accepted by everyone. Reinstein compared two groups of students in terms of their views of fables. The students in one group attended a four-year state college in New England while those in the other group were enrolled at a two-year community college, a branch of the City University of New York. When the backgrounds of the two groups were compared, most students in the former group were young, single, white and middle to lower-middle class while those in the latter group were mainly older (30-60 years old), married and rearing children, black or

Hispanic, and working class or on welfare.

According to Reinstein, many of the respondents from middle class backgrounds believed that fables are inappropriate for young children's reading because an "unpleasant cynicism" pervaded in the fables. That is, the fables generally describe the world as a dangerous place, full of exploiters, bullies, and false friends. The students were found to believe that such cynicism could deprive small children of a sense of safety and destroy their trust in loving adults who would protect them from danger. Nonetheless, they considered that fables make intellectual exercises for children of 10 or older. On the other hand, Reinstein found that the respondents with lower incomes showed different views. They shared Aesop's view of the world as a dangerous place, full of wicked and cruel creatures like the fox and the lion characters, and saw their children as weak creatures, like mouse and sheep, who must lie low, use their wits when in danger, and work hard the rest of the time. Thus they considered that Aesop's fables gave pragmatic lessons that they felt their children would need to cope with life, and acknowledged the fables as ideal books to read to children of about 4 or 5 years old, before they were allowed to leave the house alone to play or walk to school. The differences between the two groups indicate that individuals can value the same fable differently according to their background.

In addition to having different attitudes towards fables, individuals may obtain different morals from the same fable. Lewis (1993), through a case study of a boy, a fourth grader, found that individuals could draw different morals from the same fable depending on their own experiences. "The Pelican and the Crane," a fable by A. Lobel (1980, in Lewis, 1993) expresses the moral, "when one is a social failure, the

reasons are clear.” However, the boy discovered the moral, “give people a chance,” when he was asked to detect the hidden moral in the fable. The boy’s response to the fable seemed to stem from his experience with his mother. This finding would suggest that a shared culture may be important for interpretation of a fable but there will be individual differences as well. Similarly, Vipond and Hunt (1984) highlight the importance of social and cultural background in understanding stories. They point out that stories are devised to make points which are socially and culturally salient to the extent that sometimes people from other cultures find the stories difficult to understand or even “pointless.” According to the studies, cultural influence on understanding fables and their morals seems to be unavoidable.

Some researchers have studied children’s responses to fables in connection with their moral development as described by Kohlberg and initiated by Piaget. Pillar (1983) analysed children’s responses to fables in order to demonstrate the existence of the sequential stages of moral development, as Kohlberg claimed (see Chapter II for details). The study involved 60 children, aged 7, 9, and 11 years as participants and their responses to the fables were assessed on 4 moral dimensions; intentionality, relativism, punishment and independence of sanctions. It was hypothesized that children would show developmental trends within each of the 4 moral dimensions. As regards intentionality, young children would judge an act according to its actual physical consequences, whereas older children would judge the act in terms of its intention; with regard to relativism, young children would be characterized as viewing an act as either totally right or wrong, and as thinking everyone views it in the same way, while older children would be aware of possible diversity in views of right and wrong; as for punishment, young children would advocate severe and painful

punishment for misdeeds whereas older children would prefer milder punishments leading to reforming the offender; with respect to independence of sanctions, young children would consider an act bad if it yielded punishment, while older children would do so because it violated a rule or did harm to others. As expected, significant relationships between age and maturity of responses were found for all of the dimensions. These findings clearly demonstrate a developmental pattern in children's responses to the fables across age which is consonant with Piaget's and Kohlberg's moral developmental theories.

Despite having a small sample, Lambrou (1988) supported the findings of Pillar through a similarly designed study. However the study also indicated that the level of understanding of morals differs according to the content of fables. With respect to four moral dimensions, intentionality, relativism, punishment, and independence of sanctions, children showed more mature responses to the fables whose moral was "do not be foolish" than the other two fables, containing the moral, "do help others" and "do not lie" respectively. The fables showing the moral, "do not lie" obtained the lowest mature responses. On the basis of the findings, Lambrou suggests the possibility of differences in developmental trends in the way that children acquire certain concepts such as "do not be foolish," "do help others," and "do not lie."

The above two studies concern the relationship between understanding fables and the stage of moral development that the individual has achieved. They do not take into account moral orientation, which has been shown in the first experiment of the present study to show cultural and developmental variation. However, Johnston (1988) investigated how adolescents' moral orientations were related to their solutions to

dilemmas in fables. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg mainly focused on a justice/rights orientation, which is mainly presented by males although there is another orientation, a care/responsibility orientation, which is more likely to be referred to by females (see Chapter II and III for details). On the basis of Gilligan's two moral orientations, 60 adolescents, aged 11 and 15 years, were interviewed so as to ascertain the differences in the usage of moral orientations between boys and girls in combination with the influence of the content of fables on the use of orientations.

It was found that all of the boys and girls represented the two orientations in some way. This indicates that most children have some knowledge of both orientations by 11 years of age. However, they tend to favour one orientation over the other when they attempt to find a solution for a moral dilemma. Generally, boys tend to prefer the rights orientation to the care orientation whereas girls show the opposite. Also, it was found that the usage of orientations was related to the content of the fables. Over half of the children in the sample used the rights orientation for one fable and the care orientation for the other one. This implies that individuals employ orientations differently depending on the content of moral dilemmas rather than persist in using only one orientation. These findings parallel the early findings of the present study (see Chapter VI).

However, Daniels et al. (1995), in their study replicated the study of Johnston (1988), argued against Johnston's claim on gender differences. The purpose of the study of Daniel et al. was to investigate possible differences in the use of moral orientations between male and female youths whose cultural background was very different from the participants in the studies of Johnston (1988) and Gilligan (1982). Thus they

applied Gilligan's moral orientations in examining moral decisions and the reasons for them with youths of Hawaiian ancestry. As participants, 80 children and adolescents, aged 10 to 18 years were selected from state schools located in one of the less-developed islands in Hawaii. Ten boys and 10 girls were selected from each of 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th grade levels. Unlike the claims of Gilligan (1982) and Johnston (1988), the results indicate that the Hawaiian boys and girls did not significantly differ in terms of the use of care and justice orientations for their moral decisions although they used the same two fables that Johnston used in his study as the material. In fact, the boys tended to use the care orientation rather than the justice orientation for their spontaneous and best solutions. Daniels et al. attributed the predominance of the care orientations in Hawaiian boys and girls to the cultural context in which these youths are socialized. That is, Hawaiian culture, characterized as emphasizing the importance of kindness, being agreeable and patient, and seeking harmony with others and one's environment could influence the Hawaiian youths' use of moral orientations. The findings indicate a possibility of cultural influence on the use of moral orientations rather than gender differences. Also, they reported differences in the use of the orientations according to the content of fables. The participants were more likely to use the justice orientation for the fable which is much more aggressive and threatening than the other fable. Thus, the overall findings of the Daniels et al.'s study imply that cultural background and the content of fables could affect the use of moral orientations.

Up to now, empirical studies on understanding fables and their morals have been reviewed in this section. Some studies (Chia, 1993; Dorfman & Brewer, 1994; Jose, 1990) reported that even children as young as 7 years old are capable of

understanding fables and of identifying morals from fables while other studies claimed a great improvement in the ability of children aged between 9 to 14 years. Also, there is evidence of differences in understanding fables and their morals across various cultural, social backgrounds, or both (Daniels et al., 1995; Lewis, 1993; Reinstein, 1983; Vipond & Hunt, 1984). Pillar (1983) and Lambrou (1988) show developmental patterns in children's responses to fables in relation to the stage of moral development, that originated in Piaget's work and were described by Kohlberg. Lambrou also suggests that moral concepts such as "do not be foolish," "do help others," and "do not lie" would be acquired at different points in the course of development. With respect to gender differences in the use of moral orientations, the findings are still controversial. Johnston (1988) found an influence of the content of fables and gender differences in the use of moral orientations to solve dilemmas in fables while Daniels et al. (1995) who replicated the study of Johnston reported that there is no gender difference.

Taking account of the empirical studies examining moral reasoning with fables it is demonstrated that the understanding of fables has developmental patterns as does moral reasoning and that certain responses to fables seem to relate to the development of moral reasoning. These empirical findings on fables in combination with a reputation of Aesop's fables as a didactic story in almost every culture validate the utility of using fables as a method for examining children's moral reasoning. However, it should be noted that some factors such as the content of fables and cultural influence could cause variation in the understanding of fables and their morals.

Also, several points should be considered in using the fables. First of all, because characters in fables are mainly animals, individuals may be less likely to identify with the characters than human characters. This may mean children do not identify fully and therefore do not display their complete moral reasoning. On the other hand, Walker (1989) found that individuals tend to use the rights orientation (the normative and the fairness orientations) more than the care orientation (the utilitarian and the ideal orientations) when they are asked to solve impersonal dilemmas whereas for personal matters, they showed the reversed tendency. These differences between the types of dilemmas were elicited from almost all the age groups of the sample the range of which is between 5 to 13 years. Thus, if fables are generally perceived as “impersonal,” it is possible that individuals may be more likely to rely on their rationality (i.e. the rights orientation) rather than the care orientation in order to make a moral decision for the fables. While bearing in mind the limitations of using fables, a further study has been planned to use fables as a method to explore moral reasoning in order to corroborate the findings presented in the earlier chapters.

### **7.3 OUTLINE OF THE SECOND STUDY**

The first experiment of the present study examined Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning through interviewing Korean and British children about Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. The results showed significant developmental trends in both moral stages and orientations, cultural and gender differences in several sub-groups with respect to moral orientations and the differences in the use of moral orientations according to the content of dilemmas. Also the study found some of the Korean children's responses were unable to be matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments.



Based on these findings, the second study is aimed at exploring two aspects in particular; the applicability and insufficiency of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning to Korean children. The main question of the study is whether Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning as it was applied to his hypothetical dilemmas might also apply to children's responses to fables. Do children show developmental trends and gender differences in their understanding of fables and the morals embedded in them? Do Korean children still show the same patterns of moral reasoning in responding to fables as appeared in their responses to Kohlberg's dilemmas? Does the content of fables affect children's understanding of fables and the use of moral orientations? The research questions are described in detail in the next chapter.

The second study involves only Korean children as participants. As mentioned earlier the empirical studies which were carried out in different cultures have already indicated the general developmental trends in the responses to fables and their morals (e.g. Chia, 1993; Dorfman & Brewer, 1994; Pillar, 1983). The findings of Chia (1993) and Dorfman and Brewer (1994) support universal patterns of the understanding of fables. Moreover, Pillar (1983) found developmental trends in children's responses to fables in accordance with Kohlberg's sequential moral stages. These findings suggest further investigation is needed on the general patterns of the responses to fables in other cultures rather than Western cultures where most of the studies were undertaken, in order to ascertain the universality of the general patterns. Thus the second study focused on Korean children's understanding of fables and the morals embedded in them which reflects their moral reasoning. In order to correspond with the age range of participants in the first study, children aged 7, 10, 13 and 16 years participated in the second study.

A set of questions concerning fables was compiled on the basis of the questionnaire used in Chia's study (1993). Chia concentrated on examining belief in a "just world" through children's judgment of the characters and events in fables. However, the present study focuses on overall patterns of moral reasoning described by Kohlberg rather than examining belief in a "just world." Thus, new questions asking children the reasons for their judgment on the characters and events in fables were added to the original questions used in Chia's study. Moreover, in order to examine developmental trends in the understanding of fables and their morals, the present study was extended to the participants up to 16 years of age while Chia studied children only up to 11 years old. The details of participants, the instrument and procedure are described in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **8.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Several questions on the relation between children's understanding of fables and their morals and children's background (age, gender, and academic level) and the content of stories were proposed mainly concerning 4 parts; children's moral stages, their usage of moral orientations, unscorable responses with Kohlberg's system, and abilities to identify morals embedded in fables. The questions are as follows.

1. Development through moral stages;
  - i) Do children show an increase through the moral stages with age?
  - ii) Is there any gender difference in children's progression through the moral stages?
  - iii) Is there any difference in children's progression through the moral stage according to their academic level?
  - iv) Is there any interaction among these variables (age, gender and academic level), which affects the development of moral stages?

2. Usage of moral orientations

- i) Does the usage of moral orientations differ according to age?
- ii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in the usage of moral orientations?
- iii) Is there any difference in children's usage of moral orientations according to their academic level?
- iv) Is there any interaction among these variables (age, gender, and academic level), which affects children's usage of moral orientations?

3. Unscorable responses

Are there any responses that are unscorable with Kohlberg's system due to cultural uniqueness?

4. Ability to identify morals

- i) Does children's ability to identify morals embedded in fables vary with age ?
- ii) Is there any difference between boys and girls in their ability to identify morals?
- iii) Is there any differences in children's ability to identify morals according

to their academic level?

iv) Is there any interaction among these variables (age, gender, and academic level), which affects children's ability to identify morals?

## 8.2 PARTICIPANTS

A total of 160 Korean children participated in the present study. Equal numbers of boys and girls (i.e. 20 for each gender group) were from each age group of 7, 10, 13, and 16 years old.

All the children had similar social economic background in order to minimize any effect of SES on the understanding of fables and their morals. Children's SES were assessed by means of their own statement of the educational level and the occupations of their parents. All parents of the participants had been educated at least for 12 years and to university level, and most were engaged in "white collar" occupations. The method of controlling for SES coincides with the method used in the first study.

Unlike in the first study (In the first study, only the children whose academic level was either average or just above average were selected.), the academic level of the children was taken into account in order to examine the relation between academic level and the understanding of fables and morals. Children were divided into two groups -the "above half" group and the "below half" group based on the academic rank arranged through school examinations. However, it should be noted that the children were not equally divided into the groups in terms of the amount. The numbers of children in each sub-group are described in Table 8.2.1.

**Table 8.2.1** Subgroups of Participants

Age	7 (40)		10 (40)		13 (40)		16 (40)		Total (160)	
Gender	Boys (20)		Boys (20)		Boys (20)		Boys (20)		Boys (80)	
Academic level	Above (14)	Below (6)	Abo. (14)	Bel. (6)	Abo. (11)	Bel. (9)	Abo. (11)	Bel. (9)	Abo. (50)	Bel. (30)
Gender	Girls (20)		Girls (20)		Girls (20)		Girls (20)		Girls (80)	
Academic level	Above (9)	Below (11)	Abo. (9)	Bel. (11)	Abo. (10)	Bel. (10)	Abo. (12)	Bel. (8)	Abo. (40)	Bel. (40)

( ) = numbers of participants

### 8.3 INSTRUMENT

Three fables from Aesop's fables were used for the experiment. The fables were "The Ass Carrying Salt," "The Goose and the Golden Eggs," and "The Farmer and the Vulture." The fables were selected according to the two criteria described in the studies of Chia (1993) and Dorfman and Brewer (1994). They are a developmental criterion and a rating criterion. In order to satisfy the developmental criterion, fables which appeared the most frequently in books were selected through analysing the contents of 14 fable books. The books analysed in the present study were drawn from the National Library and popular book stores. According to the age guidelines indicated on the books, the books were especially designed for young children aged 5 to 7 years old. Amongst approximately 130 fables, very few fables appeared in most of the books. Thus the fables that appeared in at least seven books (that is, half of the books) were selected. Those were only 24 fables. Also, six of them which were featured in the primary school textbooks were eliminated in order to avoid the influence of schooling on grasping the morals of the fables. Finally 18 fables, which satisfied the rating criterion were selected.

Regarding the rating criterion, three independent coders were asked to rate the fables as to whether the fables had clear didactic points. They were also asked to assess whether they thought the fables were suitable especially for young children aged 7 years. All the coders had obtained Master degree in child studies and practised in the field of child education in Korea. They rated the fables on a three-point scale for clarity of point. The fables rating a score of 1 were deemed to have a clear moral message. A score of 2 was for the fables having a discernible, but not completely clear, didactic point. A score of 3 indicated that the fables had no clear didactic point or moral message. Seven of the 18 fables were given a score of 1 by all the three coders, indicating that these fables have clear didactic points. These fables were also thought to be suitable for 7 years old children.

Amongst them, three fables were randomly selected as the final set of materials for the experiment and these fables were “The Ass Carrying Salt,” “The Goose and the Golden Eggs,” and “The Farmer and the Vulture.” These were taken from two children books of “Aesop’s fables (1993, 1996)” written in Korean language.

Each story contains 8-9 standardized questions to probe children’s ability to generate morals from fables and their judgment and reasons for their judgment concerning story content such as characters and events. The base set of questions in the present study were a modified version of the questions used in the study by Chia (1993). In Chia’s study, three yes/no questions, an open-ended question and a number of questions were used in relation to children’s understanding and evaluation of the fables. The present study copied two yes/no questions and seven to eight open-ended questions (see Appendix B). Children were required to answer two yes/no

questions to ascertain whether they had ever heard the fable and whether the fable had a moral. If they answered “Yes” to the latter question, they were asked an open-ended question about what they thought the moral was. Depending on the number of characters in the fable, the children were also asked either six or seven questions relating to their preference for fable itself, the outcome and characters of the fable.

In addition to the scale questions in Chia’s study, the present study went one step further and asked children the reasons for their decision through providing open-ended questions. Also, the present study also added two questions. One question asked how important the children thought the moral was and the other asked how would they like to change the content of fable if they could.

## 8.4 PROCEDURE

### 8.4.1 Administration

Administration was the same as that of the first study. Oral interviews were conducted with all the children in the schools they were attending. All the interviews were administered individually, tape-recorded, and transcribed afterwards for scoring. It took approximately 30 minutes for an interview. Although the questions for the interview were standardized, not every interview rigidly followed the question set. Some alternations were allowed in asking questions in consideration of circumstances.

### 8.4.2 Scoring and coding

#### 8.4.2.1 Scoring and Coding for Moral Stages and Orientations



The procedure of scoring the children's responses to fables in the present study traced that of Walker et al. (1987) and Walker & Moran (1991). In order to score the real-life dilemmas they used Colby and Kohlberg's manual (1987) after a slight adaptation since the manual is keyed to particular dilemmas and issues.

Because of the lack of explicit criterion judgment for the responses to fables, the scoring was carried out relying more on general stage structure definitions for each criterion judgment than on particular (i.e., dilemma specific) critical indicators. Thus, scores were assigned for every moral judgment that matched a stage structure definition for a criterion judgment in the manual, regardless of the dilemma and issue. For instance, a child responded to the Ass's story that "whoever neglected their duties should be punished in some way, otherwise everyone starts neglecting their duties and it causes chaos." This response can be scored stage 3 using the punishment issue, the law norms and the good group consequences element according to the criterion judgment in Officer Brown's dilemma, #CJ 14. There is another response to the Ass's story; "Ass should listen to the owner, just as we listen to our teachers, because he is the boss." The above response could match the criterion judgment in Joe's dilemma, # CJ 1, stage 1 using the authority issue, the authority norm, the obeying element.

According to the manual, the weight of issue scores is different in computing the moral stages. Scores for chosen issues are given greater weight than those for non-chosen issues. However, in the present study, there is no distinction between chosen issues and nonchosen issues and all the responses were given the scores of chosen issues since the fables do not contain dilemmas and hence there is no need to choose

an issue. The rest of the scoring procedure for moral stage and orientation coincides with that of the first study which followed the manual (see section 4.4.2 in Chapter IV).

#### 8.4.2.2 Coding for Morals Identification for Fables

Children were asked whether they thought that the each fable has a moral and if so to state what the moral was. The morals given by the children were categorised according to the coding system based on Dorfman's study (1989, as cited in Chia's study, 1993). In the present study, a new category called "mixed responses" was added for children who gave more than two morals which were categorised into different classes respectively. The definitions and coding criteria were described as follows. The examples were taken from the responses to the story of "Ass Carrying Salt" in the present study.

#### ***Prototypical Responses***

##### Abstract Responses

Responses that were categorised as abstract are identical with or approximate to the moral of a fable which is indicated in a printed text.

*Example:* Do not shirk your duty.

##### Concrete Responses

Concrete responses are different from abstract responses only in that reference is made to a concrete agent, a concrete action or both.

*Example:* Do not try to make your burden lighter like the Ass.

### *Non-prototypical Responses*

#### Overgeneralisation

Because of overgeneralizing the action resulting in the fable outcome, these responses are so general that they could apply not only to the relevant fable but also to any number of stories containing similar actions. They may or may not be morally significant.

*Example:* Do not be greedy

#### Undergeneralisation

These responses are often too specific and as a result, fail to generalize the action resulting in the outcome. They may not be morally significant.

*Example:* The ass cannot always carry light things

#### Event Summaries

Event summaries describe all or some part of the action, events or characters in the story. Consequently, there is no moral import.

*Example:* The ass carried heavier burden at the end.

#### Anomalous Responses

Anomalous responses are uninterpretable or have no obvious relation to the story content. In the present study, the responses which are probably morally significant

but far from the morals indicted in the printed text are included in this category.

*Example:* Do not step into water recklessly.

### Mixed Responses

The mixed responses involve those that can fall into more than two categories for a fable.


*Example:* Do not try to take the easiest way or apply one method to everything.

All the responses were assigned to one of the above categories.

## 8.5 A Reliability Test of the Present Study

An interrater reliability test was conducted for the present study. As in the first study (see section 4.5.2 in Chapter IV), the second rater who has Korean as mother tongue

**Figure 8.5.1** The Correlation between the Two Raters in terms of Children's WASs



**Table 8.5.1** The Agreement between the Two Raters  
for Children's use of Moral Orientations

Children	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
First Rater	u	u	<b>f</b>	i	<b>f</b>	<b>f</b>	i	i	i	e	n	<b>f</b>	e	<b>u</b>	n	u	n	e	n	e
Second Rater	u	u	i	i	<b>f</b>	<b>f</b>	i	i	i	e	n	<b>f</b>	e	<b>e</b>	n	u	n	e	n	e

n = The Normative Orientation    e = Egoistic    u = Utilitarian    i = Ideal    f = Fairness

The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.

**Table 8.5.2** The Agreement between the Two Raters for Children's Ability to Identify Morals

Children	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
First Rater	u	e	c	u	o	u	o	o	a	a	c	u	a	o	a	a	a	a	o	a	a	a	a	c	a		
Second Rater	u	e	e	u	o	u	o	o	a	a	u	u	a	c	a	a	a	a	o	a	a	a	a	c	a	o	

a = Abstract moral    c = Concrete    o = Overgeneralization    u = Undergeneralization

e = Event summary    n = Anomalous    m = Mixed

The emboldened letters denote disagreement between the raters.

and holds a Master degree in psychology scored 20 interviews in order to examine reliability of the first rater scoring children's moral stage, orientations and abilities to identify morals embedded in fables. In order to strengthen the reliability, almost same numbers of interviews were randomly selected from each stage. Concerning moral stages, there was 75% perfect agreement between the two raters, with showing a high reliability for WASs ( $r = .98$ ). Figure 8.5.1 describes the correlation between the raters scoring children's moral stages.

Concerning moral orientations, 20 moral orientations, one from each interview scored by the second rater were selected at random as did in the first study. Since Cohen's kappa was used for the reliability test, agreement between the two raters was high,  $= .875$ . Table 8.5.1 indicates the children's use of moral orientations scored by the

two raters. Agreement between the two raters scoring the children's ability to identify morals was also computed using Cohen's kappa with 27 morals that children stated, one moral from each interview. In order to strengthen the reliability test, more or less equal numbers of morals were randomly selected from each age group and each fables. That is, six to seven morals from each age group and nine morals from each fable were selected. Table 8.5.2 shows the agreement between the two raters concerning scoring the morals that the children stated. As a result,  $k = .79$ , thus the agreement between the raters was high.

## **CHAPTER NINE**

### **RESULTS**

Korean children's spontaneous responses to fables were analysed in order to examine children's understanding of fables and their morals in connection with Kohlberg's moral reasoning. In other words, children's moral stages, use of moral orientations, and ability to draw morals embedded in fables were compared across their background such as age, gender and academic level. As to the moral stages and orientations, this chapter describes the results obtained from statistical analyses following the form of Chapter V, presenting the results of the first study. Also, this chapter, like Chapter V, deals with the unscorable responses of the children. In brief, the statistical analyses of children's moral stages, use of moral orientations, ability to draw morals embedded in fables, and responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system will be presented here followed by a discussion chapter.

#### **9.1 MORAL STAGE**

Differences in moral stages (WASs) of children in different groups according to their age, gender and academic level were statistically examined. According to Table 9.1.1, the range of means and standard deviations of WASs (moral stages) of the participants in the present study are similar to those of the first study.

Also, it seems that there are only age differences in moral stages but not gender

**Table 9.1.1** Means and Standard Deviations for WASs and Moral Stages

Age	Gender	Academic level	Mean	S. D.	N
7	Boys	Above	166.64 [1/2]	35.69	14
		Below	163.83 [1/2]	28.78	6
		Children	165.80 [1/2]	33.03	20
	Girls	Above	172.56 [1/2]	38.09	9
		Below	168.70 [1/2]	30.71	10
		Children	170.53 [1/2]	33.47	19
	Overall		168.10 [1/2]	32.90	39
10	Boys	Above	227.93 [2]	18.70	14
		Below	227.67 [2]	16.55	6
		Children	227.85 [2]	17.64	20
	Girls	Above	219.44 [2]	29.75	9
		Below	235.09 [2(3)]	25.03	11
		Children	228.05 [2]	27.68	20
	Overall		227.95 [2]	22.91	40
13	Boys	Above	260.45 [2/3]	25.07	11
		Below	268.33 [2/3]	33.24	9
		Children	264.00 [2/3]	28.50	20
	Girls	Above	286.30 [3(2)]	21.82	10
		Below	267.20 [2/3]	28.44	10
		Children	276.75 (3(2))	26.55	20
	Overall		270.38 [2/3]	27.94	40
16	Boys	Above	307.09 [3]	18.99	11
		Below	312.11 [3]	15.41	9
		Children	307.09 [3]	17.21	20
	Girls	Above	311.75 [3]	18.53	12
		Below	314.25 [3]	20.78	8
		Children	312.55 [3]	18.96	20
	Overall		311.05 [3]	17.95	40

[ ] indicates mean of moral stages.

difference nor academic achievement level difference, as in the first study. In order to ascertain whether there are differences in children's moral stages, the way to examine the children's moral stage was the same as that used in the first study; ANOVA was used to examine mean differences in WASs in combination with Scheffe test, a post-hoc test, at  $p < .05$  since it was presumed that WASs showed more precise



**Table 9.1.2** Analysis of Variance; Differences in WASs

	F	DF	Significant
Within & residual		144	
Age	201.99	3	.00
Gender	1.44	1	.23
Academic level	.02	1	.88
Age by Gender	.52	3	.75
Age by Academic level	.38	3	.67
Gender by Academic level	.18	1	.67
Age by Gender by Academic level	1.08	3	.36

moral scores of individuals (see 5.4.2). The range of WASs, from 100 to 361, is equivalent to the range of moral stages from stage 1 to 3(4). As expected, the statistical analyses showed that only age differences in moral stages are significant,  $F(3, 158) = 201.99$ ,  $p < .001$ . Neither gender nor academic level affects the differences in moral stages in this sample. Also, no interaction among variables was indicated (see Table 9.1.2). That is, the children showed a strong tendency to increase their moral stages with age regardless of their gender or academic level. According to the post-hoc tests, all the differences among the age groups were significant ( $p < .05$ ). Therefore, the present study strongly supports the claim of moral development with age.

## 9.2 MORAL ORIENTATION

In the first study, it was found that children varied in their use of the moral orientations in various patterns according to their background such as age, culture, and gender, and the content of the story. In order to ascertain whether the above findings, especially in terms of the influence of age, gender and the content of the story, can apply to other situations, the present study examined children's use of the


orientations for fables. It should be noted that cultural differences in the use of moral orientations between Koreans and the British that were revealed in the first study were not examined in this study but the differences of academic level in Koreans examined since the present study concerns only Korean children. However, the present study examined whether children's academic level could affect their use of moral orientations, which the first study did not take into account.

Like the first study, the present study uses a hierarchical loglinear analyses with backward elimination unless crosstabs analyses of the two-way associations revealed unsatisfactorily low expected frequencies, i.e. expected frequencies less than 1 or more than 20% expected frequencies less than 5 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, chi-square was used as a post-hoc test, if necessary. These statistical methods enable to identify factors and interactions among factors, which affect the use of moral orientations. There were no specific hypotheses about how the use of moral orientations would vary. The analyses were conducted to explore whether any consistent patterns between the first and the present studies existed.

### **9.2.1 The Patterns of Orientations in Fable I, The Ass's Story**

The children's responses to the Ass's story were analysed in terms of the usage of five moral orientations. The orientations were considered separately in order to compare whether the children used the orientations in different ways according to their age, gender, and academic level.

First of all, the children mentioned the orientations in different frequency. As indicated in Figure 9.2.1, the normative orientation (49%) was mentioned much more often than the other orientations. The other orientations were referred to in the range

**Figure 9.2.1** Percent Usage of Orientations for the Ass's Story

of 10% to 23%. The numbers of individuals mentioning each orientation for the Ass's story is presented in Table 9.2.1.

As far as the normative, the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations were concerned, hierarchical loglinear analyses yield a final model for the use of each orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 20.73,  $p = .65$  for the use of the normative orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 15.34,  $p = .91$  for the use of the egoistic orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 17.35,  $p = .83$  for the use of the ideal orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 14.76,  $p = .93$  for the use of the fairness orientation.

Concerning the normative orientation, a post-hoc comparison revealed that 7 year old children mentioned the orientation less than the children in the other age groups (likelihood  $X^2$  (3,  $N = 159$ ) = 13.35,  $p < .005$ ). The children aged 10, 13, and 16

**Table 9.2.1** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for the Ass's Story

	Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b> Boys Above (14)	4	3	3	0	1
Below (6)	0	1	1	0	0
Children (20)	4	4	4	0	1
Girls Above (9)	2	2	0	0	0
Below (11)	4	4	0	0	0
Children (20)	6	6	0	0	0
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>10 years</b> Boys Above (14)	9	8	2	1	1
Below (6)	4	4	1	1	0
Children (20)	13	12	3	2	1
Girls Above (9)	4	4	4	0	0
Below (11)	5	7	1	1	0
Children (20)	9	11	5	1	0
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>13 years</b> Boys Above (11)	7	1	2	2	3
Below (9)	5	2	1	2	2
Children (20)	12	3	3	4	5
Girls Above (10)	6	0	3	2	1
Below (10)	6	0	1	2	1
Children (20)	12	0	4	4	2
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>16 years</b> Boys Above (11)	8	0	0	0	4
Below (9)	7	0	1	2	2
Children (20)	15	0	1	2	6
Girls Above (12)	6	0	9	3	3
Below (8)	2	0	3	0	2
Children (20)	8	0	12	3	5
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>

( ) indicates a total number of children in each sub-group.

years used the orientation more or less at the similar level to one another. In particular, they tended to emphasize the virtues of working hard and fulfilment of duties. Similarly, the older children were more likely than the younger children to use the ideal, and the fairness orientations. The older children (aged 13 and 16 years) referred to both the ideal (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 7.43, p < .01$ ) and the fairness orientations (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 16.55, p < .001$ ) more than the younger children (aged 7 and 10 years). That is, the older children justified giving punishment to a wrongdoer in terms of reforming their wrongdoing (the ideal orientation) or a kind of compensation for the wrongdoing (the fairness orientation). On the other hand, they justified the ass's negligence of its duty through identifying

themselves with the ass which might be tired of always carrying heavy loads. This role-taking response also implies that the children have a tendency to orient toward fairness.

As opposed to the use of the other three orientations, the egoistic orientation was favoured by the younger children (7 and 10 years old) more than the older children (13 and 16 years old) (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 36.58, p < .001$ ). For instance, the younger children were more likely to give reasons for working hard in terms of avoiding punishment. Unlike the younger children, the older children rarely mentioned it. Amongst the younger children, 10 year old children unexpectedly used the egoistic orientation more than the 7 year old children.

Concerning the utilitarian orientation, the statistical analysis identified a minimal model including an effect of academic level and interaction between age and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(14, N = 160) = 11.07, p = .68$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 4.11, p < .05$ ; age  $\times$  gender, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 18.25, p < .001$ . With respect to the interaction between age and gender, girls at the age of 16 considered advantages and disadvantages of an act for individuals or groups distinctly more than the children in any other groups (Fisher's exact two-tailed test,  $p < .001, N = 160$ : The expected frequencies less than 5 are over 20% so that Fisher's exact two-tailed test was used). For instance, a 16 year-old girl stated that we should not shirk work otherwise it could damage the functions of society. In the use of the utilitarian orientation children also showed academic level differences. The children in the above average academic level group tended to

**Table 9.2.2** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Ass's Story


Orientations	Age Differences	Gender Differences	Academic Level Differences
Normative	Youngest < The Others	none	none
Egoistic	Younger > Older	none	none
Utilitarian	Boys < Girls at the Age of 16		Above > Below
Ideal	Younger < Older	none	none
Fairness	Younger < Older	none	none

mention the utilitarian orientation more than those in the below average group (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 4.11, p < .05$ ).

In summary, age seemed the most influential factor in the use of most orientations. The older children used the normative, the ideal, and the fairness orientations more than the younger children while the latter were more likely to consider egoistic consequences than the former. Regarding the utilitarian orientation, 16 year-old girls mentioned the orientation more than the other children. Also, children in the above average academic group referred to the utilitarian orientation more than those in the other group. Table 9.2.2 summarizes the differences in the use of the orientations according to age, gender and academic achievement level concerning the Ass's story.

### 9.2.2 The Patterns of Orientations in Fable II, The Golden Eggs' Story

Differences in children's usage of each moral orientation for the Golden Eggs' story were examined according to their age, gender, and academic level. The usage of the orientations varied in the range from 13% to 36% (Figure 9.2.2). As with the Ass's story, the normative orientation was favoured the most for children's moral reasoning. That is, many children showed normative concern, for example by mentioning that the

**Figure 9.2.2** Percent Usage of Orientations for the Golden Eggs' Story

farmer was so greedy that he should be blamed and deserved punishment. However the gap between the use of the normative orientation and the other orientations was not as wide as that in the Ass's Story. Table 9.2.3 describes the number of individuals who mentioned orientations for this story.

According to the statistical analyses, there are various differences in the use of orientations across age, gender and academic level for the Golden Eggs' story. With respect to the normative orientation, the hierarchical loglinear analysis yielded a final model for the use of the orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 16.00,  $p = .89$ . The youngest children mentioned the orientation the least whereas the oldest children used it the most (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (3,  $N = 160$ ) = 16.56,  $p < .001$ ).

**Table 9.2.3** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations  
for the Golden Eggs' Story

	Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b> Boys Above (14)	2	4	4	0	0
Below (6)	2	2	2	0	0
Children (20)	4	6	6	0	0
Girls Above (9)	0	8	1	0	0
Below (11)	1	3	2	0	0
Children (20)	1	11	3	0	0
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>10 years</b> Boys Above (14)	6	2	4	1	0
Below (6)	2	2	1	2	2
Children (20)	8	4	5	3	2
Girls Above (9)	4	4	3	2	0
Below (11)	4	2	3	2	2
Children (20)	8	6	6	4	2
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>13 years</b> Boys Above (11)	4	0	3	0	7
Below (9)	4	2	3	2	0
Children (20)	8	2	6	2	7
Girls Above (10)	4	0	1	1	2
Below (10)	2	0	2	1	1
Children (20)	6	0	3	2	3
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>16 years</b> Boys Above (11)	5	0	0	2	3
Below (9)	4	0	1	4	0
Children (20)	9	0	1	6	3
Girls Above (12)	7	0	4	5	4
Below (8)	5	0	4	2	1
Children (20)	12	0	8	7	5
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>

( ) indicates a total number of children in each sub-group.

Concerning the egoistic orientation, the statistical analysis generated a minimal model including the effect of age and the interaction between gender and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (9,  $N = 160$ ) = 8.70,  $p = .46$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (3,  $N = 160$ ) = 45.85,  $p < .001$ ; gender x academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 160$ ) = 11.90,  $p < .001$ . According to a post-hoc test, younger children obviously used the egoistic orientation more than older children (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (1,  $N = 160$ ) = 38.02,  $p < .001$ ). For instance, a 7 year-old child stated that you lose your friends if you are greedy. Furthermore, the post-hoc test showed that the girls



in the above average academic level group used this orientation more than those in the below average academic level group (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 80) = 5.78, p < .05$ ).

In the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis identified a final model only indicating an interaction between age and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 160) = 11.55, p = .77$ . According to Fisher's exact two-tailed test, a post-hoc test, at the age of 16, girls were more likely to use the orientation than the boys through mentioning that an individual's greediness could get a group into trouble ( $p < .05, N = 40$ ).

Concerning the ideal orientation, the statistical analysis generated a minimal model including an effect of age and an interaction between gender and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(18, N = 160) = 4.20, p = 1$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 21.48, p < .001$ ; gender x academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 5.25, p < .05$ . Although not many children referred to the orientation, the children in the oldest group certainly tended to use the orientation, which is related with maintaining social harmony or the dignity of life, more than the children in the other age groups. Especially, no one in the youngest group mentioned the ideal orientation (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 21.48, p < .001$ ). Concerning the interaction between gender and academic level, only the boys in the below average group tended to refer to the orientation more than those in the other groups (Fisher's exact two-tailed test  $p < .05, N = 80$ ). However, when each age group was examined, there was almost no difference between the two academic groups in all of the four age groups. Thus it is doubtful whether the academic level difference in the use of the

ideal orientation really exists among the boys.

With respect to the fairness orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis indicated only an interaction between age and academic level as a final model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 160) = 13.12, p = .66$ . That is, the children in the above average academic group showed an age tendency whereas there seems to be no substantial change across age in the below average academic level group (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 16.51, p < .001$ ). A post-hoc test revealed that, only in the above average academic group, the older children were more likely than the younger children to refer to fairness (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 90) = 26.56, p < .001$ ). Furthermore, differences in academic level in the use of fairness orientation were found in the 10 year olds and the older groups (the 13 and 16 year old group) respectively although the use of the orientation generally increased with age. At the age of 10, the children in the below academic level group used the orientation more than those in the other group (Fisher's exact two-tailed test  $p < .05, N = 40$ ) while the older group showed the opposite direction of the academic level differences (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 80) = 12.175, p < .001$ ).

Table 9.2.4 summarizes differences in the use of the fairness orientation according to age, gender and academic level. The age differences in this story were similar to those in the Ass's story. However the tendency for the use of the fairness orientation to increase with age, which the whole group showed in the Ass's story, was found only in the above average academic group. The 16 year old girls used the utilitarian orientation more than the others in this story as well as in the Ass's story. Lastly, some sub-groups showed interactions between academic differences and age and/or


**Table 9.2.4** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Golden Eggs' Story

Orientations	Age Differences	Gender Differences	Academic Level Differences
Normative	Increase with Age	none	none
Egoistic	Decrease with Age	Girls in the Above Group > the Others	
Utilitarian	Boys < Girls at the Age of 16,	none	
Ideal	Increase with Age	Boys in the Below Group > the Others	
Fairness	Younger < Older in the Above Average Academic Group	none	the Above < the Below At the Age of 10 the Above > the Below in the Older Group

gender differences in the use of the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations.

### 9.2.3 The Patterns of Orientations in Fable III, The Vulture's Story

The frequency of mentioning the moral orientations for the Vulture's story varies as shown in Figure 9.2.3. Unlike the usage of orientations in the previous two stories,

**Figure 9.2.3** Percent Usage of Orientations for the Vulture's Story

**Table 9.2.5** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations for the Vulture's Story

	Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b> Boys Above (14)	1	7	4	1	1
Below (6)	1	2	1	0	1
Children (20)	2	9	5	1	2
Girls Above (9)	2	3	1	1	3
Below (11)	2	5	1	0	2
Children (20)	4	8	2	1	5
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>10 years</b> Boys Above (14)	1	4	5	5	14
Below (6)	0	1	4	1	6
Children (20)	1	5	9	6	20
Girls Above (9)	0	0	1	4	9
Below (11)	1	3	6	3	7
Children (20)	1	3	7	7	16
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>13 years</b> Boys Above (11)	0	0	0	3	10
Below (9)	2	0	2	2	8
Children (20)	2	0	2	5	18
Girls Above (10)	1	0	2	4	5
Below (10)	3	1	2	2	10
Children (20)	4	1	4	6	15
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>16 years</b> Boys Above (11)	1	0	1	5	9
Below (9)	1	0	1	4	8
Children (20)	2	0	2	9	17
Girls Above (12)	1	0	6	10	10
Below (8)	2	0	1	4	4
Children (20)	3	0	7	14	14
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>31</b>

children used the fairness orientation distinctly more than the other orientations. The percentage of the use of the fairness orientation reached 67% while the other orientations were referred to within the range from 11 to 31%. Table 9.2.5 presents the numbers of individuals who mentioned orientations for this story.

When the differences in the use of orientations according to children's background were examined, various patterns of differences were shown in the use of all the orientations except the normative orientation. The statistical analysis showed no difference in the use of the normative orientation across age, gender and academic level.

With respect to the use of the egoistic orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final model including the effect of age and the interaction between gender and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(18, N = 160) = 6.00, p = 1.00$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 38.08, p < .001$ ; gender x academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 5.56, p < .05$ . The egoistic orientation - e.g. we should help others in order to get a return or to avoid punishment - was used most frequently at the age of 7, and rapidly dropped afterwards. Thus the 13 and the 16 year old children rarely mentioned the egoistic orientation. Also, the girls in the above average academic level group used the orientation less than those in the other group.

In the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis indicated only the interaction between age and academic level as a final model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 160) = 16.90, p = .39$ . The age difference was found to be significant only in the below average academic level group. According to a post-hoc test, in the below average level group, the 10 year old children used the orientation more than the other children (Fisher's exact two-tailed test  $p < .001, N = 70$ ). The 10 year old children in the above average academic level group also used the orientation relatively less than those in the below average level group (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 40) = 4.40, p < .05$ ).

With respect to the ideal orientation, the hierarchical loglinear analysis identified a final model for the use of the orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(24, N =$

160) = 18.40,  $p = .78$ . The use of the ideal orientation, for instance, stating that we should help others for conscience's sake, increased with age, especially at the age of 10 and 16 (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 29.21, p < .001$ ).

Concerning the use of the fairness orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final model including two types of interaction between age and gender, and between age and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(8, N = 160) = 10.96, p = .20$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age  $\times$  gender, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 8.27, p < .05$ ; age  $\times$  academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 12.16, p < .01$ . A post-hoc test showed that, although the use of the fairness orientation rapidly increased at the age of 10 and maintained the same level of the use up to the age of 16. At the ages of 10, 13 and 16, the boys' use of the orientation increased more rapidly than that of the girls (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 120) = 6.23, p < .05$ ). Also, at the age of 10, the children at the above average academic level used the orientation more than those at the below average academic level (Fisher's exact two-tailed test  $p < .05, N = 40$ ).

**Table 9.2.6** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Vulture's Story

Orientations	Age Differences	Gender Differences	Academic Level Differences
Normative	none	none	none
Egoistic	Decrease with Age	Girls in the Above Group < the Others	
Utilitarian	the 10 Year Old Group > the Others in the Below Average Academic Group	none	the Above < the Below at the Age of 10
Ideal	Increase with Age	none	none
Fairness	Increase with Age but Boys > Girls, at the Ages of 10, 13, and 16		the Above > the Below at the Age of 10


In sum, the children showed similar patterns of age differences in the use of the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness orientations as in the other two stories but no age difference in the use of the normative orientation. Various interactions between age, gender and academic level were observed in the use of the egoistic, the utilitarian and the fairness orientations (see Table 9.2.6).

#### 9.2.4 The Patterns of Orientations in the Three Fables as a Whole

This section shows the children's use of moral orientations when the three stories were considered as a whole. The children expressed their moral reasoning for the three stories through using the moral orientations in the range from 39 to 72 % (Figure 9.2.4).

Compared with the percentage of use of orientations in the first study, the children in the present study did not use the orientations as much as in the first study especially

**Figure 9.2.4** Percent Usage of Orientations for the Three stories as a Whole



the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations. In the present study, the children used the normative orientation (71%) the most and then the fairness orientation (69%). The egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations were referred to by 39%, 45%, and 41% of the children respectively. When the stories were considered separately, the children showed some differences in the amount of the use of certain orientations across stories. For instance, only a few children referred to the fairness orientation for the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories while almost 67% of the children used the orientation for the Vulture's story. The first study also indicated different numbers of children across the stories with respect to the use of moral orientations and suggested the fluctuation of the usage of moral orientations according to the content of stories. Not only the content of the stories but also the background factors such as age, gender, academic level seemed to influence the use of moral orientations. The number of individuals who mentioned orientations for the three stories as a whole in each sub-group are described in Table 9.2.7.

With respect to the normative and the egoistic orientations, hierarchical loglinear analyses yield a final model for the use of each orientation showing only an effect of age regardless of culture and gender. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 13.51,  $p = .96$  for the use of the normative orientation; likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (24,  $N = 160$ ) = 15.06,  $p = .92$  for the use of the egoistic orientation. In general, the use of the normative orientation (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (3,  $N = 160$ ) = 23.22,  $p < .001$ ) increased with age whereas the use of the egoistic orientation decreased with age (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (3,  $N = 160$ ) = 97,  $p < .001$ ).



**Table 9.2.7** The Number of Individuals Who Mentioned Orientations  
for the Stories as a Whole

	Normative	Egoistic	Utilitarian	Ideal	Fairness
<b>7 years</b> Boys Above (14)	6	9	6	1	2
Below (6)	2	4	3	0	1
Children (20)	8	13	9	1	3
Girls Above (9)	4	8	2	1	3
Below (11)	5	7	2	0	2
Children (20)	9	15	4	1	5
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>10 years</b> Boys Above (14)	12	10	8	7	14
Below (6)	5	5	4	3	6
Children (20)	17	15	12	10	20
Girls Above (9)	6	8	5	5	9
Below (11)	7	8	8	4	7
Children (20)	13	16	13	9	16
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>13 years</b> Boys Above (11)	8	1	4	4	10
Below (9)	6	2	4	5	8
Children (20)	14	3	8	9	18
Girls Above (10)	8	0	4	4	5
Below (10)	8	1	4	3	10
Children (20)	16	1	8	7	15
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>16 years</b> Boys Above (11)	10	0	1	7	9
Below (9)	8	0	2	6	9
Children (20)	18	0	3	13	18
Girls Above (12)	10	0	11	12	10
Below (8)	8	0	4	4	6
Children (20)	18	0	15	16	16
<b>Overall (40)</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>34</b>

Concerning the use of the utilitarian orientation, a hierarchical loglinear analysis indicated only an interaction between age and gender as a final model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 160) = 14.45, p = .56$ . The age tendency was observed in connection with gender differences as shown in the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories. At the age of 16, only a few boys used the orientation whereas the 16 year old girls tended to mention the orientation more than the other children. Consequently, the girls used the orientation much more than the boys at the age of 16 (likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 40) = 15.65, p < .001$ ).

In the use of the ideal orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final model

**Table 9.2.8** Differences in the Use of Moral Orientations for the Stories as a Whole

Orientations	Age Differences	Gender Differences	Academic Differences	Level
Normative	Increase with age	none	none	
Egoistic	Decrease with age	none	none	
Utilitarian	Boys < Girls at the Age of 16		none	
Ideal	Increase with age	Girls in the Above Group > the Others		
Fairness	Increase with age	none	The Above Group at the Age of 10 > the Others	

including an effect of age and an interaction between gender and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(18, N = 160) = 10.92, p = .90$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 44.75, p < .001$ ; gender x academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2(1, N = 160) = 5.31, p < .05$ . That is, the children's use of the ideal orientation increased with age and the girls at the above average academic group were more likely than the boys at the same academic level to use the orientation.

Concerning the fairness orientation, the statistical analysis yielded a final model indicating an interaction between age and academic level. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2(16, N = 160) = 20.10, p = .22$ . Although the use of the fairness orientation rapidly increased at the age of 10 and maintained the same level of the use afterwards, at the age of 10, the children in the above average academic level group used the orientation more than those in the other academic groups (likelihood ratio  $X^2(3, N = 160) = 11.94, p < .01$ ).

In summary, the children mentioned orientations in different amounts across the stories. It seems that the content of the story influences the children's use of moral

orientations. However, age tendencies of the children's usage of orientations were consistent, regardless of the content of the stories. The older children referred to the normative, the ideal, and the fairness orientations more than the younger children while the use of the egoistic orientation decreased with age. Regarding the utilitarian orientation, the girls at the age of 16 used the orientation more than the others. Some sub-groups showed academic level differences in the use of ideal and fairness orientations when the three stories were considered as a whole.

### **9.3 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES**

The children in the present study using fables made some responses which were unable to be matched to Kohlberg's system. In line with the claim of other studies (e.g. Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Iwasa, 1992; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990; Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) that Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment has limitations since he missed or misunderstood some concepts peculiar to non-Western cultures, the unscorable responses in the present study also imply that there are some concepts which affect Koreans' moral reasoning that Kohlberg did not grasp well. Some of these unscorable concepts of Korean children such as "pure conscience" and "reconciliation," which the first study using Kohlberg's dilemma found, could not be revealed in the present study using fables, probably because the content of fables was insufficient to let the children express those concepts. However, the present study showed some unscorable concepts such as restricted-simple sympathy, *chung* and collectivism, which the first study has already found. Furthermore, the present study found other unscorable responses such as "the respect for all living things," which was not found in the first study. The examples of

unscorable responses are presented below.

There are examples of the 7 year old Korean children's responses on the basis of the restricted-simple sympathy.

"The farmer was bad. Because he killed *the poor goose*." [a response to the Golden Eggs' story]

"He (the farmer) should not kill the goose because *dying is sad*." [the Golden Eggs' story]

"We should help others because *it is sad if someone died*." [the Vulture's story]

The examples below are the responses based on physical consequences;

"We should protect animals because we need meat...and we will be bored if there is no animal."

"He should help the vulture otherwise it would scratch him with its claws."

These examples indicate that 7 year old Korean children tended to focus not only on the physical consequences but also emotional consequences - i.e. the restricted-simple sympathy - in order to make a moral decision in the study using dilemmas. The responses based on the restricted-simple sympathy were not able to be scored with Kohlberg's system since he did consider only the physical consequences for young children's moral reasoning.

Another type of unscorable responses is the responses concerning the respect for life, even that of animals. It seems that children at the age of 13 begin to reveal the concept of the respect for life and those at the age of 16 clearly express the concept. There are examples of the responses to the Golden Eggs' and the Vulture's stories

showing the concept of the respect for life.

“I don’t like the farmer. He is bad because he killed the innocent goose just for his greediness.” (age 13)

“He was good because he saved a life. You shouldn’t kill any living thing without good reason.” (age 13)

“The farmer was good. He didn’t just pass by the dying vulture but tried his best to save its life. We should value life although it is the mere life of an animal.” (age 16)

The concept on *chung*, which appears at older age, is also unable to be scored with Kohlberg’s manual. The concept on *chung* could be identified though analysing children’s reasons for “helping others.”

“We should help each other because that is what people should do in a society to make the society be full of *chung* (through helping others).”

“If someone minded only his own business and did not care for others, there is no *chung* in a society and the society becomes dreary. He shouldn’t do that.”

The above example shows the responses of 16 year old children mentioning *chung*. Based on these findings, it seems that the concept of *chung*, which Kohlberg missed, affects the moral judgment of Korean children.

The collectivism-based cultures are characterized by the fact that the tranquillity of community sometimes takes precedence over the rights of individuals, and hence that the individuals are asked to relinquish some freedom and identity in order for society to function (Ma, 1988b; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In the present study, Korean children especially at the age of 16 revealed the characteristics of collectivism through giving moral reasons for “not disturbing or harming others” and it is impossible to

score these responses with Kohlberg's system.

"Working hard is important because others work hard too. If I didn't work hard, it does others working hard harm. I should fulfil my duty even though I don't like it especially when I'm in a group."

"You shouldn't disturb others with odd behaviour but keep pace with others. Because you are in a group. You can't live completely by yourself."

On the basis of these responses, it seems reasonable to say that Korean society is a collectivism-based culture like many other non-Western cultures.

In sum, overall findings that unscorable responses among Koreans generated from some concept peculiar to Koreans such as "collectivism," "*chung*," and "respect for all living things" indicate that Kohlberg's system is insufficient to assess Koreans' moral judgment. The fact that moral judgment based on the restricted-simple sympathy of young Korean children at the stage 1 or 2 is also unscorable implies that Kohlberg's system is insufficient even for young Korean children since Kohlberg de-emphasized sympathy in his moral stages. Except for the restricted-simple sympathy, most unscorable responses of Koreans appeared during adolescence. This indicates that the influence of concepts peculiar to Koreans on their moral reasoning is greater during adolescence than childhood and hence the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system is greater for adolescents.

#### 9.4 ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND GENERATE MORALS IN FABLES

The children were asked whether they thought that each fable has a moral and if they did, to state what the moral was. Based on their responses (whether they thought the fables have morals and which types of morals they stated) the children's ability to

identify and to generate morals was assessed. In order to assess the ability to generate morals, the children were divided into seven categories - abstract responses, concrete responses, overgeneralisation, undergeneralisation, event summaries, anomalous responses, and mixed responses - according to the morals that they gave. Amongst them, the first two - abstract and concrete responses - were regarded prototypical responses while the others were non-prototypical responses (see section 7.4.2.2 in Chapter VII for details).

Table 9.4.1 describes the numbers of children who could identify morals (i.e. those who drew any types of morals) and those who could not (i.e. those who thought there were no morals in the fables) and also shows age differences in children's ability to identify morals for the fables. When the children were asked whether each story had a moral, older children tended to give affirmative responses more than the 7 year old children. At the age of 7, 67.5%, 60%, and 72% of the children gave affirmative responses for the Ass's, the Golden Eggs', and the Vulture's stories respectively while the children in the other age groups stated morals for the fables within the range from 96 to 99%. The percentage of children who identified morals are comparable with those in Chia's (1993) and Dorfman's studies (1988, 1989, re-cited in Chia, 1993) although the fables used in the present study were different from those in the other studies. In Chia's study 91%, 89%, and 100% of Chinese and Malay children identified morals for fables at the ages of 7, 9, and 11 years respectively while Dorfman reported that 80% identified a moral at age 7, 69% at age 9, and 73% at age 11. These findings show that Korean children seemed to lag slightly behind those in Chia's and Dorfman's studies at the age of 7 regarding the ability to identify morals. However, most of the children over 10 in the present study could identify morals in

**Table 9.4.1** The Number of Children Who Identify and Generate Morals  
for the Three Fables

*Fable I; the Ass's Story*

Age Academic Level Gender	7				10				13				16				Total			
	Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel	
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G
No Morals	2	1	3	7	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	4	7
Abstract	1	1	0	1	12	6	3	7	9	7	8	7	10	9	8	7	32	23	19	22
Concrete	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	5	3	1	1
Over-generalised	0	1	1	3	1	3	2	2	1	2	1	2	0	1	0	0	2	7	4	7
Under-generalised	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	2
Event summary	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	0
Anomalous	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Mixed	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Total	14	9	6	11	14	9	6	11	11	10	9	10	11	12	9	8	50	40	30	40

Abo: Above Bel: Below B: Boys G : Girls

*Fable II; the Golden Eggs' Story*

Age Academic Level Gender	7				10				13				16				Total			
	Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel	
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G
No Morals	3	4	2	7	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	6	4	8
Abstract	4	4	3	3	13	5	4	11	7	8	7	9	9	9	7	7	33	26	21	30
Concrete	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	1
Over-generalised	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	3	0	1
Under-generalised	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Event summary	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
Anomalous	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	0
Mixed	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0
Total	14	9	6	11	14	9	6	11	11	10	9	10	11	12	9	8	50	40	30	40

Abo: Above Bel: Below B: Boys G : Girls

*Fable III; the Vulture's Story*

Age Academic Level Gender	7				10				13				16				Total			
	Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel		Abo		Bel	
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G
No Morals	2	2	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	2	6
Abstract	1	2	1	1	12	8	5	8	6	7	6	10	7	9	7	7	26	26	19	26
Concrete	4	3	2	1	2	1	1	3	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	6	5	4
Over-generalised	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	5	1	2	2
Under-generalised	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Event summary	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1
Anomalous	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	5	0	1	1
Mixed	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
Total	14	9	6	11	14	9	6	11	11	10	9	10	11	12	9	8	50	40	30	40

Abo: Above Bel: Below B: Boys G : Girls



the fables, which indicates that the children in the present study were not different from those in Chia's study and even surpassed those in Dorfman's study in terms of identifying morals at the age of 10.

When the types of morals that children gave were examined, it seems that there are also age differences (Table 9.4.1). The children over 10 years old generated abstract morals, which were regarded as the most mature responses, much more than the 7 year old children. Conversely the 7 year old children drew non-prototypical morals (over-generalised to anomalous morals) more than the 10 year olds. Regarding the concrete morals, the youngest children generally tended to yield them more than those in older age groups and the mentioning of concrete morals decreased with age. The tendency for concrete morals to decrease with age was also revealed in the study of Jose et al. (1992, as cited in Chia, 1993) (10%, 13%, and 3% for 7, 9, and 11 year old children respectively) while, in Chia's study (1993), the 11 year old children (8%) stated concrete morals slightly more than the children at the ages of 7 and 9 (3% and 3.5% respectively).

Interestingly, Table 9.4.1 shows that 7 year old children were more likely to generate abstract morals for the Golden Eggs' story than for the other stories. It seemed that the fable itself affected young children's ability to draw morals. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

It was also assumed that children's familiarity with the fables could affect their ability. Thus the children's familiarity ratings was illuminated (Table 9.4.2). The children seemed quite familiar with the Ass's (89%) and the Golden Eggs' stories (86%), but not with the Vulture's story (41%). Although the fable was rated as one of the most

**Table 9.4.2** The Number of Children Who Had Heard the Stories Before

Age	The Ass's Story	The Golden Eggs' Story	The Vulture's Story
7	30	23	10
10	34	35	16
13	39	40	21
16	39	40	19
Total	142 (88.75%)	138 (86.25%)	66 (41.25%)

frequently appearing fables in books, the amount of children who had heard the Vulture's story was less than half. However, when the numbers of children who drew prototypical morals from the three stories were compared, the numbers for the Vulture's story (74%), which was the least familiar, was little different from those for the Ass's (66%) and for the Golden Eggs' stories (72.5%). The number of children who thought each fable had a moral also showed almost no difference among the fables (91% for the Ass's, 86% for the Golden Eggs', and 92.5% for the Vulture's stories).

The claim that familiarity with the fables had nothing to do with generating morals in the fables became more definite through examining the 7 year old children's responses. Only a quarter of the children had heard the Vulture's story while 75% of the children had heard the Ass's story. However, the number of children who thought the fable had a moral and generated a prototypical moral was slightly larger for the Vulture's story (72.5% and 37.5% respectively) than for the Ass's story (67.5% and 22.5% respectively). These descriptions on children's familiarity with fables indicate that children's ability to identify morals could not be affected by familiarity with particular fables.

Based on these overall sketches, differences in children's ability to identify and to

generate morals in the each fable were statistically examined mainly according to their age, gender and academic level. The children's familiarity with the fables was also taken into account as an influential factor. The hierarchical loglinear analyses using backward elimination in combination with chi-square were used as a statistical analysis. For the statistical analyses, the children were divided into two age groups - the 7 year old group and the older group - since it seemed that there was no difference among the 10, the 13 and the 16 year old groups. Also, the children's responses were appertained to one of the three groups; the no moral group, the prototypical moral group, and the non-prototypical moral group.

Concerning the Ass's story, the statistical analysis yielded a final model for the children's ability to identify and generate morals showing an effect of age and an influence of the familiarity with the fable. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (37,  $N = 160$ ) = 43.62,  $p = .21$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (2,  $N = 160$ ) = 52.73,  $p < .001$ ; familiarity, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (2,  $N = 160$ ) = 13.57,  $p < .005$ . That is, the 7 year old children were more likely than the older children to draw either no moral or non-prototypical morals from the Ass's story. Also, the children who had heard the story before generated prototypical morals more than those who had not. However, it could not be said that the familiarity is an influential factor because the expected frequencies less than 5 are over 20%.

In the Golden Eggs' story, the interaction among age, gender and academic level was generated as a minimal model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (22,  $N = 160$ ) = 17.74,  $p = .72$ . That is, except the boys whose academic levels were

below the average, the children showed an age tendency (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (2,  $N = 160$ ) = 6.80,  $p < .05$ ). The chi-square as a post-hoc test revealed that, like in the Ass's story, the older children gave prototypical responses more than the 7 year old children (likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (2,  $N = 130$ ) = 41.72,  $p < .001$ ).

With respect to the Vulture's story, the statistical analysis identified the age effect and difference in academic level as a final model. The model was a reasonable fit: likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (29,  $N = 160$ ) = 20.81,  $p = .87$ . Eliminating either effect produced a significant increase in deviance: age, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (2,  $N = 160$ ) = 41.72,  $p < .001$ ; academic level, likelihood ratio  $X^2$  (2,  $N = 160$ ) = 6.49,  $p < .05$ . The age difference was similar to those in the other two stories. Concerning the academic difference, there was no significant difference in drawing prototypical responses between the children in both groups. The difference is that the children at the above average academic level tended to generate non-prototypical responses rather than to draw no moral from the story whereas the children at the below average academic level showed the opposite pattern. However, the difference mainly stemmed from the youngest group.

In brief, the above findings of the present study indicate clear age differences between 7 year old children and children 10 years and above. It seemed that the children's ability to draw morals from the fables had not been fully developed at the age of 7. However, after the age of 10, most children had reached the mature level with the fables regardless of their gender, academic level and familiarity. That is, older children had less difficulties in identifying morals and generated a mature type of morals more than the 7 year old children. Furthermore, a difference in academic

level was observed only in the Vulture's story. Concerning the familiarity, it seems that children's familiarity with fables genre rather than the familiarity with particular fables affected their ability to identify morals if it could be assumed that the older children had heard more fables than younger children.

## 9.5 SUMMARY

To summarize, Korean children's spontaneous responses to fables were statistically analysed in order to examine whether children's moral stages, use of moral orientations, and ability to draw morals are related with background factors such as age, gender, and academic level. The results showed a developmental tendency in all the three aspects; children's moral stages, use of orientations, and ability to draw morals. Various gender or academic level differences in the use of the moral orientations were found across stories. Furthermore, the content of stories seems to relate to the children's use of the orientations and ability to draw a moral. Also, showing unscorable responses with Kohlberg's system indicated the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system for Korean children although the general findings on children's moral stage and use of the orientations showed that the system is applicable.

## **CHAPTER TEN**

### **DISCUSSION**

Only Korean children participated in the present study using fables and the differences in moral reasoning across age, gender and academic level were examined through analysing their spontaneous responses in connection with their judgments and reasons concerning the characters, events and conclusions in fables. Also, children's unscorable responses with Kohlberg's system and their ability to identify and to generate morals from the fables were explored in this study. The findings are discussed below.

#### **10.1 MORAL STAGE**

Regarding age differences, first of all, the present study showed a clear tendency of moral stage to increase with age as did the first study and other empirical studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978). In the present study, the children's moral stages developed with age regardless of their gender and academic level. Findings that moral stages increased with age supports Kohlberg's claim of the sequential development of moral stages across age at least up to stage 4.

No gender difference in moral stages was found in the present study in line with other studies that have found no gender difference in the development of moral stages (e.g.

Ahn, 1987; Chung, 1987; Lee, 1985; Snarey et al., 1985; Walker, 1984; Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991). Thus the present study does not support Gilligan's claim (1982) that Kohlberg's moral stages seem to be biased in favour of males, obtained through interviewing abortion counsellors (see section 3.1 in Chapter III for details), nor the claim that girls are generally more mature than boys in the development of moral stages, probably due to overall precociousness of females during childhood and early- and mid-adolescence (e.g. Cohn, 1991; Kang, 1994; Lee, 1981; Park, 1983; Thoma, 1986 - see section 6.1 in Chapter VI for details).

The present study examined academic level differences in moral reasoning, which had not been conducted in the first study using Kohlberg's dilemmas. Several studies have already examined the relationships between the level of academic achievement and moral stages on the basis that educational background could accelerate moral development. For instance, Narvaez (1993) examined the relationships between moral judgment and academic achievement through administering DIT to 122 adolescents aged 14 or 15 years. Academically high achievers scored significantly higher on moral judgment than their peers in line with other studies (e.g. Keen, 1990; Lee, 1985; Tan-Willman & Gutteridge, 1981; Won, 1987). However it should be noted that not every high achiever did reach a high moral stage; quite a number of them attained average or even low scores in moral judgment. Concerning those who were at average to below average academic level, no one obtained a high score of moral judgment while many of the academically higher achievers did. Based on the findings, Narvaez argues that intellectual accomplishment is necessary but not sufficient for reaching a high stage of moral judgment if the academic achievement implies intellectual aptitude.

Edwards (1978) also examined the correlation between moral judgment stages and the level of academic achievement (as measured by standardized achievement tests) with Kenyan secondary school or university students; ranging in age from 16 to the early twenties. Only secondary school students showed a positive relationship between moral stages and the level of academic achievement measured by their test scores of the three tests in English, Math and Science. In spite of a positive relationship, the relationship was not statistically significant.

The present study showed no correlation between the level of academic achievement and moral stages. There are several possible ways to interpret the findings. On the one hand, the results might be interpreted as showing there is no relationship between the two factors. On the other hand, the actual differences in the level of academic achievement between the two groups in the present study might not be significant enough to influence moral stages. Narvaez (1993) found a positive correlation between children's scores on moral judgment and academic ranks through minutely ranking the children from top to bottom according to their academic achievement scores in order to examine correlation between the two factors. However, the children in the present study were simply divided into two groups - the above average and the below average academic level groups - and differences between the two groups in terms of the mean of moral stages were examined. Additionally, there is a possibility that the children whose academic levels were slightly above or below the average rather than those who were at the top or the bottom of academic achievement level might be in the majority since the participants were not strictly confined to those who were at the top or the bottom of the academic level. This could also be one of the reasons why no relationship between the academic level and moral stages was



found. Thus, the fact that the children in the present study were simply divided into two groups according to the level of academic achievement could result in showing no relationship between the academic level and moral stages. Also, the present study has a much wider age range and fewer children in each age group than the study by Narvaez. The former examined total 160 children, 40 children from each 7, 10, 13, and 16 year old group, while the latter examined 122 children aged 14 or 15 years. The differences in sampling between the two studies imply two possible explanations of the different results obtained concerning academic level differences in moral stages. One is that children's academic achievement level might have influence on their moral stages only at certain age, i.e. the age of 14 or 15 but not in general, across the ages of 7 to 16. The other is that the sample size of the present study (40 children in each age group) might not be large enough to detect the academic level differences in moral stages of each age group. Thus the present study suggests that further research should have a larger sample and group children more specifically according to their academic level in order to examine the correlation between the academic level and the development of moral stages.

According to the findings, the present study showed the tendency for moral stages to increase with age but showed no gender or academic level differences in the moral stages and hence strongly supports the sequential development of moral stages with age at least up to stage 4.

## **10.2 MORAL ORIENTATION**

The present study examined the differences in the use of each orientation according to children's background such as age, gender, and academic level, and the content of

fables. The findings are discussed below.

### **10.2.1 Influence of the Content of Fables**

When the three fables in this study were considered as a whole, the children tended to express their moral reasoning through evenly using the five orientations for the present study. However the children seemed to prefer using some orientations to the others for certain fables. In the Vulture's story, the children referred to the fairness orientation more than the others. Even many of the 7 year old children mentioned the fairness orientation for the Vulture's story, but they rarely used this orientation for the other stories. The children mentioned the normative orientation in the Vulture's story relatively less than in the Ass's and Golden Eggs' stories. These differences in the use of the orientations according to the fables imply that the content of fables itself could influence children's decision on using the moral orientations.

### **10.2.2 Age Tendencies**

According to the findings, children's background as well as the content of fables was also influential in their use of the orientations. The present study showed that the children's use of the ideal and the fairness orientations tended to increase with age while the use of the egoistic orientation decreased, coinciding with the findings of the first study and other empirical studies (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). Thus it seems that individuals tend to orient toward ideal consequences and fairness and to make light of the egoistic consequences as they become more developmentally advanced in moral reasoning.

Although there were general age tendencies of the egoistic, the ideal, and the fairness

orientations across the fables, the present study shows the variation of the age tendency according to the content of fables. For instance, concerning the Golden Eggs' story, not only the younger children but also the older children whose academic levels were below average rarely mentioned the fairness orientation. Thus the children whose academic levels were below the average showed no age tendency in the use of the fairness orientation in the Golden Eggs' story. Except for this, the tendency for the use of the fairness orientation to increase with age was found concerning every fable. The exception of general age tendency indicates that children's background could produce variations of age tendencies in the use of moral orientations in connection with the content of fables.

Regarding the utilitarian orientation, previous empirical studies (Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989) reported that younger individuals were more likely to use the orientation. However, they examined the use of the utilitarian orientation in combination with the use of the egoistic orientation and described the tendency of the use of the combined orientations as the tendency of the use of the utilitarian orientation. Unlike in previous studies, the present study examined the use of the utilitarian orientation separately from the use of the egoistic orientation in order to determine the age tendency of the use of each orientation rather than the age tendency of the combined orientations. When the use of the utilitarian orientation was examined as an independent orientation, the present study showed no genuine age difference. The age differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation varied in connection with academic level or gender differences across the content of fables. A tendency showing that 10 year old children used the orientation more than the others was also observed in the Vulture's story, although only in the below average academic

group. Regarding the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories, girls at the age of 16 used the orientation more than boys. Especially in the Ass's story, the 16 year old girls used the orientation more than not only 16 year old boys but also the children in the other age groups. Finding various age differences only in several sub-groups seems to imply that there was no genuine age development in the use of the orientation, regardless of gender, culture and academic level. Thus, the findings of other empirical studies, which revealed that the use of the utilitarian orientation decreased with age, could be due to the strong age tendency of the egoistic orientation which possibly screened the actual tendency of the use of the utilitarian orientation. The variations in the use of the utilitarian orientation will be discussed later in terms of gender or academic level differences.

Concerning the normative orientation, the present study showed the general tendency for the use of the orientation to increase with age. When all of the three fables were examined separately, no age difference was found in the Vulture's story, and the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories showed the tendency for the use of the normative orientation to increase with age. It could rather be said that the use of the normative orientation generally increased with age although there were variations of the age tendency according to the content of fables. This will be fully discussed in connection with the findings of the first study using Kohlberg's dilemmas in the next chapter, the final discussion.

When the five orientations were compared with one another in terms of the number of children who used the orientations, young children clearly used the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations more than the ideal and the fairness

orientations. In other words, children in their early childhood tended to focus on the use of the former three orientations because their concept of ideal consequences and fairness might not have been sufficiently developed. As they got older, however, the children tended to use all the orientations for their moral reasoning except for the egoistic orientation which was regarded as the least mature response. It seemed that they considered all the orientations for their moral reasoning and selected the most appropriate orientation, according to the situations. Consequently, the use of the orientations seems to diversify with age rather than simply transferred from one orientation to the other. As mentioned in the first study, this age tendency, in a way, seems to be in line with the claim made by the domain-specificity theorists (e.g. Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986) on moral development. They claimed that individuals seem to consider a broader range of components for their social judgments and to regulate the components as their social interaction increased with age. On the other hand, as far as children's use of the egoistic, the ideal and the fairness orientations are concerned, the findings of the present study partially support the other studies with regard to age tendency in the use of moral orientations (e.g. Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1986a, 1989; & Walker & Moran, 1991). Additionally, the variations of age tendency within an orientation across dilemmas and academic level and gender groups seemed to support the claim that the use of moral orientations might differ across not only children's background but also the content of dilemma.

### **10.2.3 Gender Differences**

With respect to the utilitarian orientation, Korean girls at the age of 16 used the orientation more than boys in the present study. That is, the Korean girls, especially

the 16 year old girls showed great concern for the welfare of others. There is a typical response of the 16 year old girls for the Golden Eggs' story as below.

"I do not like the farmer because he is selfish. He just killed an innocent goose for his greediness. If he keeps acting like this to others, it eventually brings about bad results not only for others but also himself. He should not offend others. There is no good for himself as well as others. He should be concerned about others' welfare as much as his."

Concerning the Ass's and Golden Eggs' stories, many girls showed more or less the same responses as the above. They said that people should not be selfish nor offend others but be considerate in order to have good consequences for themselves as well as others. It seems that girls at an older age seemed to show their concern for welfare and happiness not only to those who have a close relationship with themselves but also to others in their community.

In vulture's story, both the boys and girls showed an age tendency of the use of the fairness orientation to increase with age. However, 10 to 16 year old boys tended to use the orientation slightly more than the girls. That is, the boys were more likely than the girls to give reasons why they liked the story, the characters and/or the conclusion of the story through stating that the farmer was rewarded for his good deeds and that was fair enough.

According to these gender differences, Gilligan's claim (1982) that girls typically use the responsibility orientation (the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations) while boys use the right orientation (the normative and the fairness orientations) seems applicable to Korean children. However, the findings could only partially

support the claim since the gender differences were found only concerning the use of the utilitarian and the fairness orientations.

In brief, concerning gender differences in the use of moral orientations, Korean children showed differences in the use of the utilitarian and the fairness orientations. These findings partially support the claim of Gilligan on gender differences. However, these gender differences should be understood in connection with cultural uniqueness rather than a universal tendency. Some concepts peculiar to the Koreans seem to affect the Korean's use of the moral orientations, and hence to generate gender differences between Koreans boys and girls in terms of the use of the orientations.

#### **10.2.4 Academic Level Differences**

The present study examined whether the children's use of moral orientations differed according to their academic level, which the first study using Kohlberg's dilemmas had not dealt with. Most differences in academic level were connected with other factors such as age and/or gender differences and, moreover, those differences varied across stories. Consequently, the academic level differences seemed to be desultory at first glance. For instance, the children in the above average academic level group generally used the utilitarian orientation more than those in the below average academic level group in the Ass's story, while the opposite tendency was shown concerning the Vulture's story although it was significant only in the 10 year old group. With respect to the fairness orientation, the 10 year old children in the below average academic group used the orientation more than those in the other academic group for the Golden Egg's story. In contrast, the children at the same age showed

the opposite pattern of the academic level difference in the use of the fairness orientation concerning the Vulture's story.

In fact, there are doubts about some findings on the academic level differences in the use of the orientations although they are found to be statistically significant. For instance, concerning the use of the utilitarian orientation for the Ass's story, the statistical analyses of the present study revealed that the children in the above average academic group used the orientation more than those in the below average academic group. However, each age group showed almost no academic level difference in the use of the utilitarian orientation concerning the Ass's story when the use of the orientations in each age group was examined respectively. Similarly, although there were few differences between the two academic level groups in each age group, the statistical analyses indicated that boys in the below average academic group mentioned the ideal orientation more than those in the other academic group concerning the Golden Eggs' story (see Tables 9.2.1 and 9.2.3 in the previous chapter, Chapter IX). Thus it seems difficult to confirm the above academic level differences unless further evidence is provided.

However, it seems that there were some general tendencies of the academic level differences in the use of the orientations when paying more attention to the use of the five orientations for each story at the same time, rather than examining each orientation separately. Concerning the Golden Egg's story, the 7 year old girls at the above average academic level used the egoistic orientation more than those at the below average academic level. The findings on the general age differences in the use of the orientations indicated that the youngest children used the egoistic



orientation more than the other orientations and the use of the egoistic orientation decreased with age while the use of the other orientations either increased or were maintained at the similar level across age. These patterns of age difference in the use of the orientations imply that the concept of the egoistic orientation presumably develops earlier than the others and disappears as other orientations developed and hence the children using the egoistic orientation seem to have immature moral reasoning in comparison with those using the other orientations. Based on these implications, it seemed that the children at the above average academic level lagged behind those at the below average academic level in the developmental pattern of the use of the orientations since the former used the egoistic orientation more than the latter. However, considering the children's use of the five orientations for the story at the same time, it was observed that many of the 7 year old girls in the below average academic level group mentioned neither the egoistic orientation nor the other orientations while the girls in the other academic group mainly used the egoistic orientation for moral reasoning. That is, the 7 year old girls at the below average academic level seemed to be incapable of providing any reason for their moral decision through using the orientations. Thus the findings on the academic level differences in the 7 year old girls group indicated that the 7 year old girls in the above average academic group used the egoistic orientation possibly through being fully aware of the orientation while the other 7 year old girls had not yet sufficiently recognized even the egoistic orientation. In other words, among the 7 year old girls, those at the above average academic level seemed to develop the use of moral orientations one step ahead of those at the below average academic level.

Concerning the Golden Eggs' story, academic level differences were found in the

children's use of the fairness orientation at the age of 10. The children in the below average academic level group used the orientation more than those in the above average academic group. The reason for this academic level difference at the age of 10 is not clearly illuminated here. However, the difference between the two groups was very small and, furthermore, the pattern of the differences between the two academic groups was reversed in the older group. The older children in the below average academic level group tended to justify their moral decision with mainly using the normative, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations but not the fairness orientations. In contrast, the older children in the other academic group referred to the fairness orientation as well. The children showed a tendency to increase the use of the fairness orientation with age as mentioned before. The fairness orientation is regarded as one of the orientations which develops the latest among the orientations. Thus the preponderance of the older children at the above average academic level to those at the other academic level in the use of the orientations suggests that the children at the below average academic level lag a little behind those at the above average academic level. In other words, the latter begin to move towards the next stage at which the individuals start considering fairness deeply while the former still remain at a stage where the consideration of the fairness has not been sufficiently developed yet.

According to the academic level differences in the use of the orientations for the Vulture's story, the children, especially the girls, at the above average academic level seemed to be a little ahead of those at the other academic level. At the age of 10, the children - the girls in particular - at the above average academic level were more likely to concentrate on the use of the fairness orientation, just as the older children

did for the Golden Eggs' story, or to consider both the fairness and the ideal orientations which are the last among orientations to be developed. Those at the below average academic level, however, tended to use the utilitarian and the fairness orientations at the same time. It seemed that the children in the below average academic group still mainly adhered to the utilitarian orientation for their moral reasoning whereas those in the other group began to consider fairness deeply. In contrast, the children at the above average academic level had already fully developed concepts of ideal consequences and fairness, and hence mainly considered these two orientations rather than the others. At the age of 13, the girls in the above average academic level group tended to use either the fairness' orientation or the ideal orientation while those in the other academic level group concentrated on the use of the fairness orientation as did the 10 year old children at the above average academic level. Interestingly, at the age of 16, the girls in the below average academic group showed the same tendency as the 13 year old girls in the above average academic level group. That is, they tended to orient towards either ideal consequences or fairness. However, most 16 year old girls at the above average academic level mentioned both the ideal and the fairness orientations. The tendency of the 16 year old girls at the above average academic level to use both the orientations could compare with those of Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) since the fairness orientation in Kohlberg's theory came under the justice orientation in Gilligan's theory while the ideal orientation came under the care orientation. They reported that, when asked to describe a moral problem or conflict they had recently faced, more than two-thirds of a group of 80 educationally advanced adolescents and adults living in the US represented considerations of both the justice and the care orientations in their

interview narratives. Thus, they suggested that individuals tended to know and to use both orientations in moral reasoning. Walker et al. (1987), through interviewing 240 participants from 80 family triads with hypothetical and real-life dilemmas also found that individuals who were at a mature level of moral reasoning tended to use a considerable mix of both just and care orientations. On the basis of the findings of the present and the other empirical studies, it seems that individuals tend to consider wider ranged aspects in order to make a moral decision when they are at a more mature level of moral thinking.

According to the overall findings concerning the three stories, it seems that there was a developmental tendency in the use of moral orientations and that the academic level of the children could affect the development of the use of moral orientations. The children seemed to develop the egoistic orientation first and the fairness and the ideal orientations last. Also, the children tended to concentrate on the use of a certain orientation when they were fully aware of the concept of the orientation. For instance, the 7 year old girls at the above average academic level mainly used the egoistic orientation for the Golden Egg's story. Similarly, the 10 year old girls at the above average academic level and the 13 year old girls at the below average academic level intensively mentioned the fairness orientation for the Vulture's story. It seems that the children sufficiently recognized the concepts at that time. Afterwards, as they presumably began to recognize another orientation, they started to alternate between the two orientations, the newly recognized one and the one they had already been using. The 13 year old girls at the above average academic level showed this tendency concerning the Vulture's story. They tended, mainly, to use either the fairness orientation or the ideal orientation. Lastly, when the children were fully

aware of the concepts of both ideal consequences and fairness which seemed to develop at the last stage, as well as concepts of the other orientations, they gave reasons for their moral decision mainly on the basis of both the fairness and the ideal orientations at the same time, rather than choosing one of the orientations. Also, they still considered the other orientations for their moral reasoning. The 16 year old girls at the above average academic level showed this pattern concerning the Vulture's story. Most of them used both the fairness and the ideal orientations for their moral reasoning, and sometimes in combination with other orientations.

According to the findings of the present study, both the academic level groups showed these developmental patterns in the use of moral orientations. However, comparing the two academic level groups, the children in the below average academic level group lagged one step behind and followed the developmental pattern of those in the above average academic level group. Therefore the children's academic level seems to have an influence on these developmental patterns. However it should be noted that not all of the age groups showed the significant tendency of academic level differences regardless of gender and the content of stories. Besides, the time that the children moved from one stage to the next stage in the use of the orientations tended to vary across the stories even within the same academic level and gender group. For instance, among girls at the above average academic level, the concentrated use of the fairness orientation occurred at the age of 10 for the Vulture's story while, for the Golden Eggs' story, it started at the age of 13. Therefore, according to the results of the present study, it seems that children's academic level differences could affect the developmental tendency of the use of moral orientations. However, the influence of the level of academic achievement on the use of the orientations could vary across the

stories and children's background and gender.

#### **10.2.5 Summary**

Overall findings on the use of moral orientations indicate that there are general differences in children's use of the orientations across their background including age and gender. Also, children's differences in academic level seem to affect the age differences in the use of the moral orientations. However, all of the above differences were not observed in each story without exception. The children tended to favour particular orientations for certain contexts. This preference of the children occurred sometimes in a whole group or sometimes only in a sub-group.

In spite of the differences in the use of the orientations across the content of fables, the present study showed some general tendencies to use the orientations as indicated below. The youngest children seemed to mainly consider egoistic consequences of their moral decision. As they got older, they began to be aware of ideal consequences and fairness and took them into account for their moral decision while the consideration of egoistic consequences decreased. Their concern about normative order and utilitarian consequences seemed to maintain similar levels across age. Concerning the development of the use of moral orientations, the children sometimes emphasized only one or two orientations of which they were fully aware at that time. However, the tendency to emphasize a certain orientation tended to diminish later and the children justified their moral decision in consideration of various orientations altogether as they were sufficiently aware of all the orientations. In other words, the children eventually diversified the use of the orientations although they sometimes seemed to simply transfer their use from one to another orientation

while the development of the use of the orientations was in progress. The academic level differences seemed to affect the overall age tendency to use of the orientations. The children at the above average academic level tended to be one step ahead of those at the below average academic level.

Concerning the gender differences, the preponderance of the girls to the boys in the use of the utilitarian orientation could also imply that the characteristics of Korean society, which is that Korean society has different expectations for boys and girls, influenced the use of the orientation.

In summary, the present study indicated general age tendencies in the use of moral orientations regardless of children's gender and cultural background. Only the children's academic level affected the age tendency. Apart from the age tendency, children also showed gender differences. However, the present study showed variations of these general tendencies across the content of stories and sub-groups.

### **10.3 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES**

The Korean children in the present study using fables made some responses which were unable to be matched to Kohlberg's system. In line with the claim of other studies (e.g. Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Iwasa, 1992; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990; Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) that Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment has limitations since he missed or misunderstood some concepts peculiar to non-Western cultures, the unscorable responses in the first study using the dilemmas imply that there are some concepts which affect Koreans' moral reasoning that Kohlberg did not grasp well. The present study also supports the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system to Korean children through showing some responses which

were unable to be scored with Kohlberg's system.

Korean children at the age of 7 tended to make their moral judgment based on emotional consequences such as the restricted-simple sympathy as well as physical consequences in the present study. This is inconsistent with Kohlberg's claim that young children mainly gave moral reasoning based on the physical consequences. The examples of 7 year old Korean children's responses to fables on the basis of sympathy and the physical consequences were presented in section 9.3 in chapter IX. No matter if they focused on emotional or physical consequences for their moral reasoning, most children at the age of 7 commonly showed a restricted viewpoint. That is, they tended to stick to only one point of view such as reasoning their moral judgment only on their feeling towards a "poor goose," rather than taking multiple perspectives on the situations. Thus, in the present study, the sympathy of the 7 year old children is defined as "restricted-simple sympathy" (see section 6.4 in chapter VI for details). The restricted-simple sympathy partially supports Kohlberg's claim that the children at preconventional level make moral judgment with a rigid view and that younger children are lacking mediating concepts such as deservingness or intentionality through which the particular circumstances of the case alter its moral significance. However, finding that Korean children revealed overtly sympathetic moral reasoning which are unable to be scored with Kohlberg's system implies that Kohlberg's system is insufficient even in scoring the responses of 7 year old Korean children whose mean of moral stages is only 1/2. This indicates that some concepts peculiar to a certain culture could influence the moral judgment not just after stage 3 but even at the preconventional level as opposed to the claim of other studies (e.g. Ma, 1992; Snarey, 1985) that Kohlberg's moral judgment up to the stage 3 seems



applicable to individuals in most cultures.

When analysing the responses of children in all age groups, the restricted-simple sympathy at the age of 7 seems to develop in two ways; respect for life and *chung*. Concerning the children's concept of life, the responses to the Golden Eggs' and the Vulture's stories show how the concept of the respect for life develops from the restricted-simple sympathy with age. There are examples of the responses from each age group;

"He (the farmer) should not kill the goose because dying is sad." (age 7)

"The farmer was bad because, as for the goose, there is no reason to be killed. It didn't do anything wrong. I pity it." (age 10)

"I don't like the farmer. He is bad because he killed the innocent goose just for his greediness." (age 13)

"He was good because he saved a life. You shouldn't kill any living thing without good reason." (age 13)

"The farmer was good. He didn't just pass by the dying vulture but tried his best to save its life. We should value life although it is the mere life of an animal." (age 16)

According to the responses, the 7 year old child judged that the farmer was bad only because of simple feeling such as compassion for the goose's death. It seems that the child has not yet conceptualized the value of life. The 10 year old child, like the 7 year old one, also sympathized with the goose, but based on rational reasoning (e.g. It did not do anything wrong to be killed). At the age of 13, the children begin to dimly express respect for life (i.e. He *saved a life*, You *shouldn't kill any living thing* without good reason) and, finally, the child at the age of 16 clearly explains the

concept of respect for life (i.e. We *should value life* although it is merely the life of an animal). Based on these responses, it is presumed that the restricted-simple sympathy of young children could be the foundation of respect for life since children's reasons for not killing or saving a life started from the restricted-simple sympathy and the concept of the respect for life eventually emerged as a reason as sympathy faded.

The restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old children could also be the basis of the concept of *chung* that appears at older age (see the section 3.4.2 in Chapter III for the definition of *chung*). The development from the restricted-simple sympathy to the concept of *chung* could be identified through analysing children's reasons for "helping others."

Children at the age of 7 mainly gave the reason for helping others in two ways; one is physical consequences, which is scorable with Kohlberg's system, and the other is the unscorable reason with Kohlberg's system, the restricted-simple sympathy.

"It is important to help others because, if you didn't, you don't have any friends and nobody likes you." (a response based on the physical consequence)

"We should help others because it is sad if someone died." (a response based on the restricted-simple sympathy)

The reason for helping others extracted from emotional state such as sympathy is almost absent at the age of 10. Rather they gave the reasons in terms of reciprocity or positive desert which could be matched to Kohlberg's criteria judgments (e.g. "If you help someone, the person might help you back"). It would be interesting to compare this tendency to the findings of Eisenberg et al. (1987) that pragmatic

concerns for prosocial moral reasoning increased at the age of 9 to 12. Based on the similarity between the two findings, it can be said that this is a general tendency of those in mid-childhood. At the age of 13, however, the children engaged emotional concerns again as a reason for helping others. On the other hand, they begin to take account of good relationships with others, which could be categorized into the element of serving social ideal and harmony in Kohlberg's terms, as another reason for helping others. There is an example showing the two kinds of responses respectively.

"He shouldn't pass by the *poor thing* who needs his help because he probably *feels uncomfortable* afterwards (if he did)."

"You can have a good relationship with others through helping others."

Children at the age of 16 seem to integrate the two reasons segregated at the age of 13 (the emotional concerns vs the emphasis on a good relationship) into the concept of *chung*.

"We should help each other because that is what people should do in a society to make the society be full of *chung* (through helping others)."

"If someone minded only his own business and did not care for others, there is no *chung* in a society and the society becomes dreary. He shouldn't do that."

The above example shows that 16 year old children argue that individuals should help others for the sake of *chung* in a society. It seems that the concept of *chung* greatly affects their moral judgment on the basis of the findings of the present study. Although it clearly emerges during mid-adolescence, the concept of *chung* seems to sprout at a much younger age in the form of the restricted-simple sympathy. The

restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old Koreans could be regarded as a primitive form of *chung* since the restricted-simple sympathy shares with *chung* emotional aspects which affect children's moral judgment.

According to studies (e.g. Dein, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985), the view on an interdependent self in non-Western cultures tends to promote another type of unscorable moral reasoning, which is based on collectivism. In a collectivism-based culture, the tranquillity of community sometimes takes precedence over the rights of individuals, thus the individuals are asked to relinquish some freedom and identity in order for society to function. In the present study, the 16 year old children's reasons for "not disturbing or harming others" clearly showed the collectivist tendencies of Koreans. That is, Korean children seem to think that an individual should not disturb or harm others because they were concerned about others' welfare, but ultimately for the sake of the group where individuals are interdependent on each other. These responses imply that Koreans, like many other collectivism-based cultures, tended to give priority to the community rather than to the individual in certain circumstances. Furthermore, Choi & Choi (1990b) claimed that the concept of "we" is representative of collectivistic thinking among Koreans. Koreans' concept of "we" seems to relate to the Korean view of individuals, which is similar to the view, so-called interdependent self, commonly found in non-Western cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Koreans tend to view an individual as an imperfect being who is part of its surroundings rather than an independent being and hence try to make close interpersonal relationships with other partial individuals by means of sharing the concept of "we" (Choi, 1997). Thus, the claim of Choi as well as the findings of the present study support the existence of collectivism in Korean

culture. However, it seems that collectivist tendencies did not clearly emerge before mid-adolescence since the concept was found only in the 16 year old group.

In summary, overall findings that unscorable responses among Koreans generated from some concept peculiar to Koreans such as "collectivism," "*chung*," and "respect for all living things" indicate that Kohlberg's system is insufficient to assess Koreans' moral judgment. The fact that moral judgment based on the restricted-simple sympathy of young Korean children at the stage 1 or 2 is also unscorable implies that Kohlberg's system is insufficient even for young Korean children since Kohlberg de-emphasized sympathy in his moral stages. Except for the restricted-simple sympathy, most unscorable responses of Koreans appeared during adolescence. This indicates that the influence of the concepts peculiar to Koreans on their moral reasoning is greater during adolescence than childhood and hence the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system is greater for adolescents.

#### **10.4 ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND GENERATE MORALS IN FABLES**

The present study examined children's ability to identify and generate morals in fables according to their age, gender, academic level and familiarity with the fables. On the basis of the literature review (Chia, 1993; Dorfman, 1988, 1989, as cited in Chia, 1993; Jose et al., 1992, as cited in Chia, 1993), it was predicted that older children would identify morals in fables better than younger children and that the ability to generate morals would develop with age from lower level literal interpretations (i.e. nonprototypical morals) to higher level generalized, abstract morals (i.e. prototypical morals). Among the prototypical morals, children would draw abstract morals more than concrete morals as they get older since the former is

regarded as more morally mature than the latter. It was also assumed that children's gender, academic level and familiarity with the fables could also influence their ability to identify and to generate morals.

The results only indicated age differences between the 7 year olds and the older children concerning all the fables. There was little age difference among the 10, the 13, and the 16 year old groups. Most children in these age groups thought that there were morals in fables and generated abstract morals, which were the most mature responses. It seems that the children at the age of 10 have already fully developed the ability to identify and to generate morals in fables, and hence little further progress was observed after the age of 10. As predicted, significant age differences were found only between the 7 and the 10 year old children. The 7 year old children tended to identify morals in fables less than the older children. Furthermore, the former were more likely to draw nonprototypical morals and less likely to draw prototypical morals than the latter. Concerning prototypical morals only, the number of 7 year olds who generated concrete morals were more or less similar to the number who generated abstract morals, whilst, in the older group, most children drew abstract morals and only a few children generated concrete morals. When asked to retell the story in order to ascertain whether they understood the story, most of the 7 year old children could retell the story. Although most 7 year old children seemed to understand the stories, approximately 33% of the 7 year old children considered the fables to have no moral. Among the 7 year old Korean children, only 67% of them identified morals in fables while 90% of children at the same age in Chia's study (1993) did. These differences between the two studies could be due to differences in the way of assessing the children's ability to identify morals. In Chia's study, the

author regarded the children who said there was a moral but were not able to generate it as those who could identify morals. However, the present study included only those who generated a moral in that category since the present study assumed that the children who could not generate morals were those who could not identify morals even though they said “yes” to the question whether there was a moral in fables. These differences between the two studies could imply a possibility that the present study underestimated 7 year old children’s ability to identify morals or alternatively that the other study overestimated the children’s ability.

Concerning the ability to generate morals from the fables, 52% of the 7 year old children in the present study generated prototypical morals (29% of abstract and 23% of concrete morals) and 48% of children generated nonprototypical morals. In comparison with 7 year old children in other studies - 39% of 7 year old children in Chia’s study (1993) and 48% in Dorfman’s study (1989 as cited in Chia, 1993) -, they seemed to be at a similar level in generating morals.

However, differences in generating morals across the stories were found in the 7 year old group. The findings imply that the fables could still vary in the level of difficulty although only fables which were deemed to have a clear didactic point by two raters were used in the present study. Abrahamsen and Sprouse (1995) pointed out that children tended to generate morals more easily from some fables than from others according to various factors such as difficulty in vocabulary, the degree of the fable’s adherence to story grammar, inclusion of one primary actor versus a relationship between actors and the children’s familiarity with the relationships portrayed in the fable. In particular, they suggested that children were more likely to

draw morals from fables in which events might correspond more closely to children's own experiences than from the other fables. A cursory examination of the fables in the present study also indicates that children might vary in terms of the ability to generate morals in this regard. According to the findings, the children generated prototypical morals in the Golden Eggs' story (58% of abstract and 12.5% of concrete morals) the most, followed by the Vulture's story (17% and 34% respectively) and then the Ass's story (11% and 22% respectively). These differences in generating prototypical morals across stories could be understood through considering the 7 year old children's general circumstances. Usually, among 7 year old children, the point of the Golden Eggs' story - do not be too greedy - might be more relevant to them than the points of the Vulture's story - do a favour for others - and the Ass's story - do not shirk your own duty -. That is, young children often tended to show their greediness such as taking all toys or food like sweets and not wanting to share them with others, consequently they might often be taught by adults that it is wrong to be greedy. However, considering fulfilment of duty, the moral that the least amount of children generated, they could be considered too young to have been charged with duty. Therefore, these general circumstances of 7 year old children possibly caused the largest number of children to draw prototypical morals in the Golden Eggs' story and the least amount of children in the Ass's story.

Interestingly, the children made no difference in identifying and generating morals according to whether they had heard the fables before regardless of their age, gender, and academic level. Most children over 10 generated abstract morals even in the fables which were unfamiliar to them. Amongst the 7 year olds, some children thought that there were morals in the fables and drew morals although they had not



heard the fables before. At the same time, there were some other children who thought that the fables had no moral although they had heard the fables before. They seemed to regard the fables as just funny old tales rather than as didactic stories. Pertinent to these findings, Stewig (1988) had already pointed out the recent attitude of teachers towards fables. That is, teachers, nowadays, are more likely to share fables with children for their literary qualities rather than for the morals they contain. The fables seem to be valued as good teaching aids for their concise language rather than their morals. Therefore, although children are familiar with fables, the children's familiarity with particular fables seems not really to affect their ability to identify and to generate morals in fables. That is, children at the age of 7 seem not to have sufficiently developed their ability to generate morals in fable while older children seem to have little difficulty in understanding morals in fables regardless of their familiarity with them. The findings of empirical studies (e.g. Demorest et al., 1983; Nippold, et al., 1984; Winner, et al., 1976) that children improved in understanding metaphors between the ages of 9 and 14 support the findings of the present study that ability to generate morals seemed to have an age-related developmental pattern beyond the matter of their familiarity with fables. However, Baechle and Lian (1990) found that practice on metaphor could enhance the ability of children with learning disabilities to comprehend figurative language. In the light of the findings, familiarity with the fable genre and practice at drawing morals from didactic stories but not just reading or hearing particular fables could accelerate children's ability to identify and to generate morals in fables.

In brief, the present study examined whether children's age, gender, academic level and familiarity with the fables could affect their ability to identify and to generate

morals in fables. According to the findings, children seemed to develop the ability with age only up to the age of 10. The children at the age of 10 seemed to have already fully developed the ability and hence hardly showed further progress afterwards. With regard to the 7 year old children, they seemed not sufficiently equipped to draw the points hidden in fables although they were able to understand the literal details in the fables. This suggests that using fables to teach 7 year old children morals might not be appropriate. Familiarity with particular fables seems to have no influence on the ability to draw morals in the fables. However, children's ability to draw morals might be speeded up according to their familiarity with the fables genre and experiences in drawing morals from didactic stories.

## **10.5 CONCLUSION**

The present study mainly examined the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning to Koreans through using fables as an alternative method to Kohlberg's dilemmas to assess moral judgment. Overall findings of the present study generally support the findings of the studies using Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. The children in the present study, like those in other studies, showed developmental patterns in terms of moral stages and the use of moral orientations in spite of showing some differences in the use of the moral orientation. Some factors such as individuals' gender and academic level, and the content of stories by themselves or the interaction between these factors could allow variation of the general development of moral reasoning, especially in terms of the moral orientations. Furthermore, the present study found that some responses of the Koreans based on concepts peculiar to Koreans cannot be scored with Kohlberg's system. This indicates that Kohlberg's

system developed from the perspective of Western cultures could not thoroughly capture some unique concepts of Koreans since these concepts stem from non-Western perspectives, such as Buddhism and collectivism. Moreover, the unscorable responses (the restricted-simple sympathy) of young children whose moral stages are between 1 and 2 indicate that the concepts peculiar to Koreans are already beginning to form and the influence of the concept on moral judgment starts in childhood. This is contrary to the claims of other studies (e.g. Ma, 1988b; Snarey, 1985) which suggest that the first three stages of moral judgment could be culturally universal.

In short, the present study showed that Korean children's moral stage and the use of the moral orientations could be assessed with Kohlberg system but there are some responses unscorable with Kohlberg's system. Based on overall findings, the present study using fables concludes that Kohlberg's system of moral reasoning could be applicable but insufficient to Korean children.

Concerning the use of fables as an alternative method, the findings on children's ability to draw morals from fables suggest that it might not be appropriate to use fables intact as an alternative method to assess the development of moral reasoning with young children although the similar findings between the two studies in the present research support the possibility. The present study showed that the 7 year old children were able to make decisions and to provide reasons for their decisions concerning characters and events in fables, and their responses were scorable with Kohlberg's manual. However, the findings of the present study also indicate that the 7 year old children tended to have difficulties in drawing hidden morals from fables, probably, because of the lack of understanding of figurative language. Therefore

these findings suggest that, in order to assess moral reasoning in children as young as 7 years old, stories that explicitly reveal morals could be more useful than stories, such as fables, that use metaphor. Furthermore, the present study also suggests that fables modified to contain dilemmas rather than fables that draw conclusions would be better to capture children's moral reasoning since cultural differences in chosen issues were found in the present and the other studies. Concerning animal characters, there would be little problems since children seemed to be familiar with and to enjoy stories that personify animals. Thus, the present study suggests that further empirical studies should consider the above points when developing an alternative method to assess children's development of moral reasoning.

## **CHAPTER ELEVEN**

### **FINAL DISCUSSION**

The present study consists of two investigations of children's moral reasoning on the basis of Kohlberg's theory. In the first, spontaneous responses of the Korean and the British children to Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were compared in order to ascertain age, cultural and gender differences in moral reasoning. The second used fables as an alternative method to assess moral reasoning in order to supplement the findings of the first study. Only Korean children participated in the second study and the differences in moral reasoning across age, gender and academic level were examined through analysing their judgments and reasons concerning the characters, events and conclusions in fables. Also, children's ability to identify and to generate morals from the fables was explored in the second study. The findings of the two studies are compared and discussed below.

#### **11.1 MORAL STAGE**

One of the aims of the present study is to examine the applicability of Kohlberg's moral stages to children not only from England, a Western cultural setting but also from Korea, a non-Western culture. Regarding age differences, both the first and the second studies showed a clear tendency of moral stage to increase with age as did the first study and other empirical studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Turiel et al., 1978). In the first study, both the Korean and

**Table 11.1.1** Analysis of Variance

Source	D.F	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F	P
Between Groups	7	859674.43	122810.63	196.18	.001
Within Groups	279	174656.83	626.01		
Total	286	1034331.25			

British children showed a tendency of moral stages to increase with age regardless of their gender. Similarly, in the second study, the Korean children's moral stages also developed with age regardless of their gender and academic level. Finding that moral stages increased with age in both studies supports Kohlberg's claim of the sequential development of moral stages across age at least up to stage 4. Furthermore, ANOVA, in combination with the Scheffe test, a post-hoc test, at  $p < .05$  showed only significant differences between age groups  $F(7, 286) = 196.18, p < .001$ , but not between groups in the first and the second studies within the same age group (Table 11.1.1). Table 11.1.2 describes the mean of moral stages for each age group in the first and the second studies. This could imply that the children's moral reasoning develops with age at the similar rate at least up to stage 4 regardless of their gender and cultural background, and the contents of stories.

**Table 11.1.2** The Means of Moral Stages

Means (S.D)	Groups	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
170.25 (29.97)	7 year olds in the Study I	(1)							
168.10 (32.90)	in the Study II	(2)							
225.78 (26.75)	10 year olds in the Study I	(3)	*	*					
227.95 (22.91)	in the Study II	(4)	*	*					
271.06 (17.61)	13 year olds in the Study I	(5)	*	*	*	*			
270.38 (27.94)	in the Study II	(6)	*	*	*	*			
325.09 (18.32)	16 year olds in the Study I	(7)	*	*	*	*	*	*	
311.05 (17.95)	in the Study II	(8)	*	*	*	*	*	*	

\* denotes that the mean difference between groups is significant at  $p < .05$  in Scheffe test

Based on the findings of the two studies, some points could be made regarding Kohlberg's moral stages. First, the findings support Kohlberg's claim that the sequential development of moral stages with age at least up to stage 4 is universal. Concerning fables as well as Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas, children's reasoning for their judgment tended to develop in line with Kohlberg's moral stages. That is, younger children tended to generate reasons which came under Kohlberg's lower stages while older children were likely to justify their moral judgment with what Kohlberg regards as higher stages. Furthermore, the finding that children's moral reasoning for fables and for Kohlberg's dilemmas developed with age at a similar rate implies that the development of moral stages with age tends to be consistent across content. Secondly, the overall findings indicated that only age seemed to have influence on the development of moral stages. However it should be considered whether it is age itself that affects the moral stages. Usually, individuals accumulated overall experiences as they got older. Thus these overall experiences rather than age itself could be the actual factor to affect moral stages. Some studies (e.g. Edwards, 1975, 1978, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) supported this view through showing cultural variations in moral stages. Rest et al. (1986) and Walker (1986a) also pointed out that individuals' overall experiences, such as educational and sociocultural experiences could diversely influence development of moral stages. Concerning educational experiences, the present study showed that increasing schooling years might affect the development of moral stages although there was no difference across the academic achievement level within the same schooling years. Concerning sociocultural experiences, the present study indicated no difference in moral stages between Korean and British children unlike other empirical studies (e.g.

Edwards, 1975, 1978, 1982; Park & Johnson, 1984; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). This could be due to the fact that the children in both cultural groups were selected from capital cities, Seoul and London, in which modernized large-scale societies are formed. Since all of them were from large-scale societies, the overall experiences of both Korean and British children in the present study might not be different enough to generate differences in moral stages between the two cultural groups. Considering the limitation of sampling to those in large cities, the present study suggests that further study should select the participants reared not only in urban (i.e. large-scale societies) but also rural areas (i.e. small-scale societies) in order to examine cultural differences in moral stages. Although the scale of society possibly diminishes cultural differences in moral stages between Korean and British children, the traditions and norms which Korean society still keeps seem to influence the Korean children's use of moral orientations. This will be discussed in the next section.

In conclusion, the present study showed that only the age factor was significantly related with the development of moral stages. However, the possibility of other factors such as educational and sociocultural experiences affecting the development of moral stages still remains based on other empirical studies.

## **11.2 MORAL ORIENTATIONS**

The present study explored the children's use of moral orientations as well as moral stages. The first study examined the differences in the use of each orientation according to children's background such as age, culture and gender, and the content of stories whereas the second study included examining academic level differences in the use of the orientations and excluded cultural differences. The findings of both



studies revealed that children's use of the orientations varied across age, gender, culture, academic level differences and the content of stories.

### **11.2.1 Age Tendencies**

According to the findings, children's background as well as the content of the stories was also influential in their use of the orientations. As far as age was concerned, the first and the second studies showed similar age tendencies. Both studies showed that the children's use of the ideal and the fairness orientations increased with age while the use of the egoistic orientation decreased, coinciding with the findings of other empirical studies (e.g., Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989). Thus it seems that individuals tend to orient toward ideal consequences and fairness and to make light of the egoistic consequences as they become more developmentally advanced in moral reasoning. However both first and second studies showed the variation of the age tendency according to the content of dilemmas and fables. For instance, regarding the Heinz's dilemma, the 7 year old Korean children unexpectedly mentioned the egoistic orientation less than the 10 and 13 year old children. This is opposed to the general tendency that younger children use the egoistic orientation more than older children. The second study showed another exception of age tendency in the use of the fairness orientation in the Golden Eggs' story. Unlike the general age tendency, the children whose academic levels were below the average showed no age tendency to increase the use of the fairness orientation with age since they rarely mentioned the orientation regardless of their age. The above two examples of exceptions of general age tendency indicate that children's background such as culture, academic level and gender could produce variations of age tendencies in the use of moral orientations in

connection with the content of stories.

With regard to the utilitarian orientation, previous empirical studies (Tappan et al., 1987; Walker, 1989) reported that younger individuals were more likely to use the orientation than older children. However, they examined the use of the utilitarian orientation in combination with the use of the egoistic orientation and described the tendency of the use of the combined orientations as the tendency of the use of the utilitarian orientation. Unlike previous studies, the present study determined the age tendency of the use of each orientation through examining the use of the utilitarian orientation separately from the use of the egoistic orientation. When the use of the utilitarian orientation was examined as an independent orientation, although some sub-groups showed various age differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation across the content of dilemmas/stories, neither first nor the second study showed a genuine age difference. Rather, children in all age groups tended to evenly use the utilitarian orientation. Thus, the findings of other empirical studies, which revealed that the use of the utilitarian orientation decreased with age, could be due to the strong age tendency of the egoistic orientation which possibly screened the actual tendency of the use of the utilitarian orientation.

Concerning the normative orientation, the present study showed the general tendency for the use of the orientation to increase with age in the second study and no general age difference in the first study. When all of the stories in both the studies were examined separately, only Joe's dilemma in the first study revealed the tendency for the use of the orientation to decrease with age as other empirical studies reported and no age difference was found in the Vulture's story of the second study. However, 4

out of 6 stories – Heinz’s and Officer Brown’s dilemmas in the first study and the Ass’s and the Golden Eggs’ stories in the second study- showed a tendency for the use of the normative orientation to increase with age. As far as the same patterns of the age tendency strongly appeared in most of the stories in the two studies, regardless of children’s background, the tendency for the use of the normative orientation to increase with age seemed too explicit to be attributed to a measurement error in the present study. It could rather be said that the use of the normative orientation generally increased with age although there were variations of the age tendency according to the content of stories. These findings of the present study are somewhat different from those of Walker’s study (1989). Walker, through his empirical study, concluded that children were less likely to be oriented to the normative concerns as they got older. However, according to comparison between age groups in terms of mean percentage of the use of the normative orientation, which Walker described, the age tendency of the use of the orientation to decrease with age was observed only among children between grade 1 and 7 (approximately age 6 to 12) and the percentage differences between age groups were small, especially concerning hypothetical dilemmas. Moreover, the use of the orientation tended to slightly increase with age between children in grade 7 (approximately at the age of 12) and adults. Therefore, the present study questions the conclusion of Walker that the use of the normative orientation tended to decrease with age and claims that the use of the normative orientation is rather steady across age as shown in the present study. However, since the oldest age group in the present study is the 16 year old group, the tendency for the use of the normative orientation to be steady across age may not be applicable to those over 16. Furthermore, when the percentages of the use of the

**Table 11.2.1** General Age Tendencies in the Use of Moral Orientations

	7 years old	10 years old	13 years old	16 years old	General Tendency
egoistic	34.8	22.9	12.1	4.3	Decrease
utilitarian	24.8	21.4	19.6	19	Slight Decrease
normative	28.6%	22.2%	24.6%	26.9%	No Consistent Tendency
ideal	2.5	13.2	18.7	24.1	Increase
fairness	9.3	20.3	25	25.7	Increase
total	100%	100%	100%	100%	

five orientations within each age group were compared, the percentages of use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations were maintained at the same level or slightly decreased with age (Table 11.2.1) although the actual use of the orientations increased or were at the same level across age. Thus, if the individuals in the present study keep these age tendencies until adulthood, the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations might relatively decrease compared with the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations.

Concerning the five orientations in terms of percentages of the use within the same age group, the present study showed that young children tend to use the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations more than the ideal and the fairness orientations. This could imply that the children at early ages tend to confine themselves to the use of the former three orientations because their concept of ideal consequences and fairness might not have been sufficiently developed. This restricted use of the orientations seems to vanish as they get older. That is, children at older ages tend to take all the orientations into account for their moral reasoning and select the most appropriate orientations, having considered the situations.

Consequently, the use of the orientations seems to be diversified with age rather than simply transferred from one to another orientation.

Although the influence of academic achievement level on the use of the orientations could vary according to story and children's background and gender, the findings of the children's academic level differences in the use of moral orientations seem to enhance the developmental tendency in the use of moral orientations. According to the findings, the children seemed to develop the egoistic orientation first and the fairness and the ideal orientations last. Furthermore, the children tended to concentrate on the use of a certain orientation when they were fully aware of the concept of the orientation. For instance, the finding that the 7 year old girls at the above average academic level and the 10 year old girls at the above average academic level tended to concentrate on the egoistic orientation for the Golden Eggs' story and the fairness orientation for the Vulture's story respectively indicates that the children sufficiently recognized the concepts at that time. Afterwards, as they presumably began to recognize another orientation, they started to alternate between the two orientations, the newly recognized one and the one they had already been using. Concerning the Vulture's story, the 13 year old girls at the above average academic level tended to use either the fairness orientation or the ideal orientation. Lastly, when the children were fully aware of the concepts of both ideal consequences and fairness which seemed to develop at the last stage, they gave reasons for their moral decisions mainly on the basis of both the fairness and the ideal orientations at the same time, rather than choosing one of the orientations. The 16 year old girls at the above average academic level showed this pattern concerning the Vulture's story. However, it does not mean that the children disregarded the other orientations.

Rather, they still considered the other orientations for their moral reasoning. Most of them used both the fairness and the ideal orientations for their moral reasoning in combination with other orientations such as the utilitarian orientation. That is, children at older ages seemed to take all the orientations into account for their moral reasoning and selected the most appropriate orientations for the situations they faced. Therefore, the findings on academic level differences support the findings on age tendency, which showed that the use of the orientations diversified with age rather than simply being transferred from one to another orientation.

In brief, the findings of the present study elicited several points on age tendency of the use of moral orientations. First, it seemed that younger children mainly gave moral reasoning in terms of the three orientations such as the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientations. Older children tended to add the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations to the use of the normative and the utilitarian orientations and were less likely to mention the egoistic orientation. The overall age tendency of the use of the orientation partially supports the claim of Walker (1989) on age tendency that the use of the normative, the egoistic, and the utilitarian orientation decreased with age while the use of the ideal and the fairness orientations increased. Second, the findings of the present study indicated that there could be variations of age tendency within the use of an orientation according to children's background as well as the content of stories. Lastly, it should be noted that the findings of age tendency in the present study might not be applicable to adults since the present study involved individuals only up to the age of 16 as participants.

### **11.2.2 Cultural and Gender Differences**

Concerning the cultural differences, it is assumed that the use of orientations would differ between Korean and British children based on the findings of empirical studies which showed cultural variations in the use of moral orientations (Tappan et al, 1987; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker, 1986a, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991). Furthermore, Korean society has its own unique characteristics which are different from those of Western societies such as the British society. For instance, Korean society still shows a strong tendency to maintain traditional, authoritarian, age-graded culture compared with the Western societies (Park & Johnson, 1984). These differences between the two cultures consolidated the assumption that there could be cultural differences in the use of moral orientations. In order to examine the assumption of cultural differences in the use of moral orientations, the two cultural groups - the British and the Korean groups - were compared in terms of the use of the moral orientations in the first study. The results of the first study showed cultural differences in the use of some orientations and those differences were explained in the light of the uniqueness of Korean society. It could be difficult to affirm the cultural differences that the first study had showed in the second study, in so far as the second study was not a cross-cultural comparative study. However, the second study showed many unique tendencies of Korean children in terms of the use of moral orientations in line with the findings of the first study. Here the cultural differences found in the first study are discussed in conjunction with the findings of the second study.

The first study showed that the Korean children used the fairness orientation more

often than the British children, especially in Officer Brown's and Joe's dilemmas. The value peculiar to Koreans, so-called "the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice" - this concept is somewhat different from Piaget's concept of immanent justice (see section 6.2 in Chapter VI) - seemed to influence the preponderance of Korean children's use of the fairness orientation over the British children's. According to their responses to Officer Brown's and Joe's dilemmas, the Korean children seemed to think that virtues should be rewarded while vices should be punished. For instance, many Korean children said that Heinz should be punished in some way for his misdeed even though the circumstance and the motivation were taken into account in Officer Brown's dilemma. Also, they tended to justify the act of the judge in giving him a sentence in order to maintain equity in the society. These responses seemed to reflect the children's concept that the punishment of vice is fair. Korean children revealed their belief in the rewards of virtue in Joe's dilemma through stating that both the upbringing of offspring and working hard are virtues worthy of reward. That is, they said that the father and Joe should get some kind of reward for the upbringing of the son and for working hard respectively. The fact that most Korean folk tales contain the concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice (Lee & Chang, 1986) indicates that Koreans have traditionally valued the concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice. Consequently, it could be natural for the Korean children in the first study to justify their moral decision in terms of the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice since they have presumably read and listened to those folk tales from an early age.

Although, in the second study, the two cultural groups could not be compared in terms of the use of the fairness orientation, the second study still showed that many of the



Korean children used the fairness orientation, especially concerning the Vulture's story. The fairness orientation was the second most commonly used among the five moral orientations, just following the use of the normative orientation, when the three stories were regarded as a whole. Moreover, the children mentioned the fairness orientation far more than the other orientations in Vulture's story only. According to other empirical studies, the fairness orientation were used the least among the five moral orientations. For instance, both Canadians and Chinese, who were in the studies of Walker (1986a) and Walker and Moran (1991) respectively, used the fairness orientation less than the other orientations. The British children in the present study also used the fairness orientation the least. These samples are not exactly comparable with one another. However, as opposed to the general tendency of the use of the fairness orientation, the second study as well as the first study showed that quite a large number of Korean children mentioned the fairness orientation. Thus, it seems that Korean children consider the fairness orientation for their moral reasoning more than those in other cultures do.

The preponderance of Korean children to others in terms of the use of the fairness orientation was explained with "the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice," which was regarded as a concept peculiar to Koreans, in the first study, and the second study partially supports this explanation. The children in the second study explicitly expressed the concept of rewards of virtue concerning the Vulture's story. For instance, many of them gave reasons why they liked the story, the characters and/or the conclusion of the story through stating that the farmer was rewarded for his good deeds and that was fair enough. These responses seemed to reflect the children's concept of the rewards of virtue. Surprisingly, even 7 and 10 year old

children mentioned the fairness orientation in the Vulture's story although they were supposed not to have developed the concept of fairness fully enough at that stage to be able to use it. The younger children's use of the fairness orientation implies that younger children may be aware of the concept of fairness although they rarely refer to fairness in their moral reasoning. Furthermore, they are probably capable of using the fairness orientation in certain conditions just as the 7 year old children did concerning the Vulture's story in the present study.

The children revealed the concept of the punishment of vice as well but not as strongly as the concept of the reward of virtue. Concerning the Ass's and the Golden Eggs' stories, the children stated that it was right for the ass in the Ass's story and the farmer in the Golden Eggs' story to get bad results because of their misdeeds. However, they showed their understanding of the characters' behaviours at the same time. For instance, many of the children said that most people, including themselves, were also lazy and/or greedy sometimes so that the behaviour of the characters was understandable. This kind of thinking of children - i.e. putting themselves in the character's shoes - seemed to weaken the children's adherence to the concept of the punishment of vice.

In short, it could be said that the findings that Korean children used the fairness orientation more than those in other cultures seemed to reflect the tendency of Koreans to hold a strong concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice. However, the Korean children did not strongly show the concept of the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice in every circumstance. It implies that evocation of the concept could depend on the context.

The children also revealed cultural differences in the use of the utilitarian orientation for Joe's dilemma in the first study. That is, Korean girls tended to be concerned about the utilitarian consequences more than not only British girls but also Korean boys through mentioning the matter of "hurting feeling of other family members." It seemed that the Korean girls' use of moral orientations was under the influence of the traditional expectation of Korean society for girls, which is that the girls should show concern for other family members' welfare in order to maintain family concord. The traditionally ideal type of woman in Korean society, the so-called "wise mother and good wife," clearly shows this social expectation for girls. Koreans traditionally have praised women who do their best and even sacrifice themselves for the sake of other family members as wise mothers and good wives. The Korean girls seemed to have internalized this traditional concept of woman from a very young age, probably through social interaction. Thus, as mentioned in Chapter VI, the traditional concept of Koreans on women seemed to result in that preponderance of Korean girls to the other children in the use of the utilitarian orientation. However, in the second study, Korean girls, especially the 16 year olds showed great concern for the welfare of others beyond the family members. Concerning the Ass's and Golden Eggs' stories, many girls said that people should not be selfish, be considerate and not offend others in order to have good consequences for themselves as well as others. Based on the findings of the use of the utilitarian orientation in the first and the second studies, the present study suggests that the Korean girls generally orient to the utilitarian consequences more than the Korean boys and the British girls in their moral decision-making concerning family matters. However, the girls at an older age seemed to extend their consideration for welfare and happiness to others in their community

while younger girls still tended to limit their concern only to family members.

According to the findings, Gilligan's claim (1982), namely that girls typically use the responsibility orientation (the egoistic, the utilitarian, and the ideal orientations) while boys use the right orientation (the normative and the fairness orientations), seems applicable to Korean children. However, the findings could only partially support the claim since the gender differences were found only concerning the use of utilitarian orientation. Furthermore, as opposed to Gilligan's claim, the British group showed that the boys used the utilitarian orientation more than girls in the first study. The preponderance of British boys to British girls in the use of the utilitarian orientation occurred in the younger age group concerning Heinz's dilemma. The finding that the gender difference of the British group in the use of the utilitarian orientation was opposite to that of the Korean group suggests that there are possibly gender differences in the use of moral orientations and the gender differences could vary across cultures rather than be universal. That is, if the society maintained different expectations for boys and girls as in the Korean society, it could affect the gender differences in the use of orientations. However, in most Western societies, different role expectations for each gender have faded, therefore almost no gender difference in the use of orientations was found. Indeed, the first study using the British children and many studies conducted in Western societies (e.g. Walker, 1991; Walker et al., 1987; Walker & Moran, 1991) reported no significant gender difference in the use of moral orientations.

In brief, with respect to cultural differences in the use of moral orientations, Korean children in the first study showed some unique tendencies in the use of moral

orientations, which were different from those of the British children. Besides, the findings of the second study generally support the unique tendencies of the Koreans, which were found in the first study. According to the findings, the present study concludes that there are some concepts peculiar to Koreans and these concepts seem to affect the Korean's use of the moral orientations, and hence to generate differences between Koreans and individuals in other cultures in terms of the use of the orientations.

### **11.2.3 Summary**

Overall findings on the use of moral orientations indicate that there are general differences in children's use of the orientations across their background including age, gender and culture. Also, children's differences in academic level seem to affect the age differences in the use of the moral orientations. However, not all of the above differences were observed in each story. The children tended to favour particular orientations for certain contexts. This preference of the children occurred sometimes in a whole group or sometimes only in a sub-group (e.g. a cultural group or a gender group).

In spite of the differences in the use of the orientations across the content of dilemmas/stories, the present study showed some general tendencies to use the orientations as below. The youngest children seemed to mainly consider the egoistic consequences of their moral decision. As they got older, they began to be aware of ideal consequences and fairness and took them into account for their moral decision while the consideration of the egoistic consequences decreased. Their concern about

normative order and utilitarian consequences seemed to maintain similar levels across age. Concerning the development of the use of moral orientations, the children sometimes emphasized only one or two orientations of which they were fully aware at that time. However, the tendency to emphasize a certain orientation tended to diminish later and the children justified their moral decision in consideration of various orientations altogether as they were sufficiently aware of all the orientations. In other words, the children eventually diversified the use of the orientations although they sometimes seemed to simply transfer their use from one to another orientation while the development of the use of the orientations was in progress. The academic level differences seemed to affect the overall age tendency to use the orientations. The children at the above average academic level tended to be one step ahead of those at the below average academic level.

Concerning the cultural influence, the Korean children tended to show greater use of the fairness and the normative orientations in certain contexts. It seems that the Korean children internalized some concepts peculiar to Korean society such as the concept of reward of virtue and punishment of vice. The preponderance of Korean girls to Korean boys in the use of the utilitarian orientation could also imply that the characteristics of Korean society, which is that Korean society has different expectations for boys and girls, influenced the use of the orientation.

In summary, the present study indicated general age tendencies in the use of moral orientations regardless of children's gender and cultural background. Only the children's academic level could affect the age tendency. Apart from the age tendency, children also showed gender differences, only in the Korean group, as well

as cultural differences between Korean and British children in the use of moral orientations. However, the present study showed variations of these general tendencies across the content of stories and sub-groups.

### 11.3 CHILDREN'S CHOSEN ISSUE

In the first study, cultural differences in chosen issues for Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas were found in relation to the concept of law-abiding and fulfilment of duty. Korean children were more likely to choose the punishment issue than the morality and conscience issue in Officer Brown's dilemma. That is, approximately two thirds of the Korean children said that Officer Brown should report Heinz's misdeed and the judge should give him a sentence rather than let Heinz go free because of the importance of being law-abiding and the fulfillment of duty. Park & Johnson (1984) reported that Korean society tends to stress the importance of abiding the law. Song et al. (1987), in their study, also characterized Korean society as a society that emphasizes the importance of authority, conformity and duty as public justification for adhering to all rules. Concerning the findings of the present study in combination with other studies, these characteristics of Korean society seem to influence the Korean children to have a strong concept of law-abiding. Furthermore, Korean girls showed the concept of law-abiding in Heinz's dilemma as well while Korean boys did only so in Officer Brown's dilemma. Concerning Heinz's dilemma, Korean girls chose the law issue more often than the life issue. That is, Korean girls argued that Heinz should not steal the drug in order to obey the law although he could not save his wife's life while others including Korean boys argued that Heinz should steal the drug to save his wife's life although it was illegal. It seems that obeying the

law took precedence over saving a life among Korean girls. This gender difference in the Korean group indicated that the adherence of Korean girls to the concept of abiding the law were greater than that of Korean boys. It implies that girls are more likely than boys to conform to the demands of society, at least in Korean society. Moreover, the finding that the Korean girls used the normative orientation more than the British girls concerning Heinz's dilemma seems to strengthen the Korean girls' strong tendency to conform to the normative order of the society. In short, the first study indicates that the Koreans, especially the Korean girls, are more likely to take into account the normative order than the British children through showing a strong concepts of abiding the law and fulfilment of duty as a member of society.

Unlike in the first study, it was impossible to examine children's chosen issues in the second study since the fables did not contain dilemmas. Furthermore, it was not possible to find out from the second study whether Koreans greatly emphasized the concept of abiding the law since the stories used in the second study contained scarcely any reference to the concept of abiding the law. However, the second study showed that the Korean children tended to express the importance of the fulfilment of duty through explaining the reasons to use a great amount of the normative orientation, especially in the Ass's story. That is, many children disapproved of the ass shirking its duty and emphasized the importance of hard work and doing one's duty. The children used the normative orientation more than the other orientations for the Golden Eggs' story as well as for the Ass's story. However, concerning the Golden Eggs' story, they used the normative orientation in terms of blaming/approving and retribution/exoneration rather than the concept of fulfilment of duty. They condemned the farmer's behaviour because greediness and selfishness, which underlie



the farmer's behaviour, were socially disapproved of. Furthermore, the children agreed to retribution for the farmer's misdeed. According to the cultural differences in children's chosen issues in the first study and the children's reasons to use the normative orientation in the second study, Korean children, especially girls, seem to orient towards the normative order, and hence to emphasize the conformity to the norms and rules of the society more than those in other cultures. This could reflect that the Korean children internalize the characteristics of Korean society, which stress maintenance of the normative order through fulfilling duties and adhering to prescribed rules and roles.

In the study of Nisan and Kohlberg (1982), Turkish village children aged 10 to 15 tended to emphasize the normative order through choosing the law issue in Heinz's dilemma and the punishment issue in Officer Brown's dilemma more than those in a Turkish city. The authors explained this emphasis on the normative order in the children in a Turkish village by the characteristics of culture of a Turkish village. That is, in the traditional village in Turkey there could be high pressure to adhere to normative order, and hence generated the tendency to choose issues relevant to the normative order rather than the other issues. Like those in a Turkish village, Korean children put great emphasis on the normative order. However, in the study by Nisan and Kohlberg, only the younger group, the 10 to 15 year old group, showed cultural differences in adherence to the normative order while the older group, the 16 to 28 year old group, did not. This leads to the possibility that a strong concept of the normative order among Koreans could be attenuated after the age of 16. Unfortunately, the present study did not examine the use of the normative orientation in individuals after the age of 16.

Snarey et al. (1985) found cultural differences between Kibbutz and Middle Eastern adolescents in chosen issue, but only concerning Joe's dilemma. In their study, most of the kibbutz adolescents aged 15 to 17 chose the contract issue while Middle Eastern youth at the same age often chose the authority issue and argued that the son should give his father the money. Snarey et al. explained this difference by the fact that individuals were more likely to draw on culturally defined values and norms from the social institutions to which they belonged in order to provide their moral reasoning. That is, the fact that the Middle Eastern society was more likely to emphasize parental respect and authority than the kibbutz society probably generated the cultural differences in the chosen issue for Joe's dilemma.

Korean society, like Middle Eastern society, greatly stresses parental respect and authority based on the traditional concept of filial piety so that Korean children were expected to choose the authority issue more than the contract issue in Joe's dilemma. Contrary to the expectation, the Korean children in the present study chose the contract issue much more than the authority issue as did the British. That is, the Korean children, as well as the British children, considered Joe's right and his father's right equally rather than advocating only the father, which probably indicates that filial piety has diminished among Koreans. However, through analysing their spontaneous responses to the dilemma, it was found that many Korean children still consider filial piety very important in their relationship to their fathers. Thus it seems that filial piety itself has not been eroded but the concept of filial piety has been changed in terms of absolute obedience of children to the authority of their parents as Kim (1992) claims. The change of the concept of filial piety is probably generated from the recent tendency of Korean parents to be more tolerant and less strict with

their children owing to the decrease in the number of children in a family and hence, the change of the family system from an authority-based large family to a child-centred nuclear family (see section 3.4.2 in Chapter III for details).

In brief, children's chosen issues in the first study indicate cultural differences in terms of the concepts of abiding the law and fulfilment of duty and the change in the traditional concept of filial piety among Korean children. The cultural differences in the concepts of abiding the law and fulfilment of duty are probably due to the characteristics of Korean society, which greatly considers maintenance of the normative order. The Korean children's frequent use of the normative orientation and their reasons for the use in the second study also support Koreans' emphasis on the normative order.

#### 11.4 UNSCORABLE RESPONSES

Some studies (e.g. Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Iwasa, 1992; Ma, 1988b, 1992; Shweder et al., 1990; Snarey, 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) claimed that Kohlberg missed or misunderstood some concepts peculiar to non-Western cultures so that his theory is insufficient. In line with the claim, finding some unscorable responses of Korean children in both the first and the second parts of the present study implies that there are some concepts which affect Koreans' moral reasoning that Kohlberg did not grasp well. These unscorable responses in the first study contained older children's concepts of "a life with pure conscience or honour," "compromise and reconciliation rather than choice and commitment when confronting interpersonal conflict," "filial piety," "collectivism," and "*chung*" and younger children's

consideration of the restricted-simple sympathy as well as physical consequences for their moral decision. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain the findings of the first study on the concepts of Korean children on “pure conscience,” “filial piety,” and “reconciliation” in the second study through fables, probably because the content of fables was insufficient to let the children express those concepts. However, the tendency of young children to sympathize with only one person (character) and older children’s concepts of *chung* and collectivism clearly appeared in the second study. Furthermore, the second study showed another type of unscorable responses of Korean children, the concept of “the respect for all living things,” which was not found in the first study.

The Korean children at the age of 7 tended to make moral judgments based on emotional consequences such as the restricted-simple sympathy as well as physical consequences in both the studies using dilemmas and fables. In contrast, as Kohlberg claimed, the 7 year old British children in the study using dilemmas focused on physical consequences and rarely mentioned emotional consequences in order to make the moral judgment. This finding on British children seems to support the findings of Eisenberg and her colleagues (e.g. Eisenberg-Berg, 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Neal; 1979). They reported that children rarely referred to empathic considerations concerning prohibition dilemmas such as Kohlberg’s dilemmas although there is evidence of empathic concerns in prosocial moral reasoning of the Western children. Eisenberg, based on the findings, argued that some young children gave their moral reasoning with reference to the needs of a protagonist in a prosocial dilemma and these mentions could be regarded as primitive empathic concerns. However, among the young children, the most frequent reason

for their moral judgment is hedonistic reason (i.e. justification for the behaviour with reference to the expected gain for the self). Moreover, Eisenberg, Shell, Pasternack, Lennon, Beller, & Mathy (1987) found that sympathetic reasoning for prosocial dilemmas was not used with any real frequency until at least age 9 to 10. Overtly empathic considerations emerged among some school-aged children and increased in use with age concerning prosocial-oriented moral dilemmas. Based on the findings, Eisenberg (1990) concludes that children's emphatic and sympathetic consideration which Kohlberg de-emphasized in his moral stages could enhance maturity of children's prosocial moral reasoning. Unlike children in Western cultures, among Koreans, even the 7 year old children tended to make moral judgments based on overt sympathy. They relied on sympathy not only for prosocial moral reasoning but also for prohibition-oriented reasoning in both Kohlberg's dilemmas and fables. This is probably due to characteristics of Korean society that emphasize emotional concerns more than Western society.

Although the 7 year old Korean children could consider emotional consequences for their moral reasoning, most of them seemed to have a restricted viewpoint. According to Kohlberg, young children at preconventional level are lacking in mediating concepts such as deservingness or intentionality through which the particular circumstances of the case alter its moral significance. As a result, they tended to make rigid moral judgment. Unlike Kohlberg who only pertained to a rigid viewpoint in terms of physical consequences, the present study found young children's rigid viewpoint in their responses not only referring to physical consequences but also emotional concerns. For instance, with respect to the Golden Eggs' story, they tended to make their moral judgments only based on their feeling

towards a “poor goose,” rather than multiple perspectives. Thus, the present study defined the younger children’s emotional concerns having a rigid viewpoint as the “restricted-simple sympathy.” Kohlberg’s claim on young children’s rigid view seems to partially support the restricted-simple sympathy as far as it also focused on children’s rigid view. The similarity between young children’s sympathy and moral judgment, both are based on the restricted view, could be explained by Dunn’s findings (1988) that emotional development is parallel to cognitive development. She pointed out that the links between emotion and cognitive change are usually understood in terms of cognitive change that underlies emotional development while the possibility that emotional experiences contribute to cognitive development has been seldomly considered. In line with Dunn’s view, Korean children’s restricted-simple sympathy could be viewed in terms of an early stage in emotional development which proceeds in parallel to a child’s cognitive development.

In short, the present study found that only Korean children revealed overtly sympathetic moral reasoning even in Kohlberg’s dilemmas and that the responses based on the restricted-simple sympathy were unable to be scored with Kohlberg’s system. These findings imply that emotional aspects seem to play a larger role in Korean children’s moral judgment than in British children’s and that Kohlberg’s scheme does not cater for them. Some studies (e.g. Ma, 1992; Snarey, 1985) argued that Kohlberg’s moral judgment up to the stage 3 seemed applicable to individuals in most cultures. The matter of applicability could be true since in the present study most responses of Koreans and the British were scorable. However, the findings of the present study on young children’s unscorable responses imply the insufficiency of Kohlberg’s system even for 7 year old Korean children whose mean of moral stages is

only 1/2. This indicates that some concepts peculiar to a certain culture could influence the moral judgment not just after stage 3 but even at the preconventional level.

As one of the developed concepts of restricted-simple sympathy, the Korean children at older ages gave unscorable responses showing a concept of respect for life (see Chapters IX and X for details). Some British children in the study using dilemmas also pointed out the importance of saving an animal's life concerning Heinz's dilemma. However, most of them argued that Heinz should steal the drug for his pet based on the affiliation norm (e.g. he should steal the drug because the pet is his friend) in line with the system of Kohlberg, who also values human-being's life and the life of the pets only for whom people have affection. In contrast, especially in the case of the fables, Koreans showed great emphasis on saving life, including those of animals, because of the respect for the life itself rather than affiliation. Korean children's concept of respect for life, even in the case of animals, seems to come from Buddhism, one of the traditional concepts of Koreans. According to Buddhism, benevolence should be applied to animals and all living things in nature as well as human-beings (Tachibana, 1975). Ma (1992) encapsulated a similar concept, defined as "sainted altruism" in his theoretical model of moral development for Chinese people. It seems that Korean and Chinese people share the concept on the respect for all lives and the concept equally seems to influence their moral judgment. However, Ma regarded this concept as the concept that appeared at the highest stage while the present study revealed that children at ages 13 to 16 have already expressed the concept of the benevolence for all living things in the form of mentioning the importance of saving the life of a mere animal. This could suggest that the concept

develops with age, probably starting from the restricted-simple sympathy, rather than suddenly appearing at the highest stage as Ma claims.

As another type of unscorable responses, both the first and the second studies found Korean children's responses pertaining to the concept of *chung*. Choi pointed out that *chung* is the fundamental concept in interpersonal relationships among Koreans as is the concept of "we" (Choi, 1997; Choi & Choi, 1990b). This implies that Korean children's moral judgment on the basis of *chung* could relate to the Korean view of individuals. Western people view the individual as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who compromised a unique configuration of internal attributes such as abilities, traits and values, and behaves primarily as a consequence of these internal attributes (Dien, 1982; Shweder & Levine, 1984). In contrast, individuals in non-Western cultures tend to view the individual as an imperfect partial being in the surrounding context rather than an independent being (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The Koreans' view of individuals seems similar to the view commonly found in non-Western cultures, namely the interdependent self. Thus, sharing the concept of "we" and *chung*, which relates to emotional state seems to show Koreans' tendency to make close interpersonal relationships with other partial individuals (Choi, 1997). Furthermore, according to the analysis of the children's responses for "helping others" in the second study, the concept of *chung* had in common with the restricted-simple sympathy in terms of emotional aspect which affected their moral judgment (see Chapters IX and X for details). Thus, as the concept of respect for life did, the concept of *chung* that appeared at older age seemed to stem from the restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old children. That is, the restricted-simple sympathy of 7 year old Koreans could also be regarded as the



primitive form of *chung* found in older children's responses.

According to some studies (e.g. Dein, 1982; Ma, 1988b; Snarey et al., 1985; Tietjen & Walker, 1985), the view of the interdependent self in non-Western cultures tends to promote moral judgments based on collectivism which leads the individual to consider the tranquillity of community before the rights of individuals. As a result the individual is sometimes asked to relinquish some freedom and identity in order for society to function. Choi & Choi (1990b) claimed that the concept of "we" is the representative of collectivism among Koreans. In the present study, the collectivist tendencies of Koreans was clearly captured in the 16 year-old children's reasons for "not disturbing or harming others." That is, the Korean children seemed to think that an individual should not disturb or harm others because they were concerned about others' welfare but ultimately for the sake of the group where individuals were interdependent on each other. These responses imply that Koreans, like many other collectivism-based cultures, tended to give priority to the community rather than the individual in certain circumstances. Also, it can be said that they think of the society as a kind of "we" group. These type of responses were often found among Korean children not the British children in relation to fables as well as Kohlberg's dilemmas and this seems to indicate that Korean society is another collectivism-based culture like many other non-Western cultures.

In summary, overall findings that unscorable responses among Koreans generated from some concepts peculiar to Koreans indicate that Kohlberg's system is insufficient to assess Koreans' moral judgment. The finding that moral judgment based on the restricted-simple sympathy of young Korean children at the stage 1 or 2

is also unscorable implies that Kohlberg's system is insufficient even for young Korean children since Kohlberg de-emphasized sympathy in his moral stages. Except for the restricted-simple sympathy, most unscorable responses of Koreans appeared during adolescence. This indicates that the influence of the concepts peculiar to Koreans on their moral reasoning is greater during adolescence than childhood and hence the insufficiency of Kohlberg's system is greater for adolescents.

### **11.5 ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND GENERATE MORALS IN FABLES**

The present study, like other empirical studies (e.g. Chia, 1993; Dorfman, 1988, 1989, as cited in Chia, 1993; Jose et al., 1992, as cited in Chia, 1993), shows the children's age differences in drawing morals from fables regardless of their gender and familiarity with the fables. However, the age difference was significant only between the 7 year old group and the older group. That is, the children at the age of 10 seemed to have already fully developed the ability to identify and generate morals in fables and hence hardly showed further progress afterwards. With regard to the 7 year old children, they were able to understand the literal details in the fables and hence to provide reasons for their moral judgments although they seemed not sufficiently equipped to draw the points hidden in fables. This suggests that fables could be used as an alternative method to assess children's moral reasoning although using fables to teach 7 year old children morals might not be appropriate. Furthermore, at the age of 7, when the development was still in progress, the children showed academic level differences in the Ass's story. This indicates a possibility of the influence of the children's academic level on their ability to generate morals. Finding no influence of familiarity with the fables on the ability to draw morals in the

fables suggests that not the familiarity with particular fables but the familiarity with the fables genre and experiences in drawing morals from didactic stories might affect children's ability to draw morals.

## **11. 6 MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN LIGHT OF THE VIEWS OF DOMAIN-SPECIFICITY AND CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY**

Many researchers have criticized Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Among these researchers, the theorists of domain-specificity (e.g. Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986) criticized Kohlberg's theory especially in terms of the unitary moral development and young children's inability to distinguish morality and conventions. Here, the findings of the present study will be discussed in light of the contrasted theories, the Kohlberg's theory and the theory of domain-specificity. In addition, the present study will illuminate the findings through the perspective of cultural psychologists.

First of all, in recent years, it has become increasingly apparent from development research that younger and older children as well as adolescents and adults make social judgments that can be characterized as multifaceted and heterogeneous rather than unitary (Turiel & Davidson, 1986). Like those in the other empirical studies (summarized in Turiel, 1983), some children in the present study also seemed to refer to such a type of judgment. They did not consistently uphold a particular moral issue for all the probe questions in a dilemma. For instance, in Joe's dilemma, they sometimes oriented towards authority and at other times chose the contract issue in contradiction with authority. They both accepted and rejected rules or norms in Heinz's and Officer Brown's dilemmas. Furthermore, the present study showed that

the children's tendency to take moral orientations into account diversified with age. As they got older, they did not simply replace an orientation at lower level with another at higher level but considered more various moral orientations at the same time. These patterns of children's judgment seemed to reflect the coexistence of multifarious orientations – i.e. heterogeneity - in their mind and the development of moral reasoning. Thus the findings of the present study as well as other empirical studies, as opposed to Kohlberg's claim, seems to challenge the existence of a general structure in the individual's thought forming a unitary or homogeneous system.

However, these multifaceted moral judgments seem to relate to content (Nisan, 1984). That is, the direction of moral decision – whether an individual chooses the law issue or the life issue – is a matter of moral content, which refers to internalized behavioural instructions regarding right and wrong, or so-called norms. Here, it should be noted that Kohlberg focused on a general structure of moral development rather than content. Regardless of the direction of decision in moral dilemmas, Kohlberg proposed that individuals reached each moral stage in accordance with social perspective and logic. For instance, individuals in the second stage make moral decisions based on concrete rewards and punishment, dictated by the holders of power. The standard for those in the third stage is the expectations of significant others. In the fourth stage, rules and laws of a more formal character and in the fifth stage, rules and laws examined in light of agreed-upon principles within a social-contract framework are the main considerations. Thus, each stage represents certain types of standards that are largely independent of the logic of that stage rather than the specific content of the standard.

Furthermore, changing into a higher stage does not mean that an individual shifts his or her perspective from one to another, which is totally different from the previous one. It rather seems that, as an individual develops into a higher moral stage, his or her considerations broaden and the main consideration in one stage becomes a subordinate rationale of the next higher stage. Thus, consideration of interpersonal reciprocity and sympathy, the main reason for a moral decision at stage 3, constitutes only a part of reasons of stage 4, in which it is integrated into a more formal social perspective. This proposition of Kohlberg, in a way, corresponds with the findings of the present study that, as the children got older, they considered more various orientations for their moral decisions.

Based on the comparison between the findings of the present study and other theories – i.e., Kohlberg's and domain specificity theories' – up to now, the present study could not accept one theory and reject the other since both theories partially support the findings of the present study. As Nisan (1984) suggests, it is necessary to ascribe to moral content an independent status in moral development alongside the moral structure. According to Nisan, Kohlberg's approach only concentrated on moral structure so that it is insufficient in explaining the development of moral judgment. It is undoubted that individuals do not have a conception of morality innately but primarily establish it through adapting beliefs accepted from the outside world, from authorities such as parents and teachers. For instance, giving priority to the life issue in comparison with the law issue and vice versa, could be related to which issue the culture emphasized more importantly. In addition, judging whether an issue pertains to morality or conventions also seems culture dependent. In the study of Shweder et al. (1990), individuals in India considered a widow eating fish morally wrong,

regardless of the existing law, because they believe it constitutes an insulting and hence harmful behaviour for the soul of her deceased husband. In contrast, Americans consider the same behaviour a convention since they do not consider it to be harmful to anyone. These examples imply that individuals could reach different moral decisions although using similar structure according to their cultural background. If a researcher tried to examine moral stages of individuals in a non-western culture with Western culture-biased instruments without understanding the cultural background, he or she could easily misinterpret and hence over or underestimate the individuals' moral stages. Thus, the present study suggests not focusing on either moral structure or content but both aspects in order to examine the development of moral judgment. Concerning the present study, the interpretation of Korean children's responses, in particular, should be made based on the consideration of uniqueness of Korean culture.

Secondly, the domain-specific theorists opposed Kohlberg in terms of young children's ability to distinguish between morality and conventions. According to Kohlberg, children at young ages viewed all rules as stemming from authority commands so that they had a unitary concept of social rules and treated all social rules alike. Thus, he assumed that the children failed to differentiate between moral and nonmoral rules and their social judgments were based on the orientation to power, punishment and physical consequences. In contrast, domain-specific theorists assumed that an individual's social judgment consists of several distinct domains so that each domain develops independently and entails differential social experiences. Thus the individual can distinguish between the domains from their early ages (e.g. Turiel, 1977, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Weston

& Turiel, 1980). Domain-specificity theorists (e.g. Tisak, 1995; Weston & Turiel, 1980) actually found that young children could distinguish between two social domains – morality and conventions – through providing different justifications for moral and conventional transgressions. They found that the children tended to make moral judgments based on individuals' welfare and rights, justice, equity, and fairness whereas, concerning conventions, they oriented towards authority, punishment avoidance, and customs or traditions although young children considered both moral and conventional transgressions to be wrong. Weston and Turiel (1980) argued that young children distinguished between morality and conventions through finding that they made moral judgments, unlike conventional judgments, on the basis of factors intrinsic to acts, such as harm inflicted on others and violation of rights. A number of studies in non-Western cultures has also been conducted in order to examine whether children in different cultures made similar distinctions between moral and conventional rules (e.g. Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Nisan, 1987; Shweder et al., 1990). Among the studies, the study in Korea (Song et al., 1987) showed that Korean children, like American children (e.g. Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Turiel, 1980; Weston & Turiel, 1980), distinguished between the moral and the conventional rules from their early ages. That is, Korean children tended to provide different justifications for moral transgressions and conventional transgressions respectively. Unfortunately, the present study did not explicitly show whether the children distinguished morality from conventions. However, finding that the 7 years old children's judgments based on the restricted-simple sympathy indicates that the children even at their young ages did not make social judgments solely depending on an orientation to power, punishment and physical consequences. The restricted-

simple sympathy could be categorized as a criterion for moral judgment since it pertained to an individual's harm. Thus, in contrast to Kohlberg's proposition, finding that children pertained to the restricted-simple sympathy for their moral reasoning could imply that the children considered an individual's harm for their moral judgment. However, the present study also found that they still gave moral reasoning in terms of the authority and punishment avoidance. With respect to this matter, Turiel (1983) states that children's focus on the authority and punishment avoidance rather than on individual's harm in making moral judgment does not mean that the children solely made moral decisions based on authority and punishment avoidance. Rather it seems to reflect an inability to coordinate the two aspects.

Although young children distinguished between moral and conventional events from their early ages, age differences in their distinction and justifications were found (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). Concerning their ability to distinguish between moral and conventional issues, the youngest children (the 6 years olds) distinguished between moral and conventional events more sharply on familiar than on unfamiliar issues. By the age of 10, however, children applied their moral reasoning to relatively unfamiliar as well as familiar issues (Davidson et al., 1983). According to the findings of the above studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988), children, as their social interactions increased with age, seemed to apply the distinctions between moral and conventional acts to a broader range of social acts, including more abstract and unfamiliar social acts. Although the present study did not explicitly show the influence of familiarity on children's distinction between moral and conventional issues, it seemed to indicate that the young children tended to generate more mature moral responses from fables concerning familiar



moral issues. That is, they tended to give more abstract responses to familiar issues such as “not to being too greedy” than unfamiliar issues such as “not to shirk your own duty” and “to do a favour for others” (see Chapter X for details). In the present study, only the 7 year old children, not older children, showed such differences. These findings of the present study might support the studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983; Tisak & Turiel, 1988) showing that moral development proceeded from a reliance on specific personal experiences to an ability to abstract or generalize unfamiliar events.

Besides, Davidson et al. (1983) found that there were age differences in the types of justifications used. Age differences indicated that older children’s conceptual regulations were more comprehensive. Most children, regardless of their ages, tended to explain that moral transgressions were wrong because they caused harm. However, for younger children, the concern for welfare and avoidance of harm was a consolidated reason and reasons based on relational issues of justice were not elaborated. By the age of 10 years, children consolidated a more abstract concern for maintaining justice, which included a concern with achieving just reciprocity between the welfare claims of various individuals (Turiel & Davidson, 1986). In this age tendency, the domain-specificity theorists argued that it did not mean that prior levels of reasoning disappeared but that they were subordinated to the subsequent levels in the form of elements. That is, the concern for welfare, a regulation in young children’s moral reasoning became an element in a subsequent level of moral reasoning (Davidson et al., 1983). Therefore, earlier levels gradually became the basis for, and part of, later levels over a period of time (Turiel and Davidson, 1986). These results suggested that reasoning within the moral domain developed and

became more sophisticated with age. That is, individuals seemed to consider a broader range of components for their moral judgments and to regulate the components as their social interaction increased with age. The age tendency in the use of moral orientations in the present study, in a way, seemed to support these assumptions of domain-specificity theorists concerning moral reasoning. The findings of the present study showed that the young children emphasized only one or two orientations of which they were fully aware at that time whereas the older children justified their moral decisions in consideration of various orientations at a time as they were sufficiently aware of all the orientations. The youngest children, in the present study, tended to make their moral decision mainly based on egoistic consequences, normative order and utilitarian consequences. This tendency could correspond to the finding of Turiel and his colleagues (Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986) that younger children focused on welfare and avoidance of harm for their moral justification. As they got older, the children in the present study became aware of ideal consequences and fairness and added them to their prior moral reasoning. This tendency could also be matched to the findings of Turiel and his colleagues that older children are concerned with a wider range of components, including a more abstract concern for achieving just reciprocity between the welfare claims of various individuals, for their moral reasoning. Thus, the present study suggests that the children, with age, eventually diversify the use of the orientations and hence elaborate their reasoning.

Furthermore, unscorable responses developing from the restricted-simple sympathy to *chung* also imply the age tendency in moral reasoning. As mentioned earlier, young children making moral decisions based on the restricted-simple sympathy showed a

rigid view focusing on only one person. For example, although they recognized that Heinz was wrong, they stated that the judge should let Heinz go free because Heinz would be sad if he had to go to a jail. Similarly, concerning the Golden Eggs' story, they said that the farmer should not kill the goose because dying is sad. Responses based on the restricted-simple sympathy seem to result from children's lack of an ability to coordinate more than two different perspectives at the same time – e.g., Heinz's sadness vs. moral transgression. As they reached higher stages, however, the children take into account various standpoints at the same time. That is, they revealed that ability to coordinate different perspectives. For instance, they mentioned the importance of having good relationships with individuals as a reason for helping others. At the age of 16, they stated that people should help each other for the sake of *chung*, which is supposed to make a society function well. This age difference in the responses showed that the children's consideration for moral judgment extended from focusing on one person to more than two persons, and then eventually to the society. This could also imply that the ability to coordinate different perspectives develops with age.

These overall findings of the present study support Kohlberg's moral stages that develop in accordance with social perspective. At the same time, the present study supports Turiel's claim that an individual tends to broaden the range of components for evaluating moral judgments with age (Turiel & Smetana, 1984; Turiel & Davidson, 1986). Showing children's use of the restricted-simple sympathy for their moral judgment in the present study also supports a general assumption of the domain specificity theorists' claim that the young children were likely to judge moral transgressions based on not authority and punishment avoidance but individuals' harm.

Thus, the findings of the present study support Kohlberg's theory on one hand and the domain specificity theory on the other.

In addition, as opposed to Kohlberg, the cultural psychologists (e.g., Shweder et al., 1990) argued that, although individuals in most cultures recognized a domain of moral issues centred around issues of justice, there were more than one moral code across cultures. Individuals in non-Western cultures emphasising collectivism tended to give great priority to duties over rights in order to make moral judgments whereas those in Western cultures emphasizing individualism tended to give priority to rights. Each tendency is defined as "duty-based" and "justice-based" moralities respectively (Shweder et al., 1990). Korean society is westernized and, on the other hand, still keeps the collectivistic view. This ambivalence might cause the Korean children's tendency to make both scorable and unscorable responses with Kohlberg's manual. The scorable responses indicate that Koreans have the right-based morality. The unscorable responses, however, seemed to indicate that Koreans also used the duty-based moral judgment. Some responses such as emphasizing the concept of "we" seemed to indicate that they had the duty-based morality through subordinating their rights and the domain of what is private to interpersonal duties.

Furthermore, some researchers (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Haste & Baddeley, 1991) assumed that differences in moral reasoning existed not only between cultures but also within cultures (i.e. subcultures). Haste and Baddeley (1991) found that both boys and girls had access to both the justice and the care orientations but girls were more likely than boys to show greater mixture and easier movement between them. The Korean children in the present study showed a similar pattern. Although Korean

boys and girls considered both the justice and the care orientations, the girls tended to use the utilitarian orientation, a kind of the care orientation, more than the boys and there was no gender difference in the use of the other orientations. This, in line with other findings (e.g., Johnson, 1988; Wingfield & Haste, 1987), implies that girls, unlike boys, were exposed not only to the dominant cultural message but also to the alternative female culture. Thus, these findings support the claim of Haste and Baddeley (1991) that some cultures consisting of a variety of subcultures were more complex than could be accounted for by a single dominant moral theory and that gender experience could be at least a quasi-culture.

Up to now, the findings of the present study were discussed in light of the theories of Kohlberg, domain-specificity and cultural psychology. Based on that, the present study supports some points which Kohlberg, domain-specificity theorists and/or cultural psychologists claimed. First, the present study supports Kohlberg's basic assumption that moral reasoning develops with age in accordance with their social perspective regardless of their cultural background through showing age tendencies in moral stages, the use of orientations, and the unscorable responses. However, the present study found that Kohlberg's system is insufficient especially in relation to the claim that young children's moral judgment is mainly based on punishment avoidance. Finding children's moral judgment based on authority and punishment avoidance seems to indicate the lack of coordination of different perspectives rather than the inability to distinguish between morality and conventions. Moreover, finding the young children's unscorable responses based on the restricted-simple sympathy implies that young children could make moral decisions based on individual harm not authority and punishment avoidance. Thus these findings and implications partially

support the claim of domain specificity theorists that for young children authority and punishment avoidance are not the main reasons for making moral judgment. Lastly, finding the development of unscorable responses with age, from the restricted-simple sympathy to *chung*, and the influence of collectivism on moral reasoning supports cultural psychologists claim that understanding individuals' cultural background should be preceded examining the individuals' moral judgment. In fact, many studies including the present study questioned the sufficiency of Kohlberg's moral system since he did not considered cultural influence on moral development in depth.

Based on the above, the present study suggests that it would be necessary to consider children's moral reasoning in light of the theories of domain-specificity and cultural psychology as well as Kohlberg's theory in order to understand the development of moral reasoning more sufficiently. Accordingly, the present study suggests that the moral stages should include judgment based on individual harm which is elaborated with age. Concerning the development of moral reasoning of Koreans in particular, the present study suggests that further study should focus on how the concepts peculiar to Koreans, such as the restricted simple sympathy which extends to *chung* later on, develop and how they affect Koreans' moral development through life-span until adulthood and compare the findings with the claim of Kohlberg and domain specificity theorists.

## 11.7 CONCLUSION

The present study mainly focused on the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning, and relied on fables as an alternative method to Kohlberg's dilemmas to assess moral judgment. There are conclusions and suggestions in terms of the above

two aspects below.

Concerning the use of fables as an alternative method, the findings on children's ability to draw morals from fables suggest that it might not be appropriate to use fables intact as an alternative method to assess the development of moral reasoning with young children although the similar findings between the two studies in the present research support the possibility. The present study showed that the 7 year old children were able to make decisions and provide reasons for their decisions concerning characters and events in fables, and their responses were scorable with Kohlberg's manual. However, the findings of the present study also indicate that the 7 year old children tended to have difficulties in drawing hidden morals from fables, probably, because of the lack of understanding of figurative language. Therefore these findings suggest that, in order to assess moral reasoning in children as young as 7 years old, stories that explicitly reveal morals could be more useful than stories, such as fables, that use metaphor. Furthermore, the present study also suggests that fables modified to contain dilemmas rather than fables that have drawn a conclusion would be better to capture children's moral reasoning since cultural differences in chosen issues were found in the present and other studies. Concerning animal characters, there would be little problems since children seemed to be familiar with and enjoy stories that personify animals. Thus, the present study suggests that further empirical studies should consider the above points when developing an alternative method to assess children's development of moral reasoning.

As for the applicability of Kohlberg's theory to Koreans in particular, both the studies indicated that the Korean children's developmental patterns of moral judgment are

similar to those of the British children not only in terms of moral stages but also in the use of moral orientations in accordance with Kohlbergians' claim. Therefore, the claims that children developed their moral reasoning with age and that the developmental tendency could be captured through using Kohlberg's dilemmas seemed plausible. Additionally, similar developmental patterns of moral reasoning between the two cultures imply that Kohlberg's system could be applicable to those not only in Western societies but also in other cultures, such as the Korean culture, which are modernized but maintain their unique traditions and norms. However, it should be noted that some factors such as individuals' background and the content of stories could allow variation of the general development of moral reasoning, especially in terms of the moral orientations.

In spite of the applicability, the present study questioned the sufficiency of Kohlberg's theory based on the findings of the present study in connection with the theories of domain specificity and cultural psychology. First, Kohlberg's theory explains the justifications of moral judgment at early stages only based on authority and punishment avoidance. This seems insufficient since the present study as well as the studies of domain specificity theorists found that children at early moral stages tend to make moral judgments based on individual harm. Second, Kohlberg claimed universality of moral development without considering cultural influence on the development in depth. However, in line with the claim of cultural psychologists, the present study found the moral reasoning undoubtedly reflects culture. Without understanding his or her cultural background, an individual's moral reasoning could be misinterpreted.



In conclusion, Kohlberg's theory seems applicable but insufficient to assess the development of moral reasoning. Thus, the present study suggests that further research is needed to complement Kohlberg's theory especially in terms of the two aspects above.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A**

#### **I. KOHLBERG'S MORAL DILEMMAS (FORM A)**

##### **i. English Version**

1. Original Version

2. Modified Version for 7 year old Children

##### **ii. Korean Version**

#### **II. STANDARD SCORING SHEET**

### **APPENDIX B**

#### **I. AESOP'S FABLES AND QUESTIONS**

##### **i. English Version**

##### **ii. Korean Version**

## APPENDIX A

\*(Starred questions may be eliminated if time for interviewing is limited.)

### Dilemma III

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid £400 for the radium and charged £4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about £2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug? (Dilemma related)

1a. Why or why not?

Questions 2 and 3 are designed to elicit the subject's moral type and should be considered optional.

\*2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?

\*2a. Why is it right or wrong? (Dilemma related)

\*3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?

\*3a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)

4. [If subject originally favours stealing, ask:]

If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her?

4. [If subject originally favours not stealing, ask:]

Does it make a difference whether or not he loves his wife?

4a. Why or why not?

5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger.

5a. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger?

Why or why not?

\*6. [If subject favours stealing the drug for a stranger, ask:]

Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?

\*6a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)

7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life?

7a. Why or why not? (General issue)

\*8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?

\*8a. Why or why not? (Issue centered)

9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?

9a. Why or why not? (General issue)

9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do? (Issue centered)

\*10. In thinking over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do?

10a. Why? (Dilemma related)

### **\*Dilemma III'**

Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber.

\*1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing?



- \*1a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
- \*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then report him?
- \*2a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)

### **Dilemma III'**

Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury was selected. The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence.

- 3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should he suspend the sentence and let Heinz go free?
- 3a. Why is that best? (Dilemma related)
- 4. Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be punished?
- 4a. Why or why not? (General issue)
- 4b. How does this apply to how judge should decide? (Issue centred)
- 5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he stole the drug.

Should a lawbreaker be punished if he is acting out of conscience?

(General issue)

5a. Why or why not?

\*6. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for the judge to do? (Dilemma related)

\*6a. Why?

### **Dilemma I**

Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the £100 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money?

1a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)

\*2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?

- \*2a. Why or why not? (Dilemma related)
- \*3. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
- \*3a. Why or why not? (Issue centred)
- \*4. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation?
- \*4a. Why or why not? (Issue centred)
- 5. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money.  
Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the situation?
- 5a. Why or why not? (Issue centred)
- 6. In general, why should a promise be kept? (General issue)
- 7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and probably won't see again?
- 7a. Why or why not? (General issue)
- 8. What do you think is the most important thing a father should be concerned about in his relationship to his son?
- 8a. Why is that the most important thing? (General issue)
- 9. In general, what should be the authority of a father over his son?  
(General issue)

9a. Why?

10. What do you think is the most important thing a son should be concerned about in his relationship to his father?

10a. Why is that the most important thing? (General issue)

\*11. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Joe to do in this situation?

\*11a. Why?

**This is used for 7 years old children.**

\*(Starred questions may be eliminated if time for interviewing is limited.)

### **DILEMMA III**

In Europe, a woman was very ill so she was nearly dying. There was one medicine that the doctors thought might save her. It was made from radium and a chemist in the same town had made it a month ago. The medicine was expensive to make, but the chemist was charging ten times what the medicine cost him to make. He paid £400 for the radium and charged £4,000 for a small amount of the medicine. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about £2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the chemist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the chemist said, "No, I made the medicine and I'm going to make money from it." So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets

desperate and thinks of robbing the chemist's shop to steal the medicine for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the medicine?

1a. Why or why not?

\*2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the medicine?

\*2a. Why is it right or wrong?

3. [If subject originally favours stealing, ask:]

If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the medicine for her?

3. [If subject originally favours not stealing, ask:]

Does it matter whether or not he loves his wife?

3a. Why or why not?

4. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger.

4a. Should Heinz steal the medicine for the stranger?

Why or why not?

\*5. [If subject favours stealing the drug for a stranger, ask:]

Suppose It's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?

\*5a. Why or why not?

6. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life?

6a. Why or why not?

\*7. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Do you think Heinz really did something wrong?

\*7a. Why or why not?

8. Usually, should people try to do everything they can to keep the law?

8a. Why or why not?

8b. Then how should Heinz do in this story?

\*9. In thinking over the story, what would you say is the best thing for Heinz to do?

9a. Why?

**\*DILEMMA III'**

Heinz did break into the store. He stole the medicine and gave it to his wife. The next day the robbery was written in the newspapers. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the story of the robbery. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the medicine.

Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber.

\*1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing?

\*1a. Why or why not?

\*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then report him?

\*2a. Why or why not?

### **DILEMMA III'**

Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury was chosen. The jury's job is to find out if a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to put Heinz in a jail or let him go free.

3. Should the judge put Heinz in a jail or let Heinz go free?

3a. Why is that best?

4. For society, should people who break the law be punished?

4a. Why or why not?

4b. Then, how should the judge decide in this story?

5. Heinz stole the medicine because he thought it was right to steal.  
Should a lawbreaker be punished when he is doing something that he thought it was right?
- 5a. Why or why not?
- \*6. Thinking back over the story, what would you say is the best thing for the judge to do?
- \*6a. Why?

### **DILEMMA I**

Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to on a camping holiday very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper round and saved up the £100 it cost to go to camping and a little more besides. But just before the holiday was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his father's friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father wanted to go too. But the father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper round. Joe didn't want to give up going camping, so he thinks of not giving his father the money.

1. Should Joe give his father the money or not?
- 1a. Why or why not?



- \*2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
- \*2a. Why or why not?
- \*3. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
- \*3a. Why or why not?
- \*4. Joe earned the money himself. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this story?
- \*4a. Why or why not?
- 5. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money. Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the story?
- 5a. Why or why not?
- 6. Usually, why should a promise be kept?
- 7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and probably won't see again?
- 7a. Why or why not?
- 8. What do you think is the most important thing a father should keep in mind about the way he acts towards his son?
- 8a. Why is that the most important thing?
- 9. Usually, what should be the behaviour of a father over his son?

9a. Why?

10. What do you think is the most important thing a son should keep in mind about the way he acts towards his father?

10a. Why is that the most important thing?

\*11. In thinking back over the story, what would you say is the best thing for Joe to do in this story?

\*11a. Why?

어느 동네에 양에 쫓겨 죽어가는 여자가 있었습니다. 의사는 이 여자의 생명을 구할 수 있는 약이 하나 있다고 하였습니다. 그 약은 같은 동네에 사는 약사가 약 한 통 전에 '라동'으로 만든 것이었습니다. 그 약을 만드는 데도 비싸게 먹히지만, 약사는 그 약을 만드는 데 10배나 비싸게 판다고 하였습니다. 즉, 약을 만드는 데는 50만 원이 들었지만, 작은 약 한 통지에 500만 원을 판다고 하였습니다. 그 병은 여자의 남편 최용준은 그가 알고 있는 모든 사람에게 가서 돈을 벌려고 또 모든 합법적인 (법에 어긋나지 않는) 방법을 다 써 봤지만, 그 약 값의 절반인 250만 원 밖에 구하지 못하였습니다. 그는 약사에게 가서 자신의 아내가 죽어가고 있다고 말하며 약 값을 깎아 주거나 외상으로 부탁하였 습니다. 그러나 약사는 "안 됩니다. 나는 이약을 만들었고 이 약으로 돈을 벌 것 입니다."라고 말했습니다. 그래서 최용준은 합법적인 (법에 어긋나지 않는) 모든 방법을 다 해 보았으나 끝내 최용준이 그 약사의 가게를 부수고 돌아가 부인을 위해 약을 훔치려고 생각하였습니다.

## 참고

1. 최용준은 약을 훔쳐야만 할니까?

1-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

2. 최용준이 약을 훔치는 것은 실제로 좋은 일입니까, 그를 원입니까?

2-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

3. 최용준은 약을 훔쳐야 할 의무나 책임이 있습니까?

3-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

4. (만약 훔치는 것에 반대한다면)

최용준이 아내를 사랑하느냐 안 하느냐가 그 약을 훔치느냐 마느냐 하는 것 에 어떤 영향을 끼칩니까?

4-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

5. 아내가 아닌 어느 낯선 사람이 죽어 가고 있었다면, 최용준은 그 사람을 위해 약을 훔쳐야만 합니까?

5-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

\*6. (낯선 사람을 위해 약을 훔쳐야 한다고 생각한다면)

죽어가고 있는 것이 사람이 아니라 그가 사랑하는 애완 (집에서 기르는) 동물이라면, 최용준은 그 동물을 구하기 위해 약을 훔쳐야 합니까?

\*6-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

7. 한 사람의 생명을 구하기 위해 자기가 할 수 있는 한 모든 일을 다 해 보는 것이 중요합니까?

7-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

\*8. 최용준이 약을 훔치는 것은 법에 어긋나는 일입니다. 이것이 도덕적으로도 틀립니까?

\*8-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

9. 일반적으로(보통), 사람들이 법을 지키기 위해서 할 수 있는 한 모든 것을 다 해야 된다고 생각합니까?

9-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

9-2. 최용준의 경우에는 어떻게 적용됩니까?

(그렇다면 최용준은 어떻게 해야 합니까?)

\*10. 다시 이야기로 돌아가서 최용준이 어떻게 했어야지 가장 책임감있게 행동했다고 생각합니까?

\*10-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

## 두번째 이야기

최용준은 그 약국을 부수고 들어가 약을 훔쳐 와서는 자기 아내에게 주었습니다. 다음 날 신문에 그 도둑질에 관한 이야기가 실렸습니다. 최용준을 알고 지내던

경찰관인 박인호씨가 그 이야기를 보게 되었습니다. 박인호씨는 최용준이 그 약국에서 나와 도망가는 것을 봤던 것을 기억하고 최용준이 그 약을 훔친 사람이라는 것을 깨달았습니다. 박인호씨는 최용준이 도둑이라는 것을 신고해야 하는지 말아야 하는지 고민 중입니다.

#### 질문

\*1. 박인호 경찰관은 최용준이 훔쳤다고 신고해야 합니까?

\*1-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

\*2. 박인호 경찰관이 최용준의 친한 친구라고 할 때, 경찰관은 최용준을 신고해야 합니까?

\*2-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

#### 계속되는 두번째 이야기

박인호 경찰관은 최용준을 신고하였습니다. 최용준은 체포되었고 재판을 받게 되었습니다. 배심원 한 명이 결정되었습니다. 배심원의 역할은 어느 사람이 어떤 범죄와 관련되어 유죄나 무죄나를 (죄가 있느냐 없느냐를) 찾아 내는 것입니다. 그 배심원은 최용준에게 죄가 있다는 것을 찾아 냈습니다. 이제 판결을 내리는 것은 재판관에게 달려 있습니다.

#### 질문

3. 재판관은 최용준에게 형량을 (벌을) 주어야 합니까? 아니면 형량 내리는 것을 보류하고 (벌 주는 것을 미루고) 최용준을 석방해야 합니까 (그냥 내보내야 합니까?)

3-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

4. 사회를 생각 할 때, 법을 어긴 사람은 처벌을 받아야 합니까?

4-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

4-2. 이 이야기에서 그 생각이 재판관이 결정을 내리는데 있어서 어떻게 적용될니까?

5. 최용준은 양심의 소리에 따라 악을 훔쳤습니다. 만약 양심에 따라 한 행동이 법을 어기는 것이 됐을 때, 그 행동을 한 사람은 벌을 받아야 합니까?

5-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

\*6. 이야기로 돌아가서 재판관이 어떻게 했어야지 가장 책임감있게 판결을 내렸다고 생각합니까?

\*6-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

### 세번째 이야기

14 살 소년인 진석이는 캠프에 무척 참가하고 (가고) 싶었습니다. 진석이 아버지는 진석이가 스스로 돈을 모은다면 캠프에 참가 할 수 있도록 해 주겠다고 약속하였습니다. 그래서 진석이는 열심히 신문 배달을 하여 캠프에 드는 돈보다 조금 더 많은 10 만 원을 모았습니다. 그러나 캠프를 떠나기 바로 전에 진석이 아버지가 마음을 바꾸었습니다. 아버지 친구들 몇 명이 특별한 낚시 여행을 가기로 결정하였는데 (진석이 아버지도 낚시 여행을 가고 싶어하였습니다. 그러나) 진석이 아버지는 거기에 드는 돈이 모자랐습니다. 그래서 아버지는 진석이에게 진석이가 신문 배달로 모은 돈을 달라고 말하였습니다. 진석이는 캠프가는 것을 포기하고 싶지 않기 때문에 아버지에게 돈을 주지 않을 생각입니다.

### 질문

1. 진석이는 아버지에게 자신이 모은 돈을 주지 않아야 합니까?

1-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

\*2. 아버지는 진석이에게 진석이가 모은 돈을 아버지에게 주도록 말할 권리가 있습니까?

\*2-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

\*3. 자신이 모은 돈을 아버니에게 주는 것이 착한 아들이 되는 것과 무슨 관계가 있습니까?

\*3-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

- \*4. 진석이 자신이 스스로 돈을 벌었다는 사실이 이 이야기에서 중요합니까?
- \*4-1. 왜 그렇습니까?
  
- 5. 아버지는 진석이가 스스로 돈을 번다면 캠프에 가게 해 주겠다고 약속했습니다. 아버지가 이렇게 약속한 사실이 이 이야기에서 가장 중요합니까?
- 5-1. 왜 그렇습니까?
  
- 6. 일반적으로 왜 약속을 지켜야만 합니까?
  
- 7. 다시는 못 볼 수도 있는 낯선 사람과 한 약속을 지키는 것은 중요합니까?
- 7-1. 왜 그렇습니까?
  
- 8. 아버지가 아들과의 관계를 생각할 때 마음에 꼭 새겨 두어야 할 가장 중요한 것은 무엇이라고 생각합니까?
- 8-1. 왜 그것이 가장 중요합니까?
  
- 9. 일반적으로 (보통) 아들에 대한 아버지의 권위는 어떠해야 합니까?
- 9-1. 왜 그렇습니까?
  
- 10. 아들이 아버지와 관계를 생각할 때 마음에 꼭 새겨 두어야 할 가장 중요한 것은 무엇이라고 생각합니까?
- 10-1. 왜 그것이 가장 중요합니까?
  
- \*11. 다시 이야기로 돌아가서 이 이야기에서 진석이가 어떻게 했어야지 가장 책임감 있게 했다고 생각합니까?
- \*11-1. 왜 그렇습니까?

## STANDARD SCORING SHEET

FORM A (Circle Chosen Issue)

Dilemma III

LIFE			LAW		
Q#	CJ#/ norm & element	stage (notes)	Q#	CJ#/norm &element	stage (notes)
ISSUE SCORE			ISSUE SCORE		

Dilemma III'

MORALITY & CONSCIENCE			PUNISHMENT		
Q#	CJ#/norm &element	stage (notes)	Q#	CJ#/norm &element	stage (notes)
ISSUE SCORE			ISSUE SCORE		

Dilemma I

CONTRACT			AUTHORITY		
Q#	CJ#/norm &element	stage (notes)	Q#	CJ#/norm &element	stage (notes)
ISSUE SCORE			ISSUE SCORE		

Summated  
Weights  
from Issue

1 \_\_\_\_\_  
2 \_\_\_\_\_  
3 \_\_\_\_\_  
4 \_\_\_\_\_  
5 \_\_\_\_\_

Overall Protocol Score

Global \_\_\_\_\_  
WAS \_\_\_\_\_



## APPENDIX B

### STORY I; THE ASS CARRYING SALT

An ass crossing a stream with a load of salt on his back lost his footing and slipped into the water, so that all of the salt was dissolved. The ass was pleased to find himself relieved of his burden when he got up on his legs again. Provoked by the loss, his master drove the ass back to market and loaded him with fresh goods. When they came to the same stream, the lazy ass, desiring to make light of his load, conspired to dunk himself in the water on purpose. However, this time the ass was loaded with sponges instead of salt. No sooner was he in the water when the sponges became soaked through and, instead of lightening his burden, they more than doubled the weight of his load.

### Questions for Fables

1. Do you understand the stories?
2. Can you draw any lesson from the story?

If you say "Yes", what is the lesson that teaches us?

3. Do you like the stories? Why/why not?
4. Do you like the ass? Why/why not?

5. Do you like the conclusion? Why/why not?
6. If you could change the story, what do you want the story to be like?
7. Have you ever heard or read this story before? Yes/No
8. How important do you think is the lesson given by the story? Why/why not?

## **STORY II; THE GOOSE AND THE GOLDEN EGGS**

A farmer had the good fortune to possess a goose that laid golden eggs. Every day the farmer went to the barn and would find an egg of pure gold. But as the farmer grew rich he also grew greedy. He was too impatient to wait for wealth to come in driblets, and, thinking that the bird's inside must be solid gold, he made haste to kill it. One night the farmer cut the goose open. Not only were his hopes disappointed, but he got no more golden eggs. There was nothing inside the goose but ordinary flesh and blood.

### **Questions for Fables**

1. Do you understand the stories?
2. Can you draw any lesson from the story?

If you say "Yes", what is the lesson that teaches us?

3. Do you like the stories? Why/why not?
4. Do you like the farmer? Why/why not?
5. Do you like the conclusion? Why/why not?
6. If you could change the story, what do you want the story to be like?
7. Have you ever heard or read this story before? Yes/ No
8. How important do you think is the lesson given by the story? Why/why not?

### **STORY III; THE FARMER AND THE VULTURE**

A farmer who found a wounded vulture cured it and let it go free afterwards. The vulture showed him that it was not ungrateful for this treatment. Seeing him sitting one day under a crumbling rock, it flew up and snatched in its talons the hat that he was wearing. The man jumped up and pursued it: the vulture then dropped the hat and he picked it up and complained of the vulture=s behaviour. On returning he found how wonderfully the bird had repaid his kindness. The rock had collapsed just where he had been sitting.

### **Questions for Fables**

1. Do you understand the stories?

2. Can you draw any lesson from the story?

If you say "Yes", what is the lesson that teaches us?

3. Do you like the stories? Why/why not?

4. Do you like the farmer? Why/why not?

5. Do you like the vulture? Why/why not?

6. Do you like the conclusion? Why/why not?

7. If you could change the story, what do you want the story to be like?

8. Have you ever heard or read this story before? Yes/No

9. How important do you think is the lesson given by the story? Why/why not?

## KOREAN VERSION

## 소금을 나르는 당나귀

어느 더운 여름 날 당나귀가 무거운 소금을 지고 개울을 건너고 있었습니다. 기울한 가운데쯤 들어 갔을 때 당나귀는 발을 헛디뎈 미끄러지고 말았습니다. 당나귀는 한참을 허우적 거리다가 겨우 일어섰습니다. 그런데 이게 웬 일인지요? 그 무겁던 짐이 가뿐해진 것이었습니다. 소금이 모두 물에 녹아 버렸기 때문입니다. “아, 물에 빠졌다 일어나면 짐이 가벼워지는구나.” 이렇게 생각한 당나귀는 집으로 돌아오며 기뻐했습니다. 며칠 후 당나귀는 숨을 나르게 되었습니다. 숨은 소금보다 훨씬 가벼웠지만 당나귀는 그것보다 더 가볍게 만들고 싶었습니다. 개울에 이르자 당나귀는 일부러 물 속에 털썩 주저 앉았습니다. “이진 훨씬 가벼워졌겠지?”라고 생각한 당나귀는 물속에서 일어나려고 하였지만 쉽게 일어날 수가 없었습니다. 물에 흠뻑 젖은 숨은 녹기는 커녕 엄청나게 무거워졌기 때문입니다. 결국 당나귀는 더 무거운 짐을 지고 가야만 했습니다.

## 물어 보는 말

1. 이 이야기를 얼마나 이해 했나요?
2. 이 이야기에서 얻어지는 교훈 (배울 점)은 무엇인가요? 만약 교훈 (배울 점)이 있다면, 그 교훈 (배울 점)은 무엇인가요?
3. 이 이야기를 얼마나 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?
4. 이 이야기에 나오는 당나귀를 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?
5. 이 이야기의 결론을 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?
6. 만약 이야기의 내용을 바꿀 수 있다면 이야기의 내용이 어떻게 바뀌었으면 좋겠나요?
7. 이 이야기를 전에 들어보거나 읽어 본 적이 있나요?
8. 이 이야기에서 얻는 교훈 (배울 점)이 얼마나 중요하다고 생각하나요? 왜 그런가요?

### 황금알을 낳는 거위

어느 농부가 거위 한 마리를 샀습니다. 농부는 거위를 열심히 키웠습니다. 어느 날 거위 둥지에 가 본 농부는 깜짝 놀랐습니다. “아니, 이게 뭐야? 이건 황금알이잖아?” 거위가 황금알을 낳았던 것입니다. 그 후 거위는 날마다 황금알 한 개씩을 낳았습니다. 농부는 황금알을 시장에 내다 팔아 순식간에 부자가 되었습니다. 부자가 된 농부는 한꺼번에 더 큰 부자가 되고 싶었습니다. “가만있자... 저 거위가 매일 황금알을 하나씩 낳는 걸 보면 분명 뱃속에는 황금알이 가득 들어 있을꺼야.” 욕심이 생긴 농부는 거위의 배를 갈랐습니다. 하지만 뱃속에는 생기다만 작은 알 하나가 들어있었을 뿐이었습니다. 그 후 농부는 두 번 다시 황금알을 얻을 수 없었습니다.

### 물어 보는 말

1. 이 이야기를 얼마나 이해 했나요?
2. 이 이야기에서 얻어지는 교훈 (배울 점)은 무엇인가요? 만약 교훈 (배울 점)이 있다면, 그 교훈 (배울 점)은 무엇인가요?
3. 이 이야기를 얼마나 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?
4. 이 이야기에 나오는 농부를 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?
5. 이 이야기의 결론을 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?
6. 만약 이야기의 내용을 바꿀 수 있다면 이야기의 내용이 어떻게 바뀌었으면 좋겠나요?
7. 이 이야기를 전에 들어보거나 읽어 본 적이 있나요?
8. 이 이야기에서 얻는 교훈 (배울 점)이 얼마나 중요하다고 생각하나요? 왜 그런가요?

### 농부를 구해준 독수리

하루 일을 마치고 돌아가던 한 농부가 길가에 쓰러져 있는 독수리를 발견했습니다. “아니, 웬 독수리가 이렇게 많이 다쳤지? 아유, 무쌍도 해라.” 농부는 독수



관가요?

9. 이 이야기에서 얻는 교훈 (배를 점)이 얼마나 중요하다고 생각하나요? 왜 그

8. 이 이야기를 전에 읽어보거나 읽어 볼 적이 있나요?

했나요?

7. 만약 이야기의 내용을 바꿀 수 있다면 이야기의 내용이 어떻게 바뀌었으면 좋

6. 이 이야기의 결말을 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?

5. 이 이야기에 나오는 독수리를 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?

4. 이 이야기에 나오는 독부를 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?

3. 이 이야기를 얼마나 좋아하나요? 왜 그런가요?

있다면, 그 교훈 (배를 점)은 무엇인가요?

2. 이 이야기에서 얻어지는 교훈 (배를 점)은 무엇인가요? 만약 교훈 (배를 점)이

1. 이 이야기를 얼마나 이해 했나요?

를어 보는 램

관을 흔들었습니다. 독수리는 천천히 독부의 머리 위를 돌고 있었습니다. 왼쪽 뺨 해구나. 독수리가 미리 알고 나를 살려 주었어.” 독부는 독수리를 향해 “우르릉 왕!” 독부가 기대고 있었던 큰 바위가 갑자기 무너져 내렸습니다. “큰 해를 해!” 독부는 화를 내며 왼쪽 모자를 찾아 들었습니다. 그 때였습니다. 자를 떨어뜨렸습니다. “응해도 모르는 독수리 같으니라고! 중 쉬려고 했더니 밤 바로 그 독수리였습니다. 독수리는 한참을 천아가다가 발 한 가운데에 왼쪽 모 가 오더니 독부의 왼쪽 모자를 들고 돌아갔습니다. 왼쪽 독부가 치료해 준 처에 있는 큰 바위에 등을 기대고 앉았습니다. 잠시 후 큰 독수리 한 마리가 다 열심히 왕을 하고 있었습니다. “아 힘들다. 잠시 쉬었다 해야겠어.” 독부는 큰 숲 속으로 돌아갔습니다. 어느덧 왼쪽 뺨이 지났습니다. 그 날도 독부는 밭에서 리를 안고 집으로 돌아왔습니다. 며칠이 지나자 독수리는 예전처럼 건강해져서